Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/37/q/bon-sent-III-d37-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue.*

Concerning the first point three things are asked.

### Question I. *Whether God ought to have imposed obligatory commandments on man.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether God ought to have imposed obligatory commandments on man. And that he ought not, it seems:

1. First, through what is said in Romans 7: *Sin, taking occasion through the commandment, wrought in me all concupiscence*; but God ought to impose nothing that makes for the increase of concupiscence: therefore he ought not to have obligated man through commandments.

2. Likewise, on that text of 1 Corinthians 15: *The strength of sin is the law*; the Gloss: « The law, by forbidding, increases the desire for sin »: if therefore God ought to impose nothing on us that makes for the increase of desire, but rather for its diminution; it seems that he ought in no way to have obligated us through commandments.

3. Likewise, Augustine says on Genesis literally: « He judged those men better who served him freely »; but the debt of obligation is repugnant to the freedom of service: if therefore God from the beginning left man *in the hand of his own counsel*, giving him freedom of choice; it seems that he ought in no way to have added the obligation of a precept.

4. Likewise, he who gives some gift without a burden gives more liberally than he who gives with the imposition of a burden: if therefore the obligation of precepts is a great burden, and God is most liberal; it seems that he ought to have given grace and glory to man in such a way that he would not obligate him to any commandment.

**On the contrary:**

1. It befits the *Maker* to set for all his works a fixed law and limit, beyond which they ought not to advance; as is plain, since all creatures are governed according to the laws imposed on them by their Creator: if therefore this belongs to the dignity of a creature, it seems that it was fitting and suitable that a law be imposed on man, beyond which it would not be permitted to man to advance. But this is done through obligatory commandments: therefore such commandments were to be given to man.

2. Likewise, it befits a *ruler* to preserve due order among his subjects: if therefore man through the freedom of his will could become disordered, it was opportune and most suitable that he be bound to right order. But this is done through the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue: it was therefore fitting that such commandments be given to man.

3. Likewise, it is fitting that a *lord* exact service from his servant; but a lord exacts service from his servant when he imposes laws and precepts on him: if therefore it was fitting that God should exact such service from man as from a servant, it was fitting that he impose obligatory commandments on him.

4. Likewise, it is fitting that a just *judge* repay according to merits; but merit and demerit have no place where no obligation of law falls: if therefore it was suitable for God to judge man, on whom he had conferred free choice, according to justice, it was also fitting that he set before him a rule of justice. But this is done by the imposition of commandments: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> The Decalogue had to be given by way of precept, both because it befitted the divine equity and majesty, and because it was expedient for us, for the increasing of our glory and the preserving of peace.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the words of the Decalogue had to be given by way of precept, in such a way that in them man should not only be instructed but also be obligated. — And the reason for this is: both because it befitted God, and because it was expedient for us.

It befitted *God* indeed, because in these words of the Decalogue consists the rule of justice, according as the light of right reason dictates. And since God, as just, ought to be a zealous defender of rectitude and justice both in his subjects and in himself; hence it is that he imposed on man the laws of justice, to which he obligated him, so that it would in no way be permitted for him to transgress them with impunity. The words of the Decalogue, therefore, had to be given by way of obligation, because thus it befitted the divine equity. — Nor did it befit equity only, but rather majesty also. For just as it befits the supreme Majesty to be worshipped with all reverence by the rational creature, so too it befits that the rational creature should, for the manifestation of that supreme Majesty, do service through obedience. And therefore it was fitting that he impose on man laws and obligatory commandments.

Now not only did it befit *God*, but it was also expedient for *us*, both for the increasing of our glory and for the preserving of peace.

For the *increasing of glory* indeed, because it is more glorious for man to obtain beatitude through merits than without merits. And since, when something is repaid out of merits, in a certain way the man who merits obligates the one repaying him to himself; and it is more fitting that man be obligated to God than God to man: hence it is that with regard to the works through which it befell him to merit, man had to be *obligated* through precepts, so that, while obligated he obeyed, he might advance in merit and arrive at a greater accumulation of glory. — Another reason is for the *preserving of peace*, which « is so great a good, as Augustine says, that all things desire peace »; but peace cannot be preserved where man usurps for himself what is another's: therefore, that peace might be preserved among men, God had to hand over commandments to man, in which he might be obligated not to usurp what is another's, but to render to God and to neighbor what was owed to them, lest otherwise, by doing injury, he break the peace, and by breaking the peace himself lose peace within himself. — Thus therefore it was fitting that the words of the Decalogue be handed over by way of obligation and precept, both because it was fitting on the part of *God*, and because it was expedient on the part of *us*. And the reasons that show this can be granted.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the authority of the Apostle, that the commandment intends concupiscence; it must be said that this holds true, but very much *per accidens* and *occasionally*. For from this, that through the Law there was knowledge of sin, yet through it there was no conferral of grace, with concupiscence striving toward the forbidden, and man knowingly perpetrating sin; from this there occasionally came about both the intensifying of concupiscence itself and the aggravation of sin. But this was not part of the principal intention of the one bearing the commandments, nor of the obligation of the commandments themselves. For the Lord so bestowed obligatory commandments that he was always ready to bestow helping grace for fulfilling them. Hence that concupiscence was increased through the obligation of the commandments, this was not from the commandments themselves, but rather from the negligence and fault of man; but the Lord, on account of man's negligence, ought not to have refrained from exercising diligence concerning man's salvation.

2. To that which is objected, that the Law by forbidding increases the desire for sin; it must be said that the Gloss does not say this absolutely, but adds this condition: « unless the Spirit pour out charity ». Hence although the Law of itself was not useful except for knowledge, nevertheless with grace the very obligation of the commandments contributed much to salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that obligation is repugnant to freedom; it can be answered that obligation to the good is not repugnant to freedom *absolutely*, but is repugnant to the freedom *of sinning*. « But to be able to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom »; and therefore, since the obligation of the commandment was repugnant to the freedom of acting wrongly, it did not diminish freedom, but rather increased it. — In another way too it can be answered, that there is an obligation that takes away *power*, and there is an obligation that takes away *impunity*. The first obligation, which takes away power, diminishes freedom; but the second, which does not take away power but removes impunity, preserves freedom of choice and adds to it the equity of justice. Now in this second way the commandments of God are obligatory; and therefore they in no way derogated from freedom of choice, but rather commended the divine justice.

4. To that which is objected, that it is of greater liberality to give something without merit than with merits; it must be said that although it is of greater liberality on the part of the *giver*, nevertheless it is not of such great glory and excellence on the part of the *receiver*. And since the Lord, in conferring a reward, attends not only to the manifestation of his liberality, but rather also to the promotion of our glory; hence it is that he preferred to give us eternal beatitude through the fulfillment of the commandments and the merit of obedience, rather than with no merit preceding. — Moreover, our merits in no way derogate from the divine liberality, but rather manifest it, both because he himself has no need of our goods, and because all our merits proceed from the gift of his grace. And therefore the Apostle says in Romans 6: *The grace of God is life eternal*.