Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/36/q/bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether there is a connection among the vices and sins.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether there is a connection among the vices and sins. And that there is, it seems.

1. *Ecclesiastes* the ninth: *He who sins in one will lose many good things*; but this would not be, unless many evils accompanied one evil committed: therefore it seems that it is necessary to posit a connection of the vices.

2. Likewise, *James* the second: *He who offends in one is made guilty of all*; but no one is judged guilty of all the divine commandments, except him who sins against all the commandments: therefore he who sins against one sins against the rest: it seems therefore that the vices are connected.

3. Likewise, just as a vice is not expelled except by the introduction of the virtue opposed to it, so neither is a virtue except by the introduction of a vice; but when someone commits one sin, the other virtues are lost: therefore when someone commits one sin, the other sins are introduced: therefore just as there is a connection on the side of the virtues, so it seems there is on the side of the vices.

4. Likewise, just as by the infusion of one grace the whole image is reformed, so by the perpetration of one sin the whole image is deformed; but for the reformation of the image according to the whole there is necessarily required the totality of the virtues: therefore likewise to the deformation of the whole image there concurs the totality of the vices: therefore just as all the virtues follow upon the grace that reforms the image, so all the vices follow upon the fault that deforms the image.

5. Likewise, just as originally all the virtues are

born from grace and are commanded by charity, so all the vices are born from concupiscence and are commanded by pride, which is the queen of all the vices: therefore just as a connection is posited among the virtues on account of the unity of origin and root, so likewise it seems that it ought to be posited on the side of the vices; since wherever such a cause is found, there such an effect ought to be found.

6. Likewise, virtue and vice are immediate opposites concerning their subject — for there is no giving a middle, since a man is either God's friend or God's enemy — therefore when virtue is absent, vice opposed to it must be present; but when virtue is absent, it is absent universally: therefore when vice is present, it is present universally: therefore the vices too have a connection, just as the gratuitous virtues do.

**On the contrary:**

1. According to the diversity of vices there is a diversity of punishments: therefore if there were a connection among the vices, such that he who had one vice would have all; then he who had one sin would undergo every punishment; which is manifestly against the divine justice.

2. Likewise, the vices and sins are from our work; but there is no connection in the works of the vices outwardly perpetrated: therefore neither is there a connection in the vices inwardly left behind.

3. Likewise, no one sins by any kind of sin except willingly; but there are many who commit some vice, and yet utterly detest some kind of sin, as many entangled in spiritual sins utterly detest the carnal ones: therefore the vices are not connected.

4. Likewise, the vices are mutually opposed, as avarice to prodigality, and audacity to faint-heartedness; but *« two opposites cannot be at the same time in the same thing »*: therefore it is impossible for the vices and sins to have a connection.

> **Conclusion.** The vices and sins do not have a connection; yet it can be said that on the side of aversion they are in some way connected.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since to a sin two things concur, namely aversion and conversion, it happens in two ways to compare the vices and sins to one another: either insofar as they turn away from the one unchangeable Good, or insofar as they turn toward changeable goods. — If therefore we speak of the vices according as they turn away from the one unchangeable Good, then they deprive a man of grace and of the other gratuitous virtues and make a man deserving to be deprived of glory and of the reward corresponding to all good merits; and this indeed comes about through one vice just as through the rest. *(Conclusion 1.)* And as to this the vices and sins have a certain connection, for the reason that they turn away from one, and by all vices one and the same God is offended.

But if we speak of the vices as to conversion, then by conversions to diverse changeable goods there arise in us diverse proclivities and vices, by which we are bound to diverse penal sufferings. *(Conclusion 2.)* And in this way there is no connection among the vices, because for each one a man will be punished by a special punishment due to him; nor moreover can they be connected on account of the repugnance of the proclivities; nor do they have a cause on account of which they should be connected, because they arise from diverse works and tend to diverse ends. Since therefore the vices take their origin and distinction on the side of conversion, and on this side do not have a connection, although in some way they agree in aversion; *(Conclusion 3.)* it must be conceded without qualification that the vices and sins are not connected, as the reasons for this side show.

