Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/36/q/bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q5
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### Question V. *Whether equality is to be posited among the gratuitous habits.*

Fifthly it is asked whether equality is to be posited among the gratuitous habits. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, from that which is said in *Revelation* twenty-one: *The sides of the city are equal*; the Gloss: that is, the gratuitous virtues are equal. — For this very point an authority is had in the text, and above, in the twenty-fifth distinction, a very express authority was had.

2. Likewise, this very thing seems [so] by reason. Wherever there is one account of goodness, it is necessary that there be an equality of goodness; but in all the gratuitous habits there is one account of goodness, namely grace making [one] pleasing and charity itself: therefore it seems that there is in them simply an equality of goodness.

3. Likewise, either the virtues in the same [man] are equal, or not. If so, I have what was proposed. If not: then to the better virtue is owed a greater reward, and to the lesser a lesser one; but to the motion of a virtue is owed a substantial reward, and that is one: therefore to one and the same man in the same state of grace is owed a greater and a lesser reward; which is unfitting.

4. Likewise, one virtue denominates another, as Augustine and Bernard hold — for prudence is brave, and fortitude prudent — therefore either prudence and fortitude are equal, or not. If not, let it be then that prudence is greater than fortitude; then it is argued thus: prudence is greater than fortitude: therefore fortitude is more prudent than it is brave in the same [man], because according to the quantity of prudence in the same [man] is fortitude prudent; but the more the virtue of fortitude is the more prudent, the more noble and excellent it is: if therefore it is more prudent than brave: therefore it is more noble and excellent than itself. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *First to the Corinthians*, thirteen: *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity*; and in the preceding chapter: *I yet show you a more excellent way*: if therefore charity is greater and more excellent than the others: therefore there is no equality among the gratuitous habits.

2. Likewise, of every Confessor it is sung: *There was not found one like him, who kept the Law of the Most High*; but if all the gratuitous gifts were equal, then he who excelled in one would excel in all: therefore if that word could truly be attributed to anyone, it would never fit another, because *« that which is said by superabundance belongs to one alone »*.

3. Likewise, to a greater good is opposed a greater evil, and conversely, because *« privations are known through habits »*: therefore since the vices opposed to the virtues do not have equality, since one vice is greater than another; by like reasoning it seems that neither [do] the gratuitous virtues.

4. Likewise, habits grow and are augmented in us, according as we dispose ourselves more and more by good acts; but we see that someone exercises himself more in the act of one virtue than in the act of another: therefore it seems that that virtue grows more than the others: therefore it is necessary that sometimes that virtue be unequal to the others.

5. Likewise, charity is the bond of persons and is the bond of virtues — for many persons

are bound by the bond of grace in one virtue, and many virtues in one man — as therefore one virtue stands with respect to diverse persons, so one man with respect to many virtues; but one virtue can be participated unequally by diverse persons: therefore also many virtues by the same man.

6. Likewise, [the function] of the habit of virtue is to enable for its own act, speaking *per se*; therefore [the function] of a greater virtue [is] to enable more, and of an equal one to enable equally: if therefore all the virtues in the same man are equal, necessarily the same man will be equally enabled and ready for the acts of all the virtues, which by experience is found to be false. For many are enabled for the act of abstinence, who nevertheless have the use of patience and obedience with difficulty.

> **Conclusion.** By a twofold way it is shown that the gratuitous virtues are in a certain manner equal, in a certain manner unequal, yet can simply be called equal.

**I respond:** It must be said that of the gratuitous habits themselves it happens to speak in two ways: either with respect to the habit itself, or with respect to its exercise. *(Way 1, with distinction.)* — If we speak of them with respect to the habit, this can be in two ways: *(Subdistinction.)* either with respect to the grace informing and in a certain manner causing [them], or with respect to free choice receiving and cooperating. — *(Conclusion 1.)* If with respect to the informing grace; thus all have equality, for the reason that grace making [one] pleasing, according to its own quantity and excellence, renders the soul pleasing to God, and its powers and habits, and meritorious operations. — But if we speak of them with respect to free choice consenting and receiving; thus, because free choice finds a greater complacency in the act of one virtue than in another, and finds a greater repugnance in one than in another, according to its diverse inclinations and dispositions; *(Conclusion 2.)* thus it is not so as to find in every way equality in the habits of the virtues, for the reason that free choice grows more fervent toward one virtue than toward another, and also adheres more to one virtue than to another.

But if we speak of the virtues with respect to exercise; *(Conclusion 3.)* thus they are scarcely or never made equal, neither in themselves nor in comparison to the cooperation of free choice. *(Reasons.)* — In themselves not, because the exercise of one virtue is more fruitful than the exercise of another, as the exercise of piety than [that] of abstinence; and the exercise of one virtue in the same [man] is more secure than the exercise of another, as the exercise of humility and of fear than [that] of another virtue. — Likewise they do not have equality in comparison to the cooperation of free choice, because there is no one who exercises himself equally in the act of all the virtues. For some are more free for the active [life], others rather for the contemplative.

