Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/36/q/bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q6
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### Question VI. *Whether charity is the form of the virtues.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether charity is the form of the virtues. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, from that which is said in *Romans* one: *Justice is revealed from faith unto faith*; there the Gloss: « *Faith is [the faith] of demons and of Christians in name only. This is an unformed quality of the mind, which is therefore called unformed because it has not charity as its companion, which is the form of all the virtues* ».

2. Likewise, this is shown by that which is said in the Gloss on *Galatians* five: *But the fruit of the Spirit is charity* etc.; there the Gloss: « *Note that in the enumeration of the fruits he set before [them] the head of the virtues, that is, charity. For what else among the fruits of the Spirit ought to hold the primacy, except charity, without which the other virtues are not reckoned to be virtues* »: if therefore the other virtues without charity are not reckoned to be virtues, therefore that they be true virtues, this they have from charity: therefore from charity itself they have completion and information.

3. Likewise, this very thing seems [so] by *reason*: « *For the affection imposes the name upon the work* »: therefore no work can be right unless the affection is first set right; but the affection cannot be right unless it love God for his own sake and above all things, and this is through charity: therefore every work, of whatever virtue it be, if it is right and good, this it has from charity. Since therefore the act of charity informs all right works, it seems that charity itself also informs all the other virtues, since, as act stands to act, so habit [stands] to habit.

4. Likewise, in moral matters completion and species is regarded in [its] ordering toward the end; but the love of the highest Good is that which makes the rest tend toward their due end: therefore the love of the highest Good gives to all the gratuitous habits and to their works form and completion. Since therefore that love is charity, charity is the form of the virtues.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that [text] of *Colossians* three: *Charity is the bond of perfection*; there the Gloss: « *The other gifts make [one] perfect; charity binds all things together, lest they slip away* »: if therefore the other virtues from charity render the one having [them] perfect, it seems that they are perfect in themselves: therefore they do not need to be perfected nor formed by charity.

2. Likewise, of things diverse according to species the perfections are diverse according to species; but the habits of the virtues are diversified according to species, according as in the preceding [questions] has been shown and is commonly held: since therefore charity is one virtue, it seems that the other virtues cannot be formed by it.

3. Likewise, when any two things are in diverse subjects, it is impossible that one be the form of the other; but charity together with all the other virtues is not found in one power, because diverse virtues regard diverse powers: therefore it is impossible that the other virtues be informed by charity.

4. Likewise, whenever some things so stand that they are species immediately dividing one genus and immediately flowing from one principle, one of them cannot be the form of the other, because an opposite cannot be the form of [its] opposite, nor one disparate [thing the form] of [its] disparate; but charity is divided in opposition with the other virtues; and again, all the virtues immediately flow from grace, which is the origin and

form of all: therefore one virtue cannot inform another; and through this it is concluded that the other virtues are not formed by charity joined to itself.

5. Likewise, of a form there is no form, nor of a perfection [is there] a perfection, nor of an ultimate is there found another ultimate, because then it would be to go off into infinity; but every virtue is a form, every [virtue] also is a perfection of the power, every [virtue] nonetheless is « *an ultimate of the power* »: therefore it seems that one virtue cannot have a form from another distinct from itself: therefore it seems false and unintelligible that the other virtues be formed by charity.

6. Likewise, if the other virtues are formed by charity and have the being of a virtue: therefore to be a virtue belongs to charity alone *per se*, but to the others by accident. But if this is false—nay, rather, the other virtues, speaking *per se*, are virtues, since they are species of virtue: therefore it seems that this is false, that charity is the form of the virtues.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** All the virtues are informed by charity, because through it they all tend toward the ultimate end and receive completion.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the habit of any virtue has to be considered in a threefold way according to a threefold relation, namely to the object, to the subject, and to the ultimate end. We can therefore speak of the virtues according to this threefold respect. — And if we speak of them in relation to the object; thus they are forms distinct only by themselves, and their distinction becomes known through act and object; and thus they are not formable nor perfectible by any one [thing], since they themselves are distinct forms and perfections. — But if we speak of the virtues in relation to the subject; thus they are forms, and yet nonetheless formable: forms indeed they are, informing the subject as to moral goodness; yet by themselves they do not suffice for the gratuitous goodness through which the soul is made pleasing and accepted to God: and therefore they can be perfected and formed through grace, which at once makes the soul pleasing [to God] and the habits existing in it. — Finally, if we speak of the very habits of the virtues in relation to the ultimate end; thus they are forms and also formable: forms indeed they are, because they are dispositions of the soul itself ordering [it] to arriving at the end; yet formable they are, because, although they all dispose toward tending to the ultimate end, nevertheless the perfection of the tending comes from charity itself. For as heavy bodies are inclined toward the center by [their] weight, so spirits tend toward the highest Good by the weight of love. — And a sign of this kind is that charity has the same [thing] and under the same account for object and end, which is not to be found in another virtue. For the end is the good under the account of good and the highest Good; and this Good under the account of good is the object of charity. And on that account the other virtues, as to the account of [their] tending toward the ultimate end, receive completion from charity itself; and therefore not without merit is the perfection of merit attributed to the root of charity. — And according to this it can be granted that the other virtues are formed by charity, as the authorities say, and as the reasons adduced for this show, which are to be granted, since they conclude truly.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that the other virtues make the soul perfect; it must be said that there is a perfection simply, and there is a perfection in a certain respect. But every virtue makes [the soul] perfect, yet in a certain respect, because in respect of a special act and object. But the soul does not have perfection simply except in the totality of the virtues, inasmuch as they are informed by one grace and commanded by one charity, by whose aid as a means they lead [the soul] to the ultimate end. Hence although the other virtues be said to perfect, from this it cannot be concluded that they themselves are not perfected by charity; for to a perfection in a certain respect a perfection simply can be superadded.