**To the opposite:**

*To 1, 2.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of *Ecclesiastes* and the authority of *James* — that he who sins in one loses many good things, and even becomes guilty as to all — it must be said *(Reason 1.)* that this is not said because, on account of one vice, someone incurs the proclivities and defectibilities of the other vices necessarily and immediately; but this is said because he who sins by one sin loses charity, in which is the fullness of merits and the fulfillment of the commandments. — *(Reason 2.)* Or certainly it is said that he loses many good things and becomes guilty as to all, for the reason that he is deprived of all the gratuitous virtues. — *(Reason 3.)* Or in a third way, because he loses all the merits which he previously had; for by one mortal sin all things become useless for attaining

glory. — *(Reason 4.)* Or in a fourth way he is said to lose many good things and to be guilty of all, because by the desert of one sin he loses the eternal rewards which were to be rendered to all the virtues and merits: but this is not on account of the connection of the vices themselves, but rather on account of the connection of the virtues and gifts or rewards corresponding to them; on account of which connection, if anyone is deprived of one of those goods, he must necessarily be deprived of the rest also. But this does not suffice to make a connection among the vices, because, as was said above, the vices consist not only in aversion from God, but also in conversion to a changeable good.

*To 3.* To that which is objected — that a virtue is not expelled except by the introduction of the vice opposed to it, just as neither is a vice except by the introduction of a virtue — it must be said *(Reason 1.)* that it is not alike: because more is required for building up than for destroying, and more things are necessary for a man to please God than for him to displease, and through this too more things are necessary for setting straight than for bending awry. *(Note.)* And therefore, although the bending-awry of a vice cannot be excluded except by a habit directly opposed to it, nevertheless the rectitude of a virtue can be taken away not only by the vice opposed to it, but also by one opposed to another virtue; whence unbelief, which is opposed to faith, excludes charity. And therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other. — *(Reason 2.)* Moreover, because the virtues are connected, therefore a vice which removes one consequently removes the remaining one; but the vices, because they are not connected, cannot be removed except by each one being expelled by the virtue directly opposed to it.

*To 4.* To that which is objected — that a sin deforms the whole image, just as grace reforms it — it must be said *(Twofold deformation.)* that the image is said to be deformed in two ways: either on account of the absence of the light of grace, or on account of the disordering in the acts of those powers in which the image is regarded. In the first way indeed the whole image is deformed by one sin and vice; in the second way not, because not every vice regards the acts of the several powers. But grace, when it reforms the soul, reforms it in both ways, both by beautifying the face of the soul itself and by setting straight every power with respect to its operation. And therefore, although in the informing by grace the other virtues concur, nevertheless the several vices do not in this way accompany the deformation by one sin.

*To 5.* To that which is objected — that all the vices are born from concupiscence and are commanded by pride, just as the virtues from charity and grace — it must be said that it is not alike: both because concupiscence is not a sufficient cause with respect to the vices, but only a disposing one; *(Note.)* and also because, since concupiscence branches out with respect to diverse objects of desire, it looks toward diverse ends and frequently tends to contraries; whence there is there a dispersion rather than a connection. But grace is a sufficient origin of the virtues, and charity moves and inclines them all to one end. And therefore the vices are not connected as the gratuitous virtues are, both from the defect of principle and also from the defect of a uniting bond.

*To 6.* To that which is objected — that virtue and vice are immediate opposites — it must be said *(Distinction.)* that of virtue and vice it happens to speak in two ways: either in general, or in particular. If we speak in general, then they are immediately opposed concerning their subject; but if in particular, then they are not immediately opposed, for the reason that it is not necessary that someone have gratuitous continence, or be lustful; and so it is to be understood concerning the other vices and virtues. And therefore, although, virtue being absent, vice is necessarily present, it does not however follow that, every gratuitous virtue being absent, on account of this all the vices are present. — And if you object that, as a vice stands with respect to virtue, so a species of this vice stands with respect to the virtue opposed to it: it must be said that it is not alike: *(Note.)* because all the gratuitous virtues are to be united in one formal element, by reason of which all vices are opposed to it and can stand with none; but when they are distinguished into species, this is by reason of special habits, by reason of which not just any virtue is opposed to just any vice, but to the one opposed to it. And therefore there is one mode of comparing vice to gratuitous virtue in general, and another in particular; and therefore that reasoning does not compel.

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