*(Epilogue.)* And thus it can be granted that the gratuitous habits are in a certain manner equal, and in a certain manner unequal: equal indeed with respect to the informing grace, as the reasons for the first part show; but unequal in comparison to the consent of free choice and the exterior exercise. And according to this the reasons which are brought for either part can be resolved.

*(Way 2, with a fourfold distinction and conclusion.)* Otherwise it can be said that of the virtues there is to speak in a fourfold manner: either with respect to *dignity* in regard to the object; and thus one is more excellent than another, even in the same [man], as the theological virtues than the cardinal. Or with respect to *fervor* and *facility* in regard to the proper act; and thus it is still not necessary that the gratuitous habits be made equal in the same [man]. Or with respect to *rootedness* and *stability* in regard to the subject; and thus it is still not necessary that there be equality, because such rootedness comes from frequency and habituation about the act of some virtue. Or with respect to *order* and *efficacy* in regard to the reward; and with respect to this they have equality in the same [man]; on account of this, that the quantity of the merit of any virtue is measured according to the quantity of grace, which makes the work pleasing to God, and according to the quantity of charity, which gives to the work of any virtue value and weight. *(Twofold reason.)* And because there is one grace making [one] pleasing, informing the other virtues in one man; there is also one charity inclining to the end by way of weight: hence it is that, with respect to the order to the end and the efficacy of meriting, it is necessary that all the virtues in the same [man] be made equal. — Again, because the principal and essential goodness of the virtues is regarded in this, that they order and dispose to the highest reward; and in this the virtues are to be made equal: *(Conclusion 4.)* hence it is that the Master simply concludes, and the Saints say, that in one and the same [man] all the gratuitous habits are equal. — And therefore the reasons which show this can simply be granted. To the objections to the contrary the response is sufficiently easy through the things which have been said.

*(Solution of the opposing [arguments].)* 1. For to that which is first objected concerning charity, that it is more eminent than the others; it must be said that this

is understood by reason of [its] exercise in its act, in which more is drawn from grace, and there is less occasion of being endangered. *(Note.)* For the affection of divine love, while it draws away from earthly things, makes [one] withdraw from the occasion of sin; while indeed it unites [one] to heavenly things, it makes the moisture of the grace of the Holy Spirit be drawn thence. And therefore from this no inequality of the virtues is concluded with respect to merit.

2. To that which is objected, that it is sung of the Confessors: *There was not found one like him*; it must be said that that is understood not by reason of habit, but by reason of some exterior use; and the very word suggests this, when it is said: *who kept the Law of the Most High*; from which it suggests that that excellence is to be understood in the work.

3. To that which is objected, that to a greater good is opposed a greater evil; it must be said that that is not regularly true, nay sometimes it happens that a greater evil is opposed to a lesser good, as despair, which is opposed to hope, is worse than hatred, which is opposed to charity. *(Note.)* Moreover, the virtues have their equality from one source, [and] the diversity of their opposites from another. For they have equality on the side of grace, by reason of which what is opposed to one virtue is consequently opposed to all; but they have the diversity of opposites by reason of special acts and objects; and from that side it is not necessary that the habits of the virtues have equality in every way, as was touched on before.

4. To that which is objected, that habits grow and are augmented in us, according as we dispose ourselves more by acts; it must be said that the increase of a habit with respect to essential goodness in the gratuitous genus is regarded from the augmentation of grace itself, which being augmented, the other virtues also grow. When therefore it is said that we exercise ourselves more in the act of one virtue than in the act of another, therefore we grow more in that one; it must be said that it does not follow, for the reason that the due use and exercise in the act of one virtue disposes to the increase of all. Whence just as in a community of brotherhood, although one trades more in acquiring than another, nevertheless the goods acquired are distributed equally to all; so also in its own manner is it to be understood in the matter at hand.

5. To that which is objected, that one virtue can be participated in diverse ways by diverse persons, therefore also diverse virtues by the same [man]; it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that of one virtue in diverse [persons] the roots are diverse; but of diverse virtues in the same [man] the roots are not diverse, but one, namely one grace, through which there is acceptance, and one charity, through which there is the perfection of merit.

6. To that which is objected, that [the function] of the habit of virtue is to render the power ready; it must be said that the greater and lesser facility of a power toward some act comes not only from the side of the perfection and goodness of the habit itself, but also from the side of the disposition of the subject. *(Note.)* Whence, according as free choice cooperates more and less toward the acts of diverse virtues, according to this it is made ready more and less, although the habits of the virtues, as far as is of themselves, are made equal. *(Note.)* Whence neither this reasoning nor the others prove inequality among the gratuitous habits with respect to essential and completive goodness, but only with respect to something accidental and annexed, as from the things which have been said before is sufficiently manifest.