Dist. 36, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/36/q/bon-sent-III-d36-dubia
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# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about this which is said: *Where charity is, what is there that can be lacking?* For if this is true, whoever has charity has everything that suffices for salvation: therefore it seems that the other virtues are superfluous. *If you say* that this is said because charity has the other virtues annexed to it; then likewise it can be said of any of the other virtues; for all are connected to any virtue whatever, just as to charity. — Likewise, the gratuitously given graces are not necessarily connected to charity itself: and yet they are very useful and opportune to the Church: it seems, therefore, that even where charity is found, many things can be lacking.

**I respond:** It must be said that when he says that *where charity is, nothing is lacking,* he understands this of those things which are necessary for salvation — for that lack is properly a lack, whereas the lack of the others is to be reckoned as of little account — and he attributes this to charity by reason of the connection of the other virtues. For he who has charity has whereby he can fulfill the Law; he has also, consequently, the other virtues, which enable [one] to fulfill the Law.

But to that which is objected, that the same could likewise be said of any other virtue; it must be said that it is not alike: because charity is not only *connected* to the others, but is also the *principle of the connection,* since it is the *bond of perfection* and in a certain manner « the mother of all good », as the Master himself says.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *it was not pleasing to our authorities, nay rather to Truth itself, that all sins are equal.* For it seems that this ought to please Truth itself: because, according to what Anselm says, « sin is nothing »; but among those things which are nothing, one is not greater than another: therefore it seems that one sin cannot excel another, and so they have parity. — Likewise, any mortal sin whatever totally deprives a man of grace and brings on death; but in total privation there is no positing of greater and less — because among those things which are dead, one cannot be called more dead than another — therefore in the genus of mortal sins one sin does not exceed another.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since sin is a *privation of order* and a *diminution of capacity,* and through one genus of sin the soul is more disordered and rendered less capable than through another, as plainly appears; it is undoubtedly true that sins are not equal; for concupiscence inclines more to one desirable object than to another; and therefore it makes [one] despise God and be estranged and withdraw from him more in one genus of sin than in another.

To that which is objected, that sin is nothing; it must be said that even if it is nothing, *essentially* speaking; yet it belongs to something as to a *subject,* and to something as to an *opposite;* whence by reason of the greater or lesser good which is taken away in the diverse sins, one sin has [the property] of exceeding another.

To that which is objected, that it totally deprives [one] of grace and brings on death; it must be said that, although every sin totally deprives [one] of *grace,* yet it does not totally take away the *capacity* for grace; although every sin *brings on death,* yet it does not *take away the capacity for life:* and therefore, although a thing is not more and less dead and more and less deprived of grace through diverse sins as regards grace itself and the life of grace in itself; yet it is more and less as regards the capacity of nature with respect to grace; and by reason of this, diverse sins have [the property] of exceeding one another. Hence it is not like bodily death, in which the privation occurs totally, and the impossibility of returning to life.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *All things pertain to the two commandments of charity, because they are fulfilled through charity and ought to be referred to charity as to their end.* For it seems to imply two opposites in itself. For if they are fulfilled through charity, they ought rather to be referred to charity as to a *principle* than as to an *end.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was touched upon above, in the twenty-seventh distinction, charity is at once posited as, with respect to meritorious works, the *principle* or head of the virtues themselves, and their *form* or bond, and their *end,* to which they are ordered; and this is because charity itself, while it immediately joins [the soul] to the highest Good, in a certain manner rises above the others and moves and commands the other virtues; and therefore it is their head and principle. Further, because by moving it makes their works meritorious; therefore it is said to be their *form*. Lastly, because we do meritorious works in order that we may enjoy God and through charity rest in God; hence it is that charity is the *end* of the other virtues and precepts. — And thus « three causes coincide in one and the same thing »; nor is it to be wondered at, since charity makes [one] conformed to God, who has in himself, with respect to the creature, the intention of the threefold cause. Hence there is no contrariety with that which the Master says in the letter.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *For he is an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment.* For no effect of justice is opposed to justice; but punishment is an effect of justice: since therefore punishment makes itself feared, it seems that it does not make [one] opposed to divine justice. — Likewise, nothing that makes [one] turn away from evil makes [one] opposed to justice; but the fear of punishment, by which one ceases from sin, makes [one] turn away from evil: therefore such a one is not an enemy of justice.

**I respond:** It must be said that that statement is understood *precisely* and *by concomitance: precisely,* so that he is called an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment, that is, who withdraws from sin from fear of punishment alone, not from love of justice; such a one, I say, who is moved from fear alone, is called an enemy of justice, not by cause, but by concomitance. For although that fear does not cause enmity, yet it *accompanies* that evil concupiscence by which we are enemies of God; for *he who is a friend of this world is constituted an enemy of God*. — And by this is made clear the response to those two things which he objects; for he raises the objection as if that statement were understood to be said by way of cause.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this which he concludes last, that *the fullness of all the divine Scriptures is the love of God and of neighbor.* For if « nature operates as briefly as it can, and does not do through many things what it can do through fewer »; it seems likewise that divine Wisdom ought to operate in this manner. If, therefore, in all of Scripture nothing more is contained than the word about the commandment of charity, it seems then that sacred Scripture ought to be concerned with this alone, and that nothing else ought to be treated of in it.

**I respond:** It must be said that for the fullness of something to be contained in something is twofold: either *integrally,* or *causally.* Now the fullness of the divine Oracles is not contained in charity *integrally,* because many other virtues are taught and enjoined there, which are diverse and distinct from charity; but what is said to be contained, this is *causally,* because all of sacred Scripture is finally ordered to this, that we may love God and neighbor.

And if you object that *he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law*: therefore that commandment alone ought to be contained in the Law; it must be said that the commandments and instructions in sacred Scripture are multiplied for two reasons, namely for *removing blindness* on the part of the intellect, and for *excluding distaste* on the part of the affection itself. For it is necessary that we know the ways according to which we ought to be ordered toward neighbor and toward God; and because those are various, and we are ignorant and cannot grasp them all at once: therefore it was fitting to set them out separately through diverse instructions. — Again, because our affection becomes weary of one thing and delights in variety: therefore in diverse manners Scripture teaches and insinuates one and the same thing, so that our affection, while it finds the same thing in diverse and varied [forms], may advance in unity and delight in variety, so that its progress may be the greater the more delightful it is. And on this account, sometimes in sacred Scripture itself there are found *obligatory commandments,* sometimes *attractive examples*, sometimes *salutary warnings,* sometimes the *teachings of the Prophets,* sometimes [those] of the *Evangelists,* so that from all these distaste may be excluded, and man may be more perfectly directed to the one. And from this it can be proved that sacred Scripture, although it is great, is yet excellently handed down and contains nothing superfluous, nothing also lacking.