2. To that which is objected, that of things diverse according to species the perfections are diverse according to species; it must be said that there is a perfection in [the] first being, and there is a perfection in [the] second being. But the proposed word holds truth concerning perfection as to first being, but not concerning perfection

as to well-being. But when we say that charity itself is the form and perfective of the virtues; this is not as to their first being, but as to [their] well-being, namely as to the perfection and completion of merit. Hence just as the other virtues, although they be formally distinguished in the genus of virtue, are nevertheless formed by grace, according as [they are] gratuitous; so also the other virtues, although they be distinct, can be formed by charity, according as [they are] meritorious; for they have the perfection of merit from a single account, namely from a perfect tending toward the highest end.

3. To that which is objected, that of things which are in diverse subjects one cannot be the form and perfection of the other; it must be said that for something to be informed by something is in two ways: either as by a constitutive principle, or as by a ruling and directive principle; or, in other words: there is a form which completes in being; and there is a form which completes in moving. When therefore we say that the other virtues are formed by charity; this is not because charity is the constitutive form of those virtues, giving them completion in being; but because it is a directive form, giving them completion in ruling and ordering. For as gravity draws downward and directs toward the center the stone together with all that is in it; so charity raises the soul upward and moves and directs the other virtues toward their end. — But as for what he objects, that the form and the thing formed cannot be in diverse subjects; this is true of the constitutive form, which completes in being; of the other it does not hold truth. For as one power can be ruled and moved by another, so the habit of one power [can be ruled and moved] by the habit of another; hence as the distinction of the powers does not take away order in moving, so also it does not impede the information of the virtues, which is regarded according to that order.

4. To that which is objected, that the virtues are divided in opposition; it must be said that this is by comparison to their objects, according to which they are distinguished; and thus one virtue is not the form of another. But in comparison to grace itself, in which they are bound together and united, and to the end itself, to which they are ordered; thus they do not have opposition, but rather connection. And from this side one virtue can inform another, for the reason that it tends more immediately into the end itself. Hence although all the virtues be immediately compared to grace, by which they are formed; this does not impede that, through comparison to the end, one virtue be informed by another. — It could also be said that the virtue of charity not only more immediately orders [the soul] into the end, but also stands more immediately to grace. And a sign of this is that it cannot be unformed, as the other virtues [can]. Hence both from a greater immediacy to the end, and from a greater immediacy to grace, it has [the power] to inform the other virtues.

5. To that which is objected, that of a form there is no form, nor of a perfection a perfection; it must be said that that is to be understood, speaking *per se*: because a form is not formed, according as [it is] a form, nor is a perfection perfected, according as [it is] a perfection, but according as in itself it has some unformedness and some imperfection. And because the other virtues, as far as is of themselves, have some unformedness and imperfection, nor are they wholly of the ultimative power itself; therefore they have to be perfected and led to a greater completion through grace and charity. — Moreover, as was touched on before, charity is not the form and perfection of the other virtues by constitution, or by composition, but rather by [their] ordering toward the end. Hence the virtues are perfections in one way, and in another way are perfected by charity: perfections, I say, they are, inasmuch as they qualify their subject by enabling [it] for the act due to it; but they are perfected inasmuch as they are commanded by charity and, through its command and aid, are more perfectly ordered toward the end.

6. To that which is objected, that if charity is the perfection of the virtues, then it is accidental to the others to be virtues; it must be said that this would be true if the other virtues drew the whole perfection of a virtue from charity; but this is false. For the virtues have a certain perfection from themselves, and a certain [perfection] from superinfused grace, and a certain [perfection] also from superadded charity, according as was touched on above. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that it is accidental to the other virtues to be virtues; for from their very selves they have that they are virtues, although they do not have [it] in such completion from themselves as they have being from the aid of charity.

> **Scholion.** This question has no scholion of its own. The closing doctrinal note (*caritas* as *motor*, *forma*, and *finis* of all the virtues; *forma directiva* rather than *constitutiva* — cf. this question's reply *Ad 3*; Petr. a Tar. on the threefold form of each virtue; the wider doxography on Petr. Lombardi III. Sent. d. 27) is supplied by the article-style **scholion §II of the preceding question** (`bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q5`), which expressly opens *« Quoad ultimam quaestionem… »* — "As to the last question…". The apparatus marker 24 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) confirms this redirect. See **d36-a1-q5 scholion §II.**