Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/37/q/bon-sent-III-d37-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the precepts of the Decalogue obligate to formed works.*

Secondly it is asked whether the precepts of the Decalogue obligate to formed works. And that they do, it seems.

1. Deuteronomy 16: *Thou shalt justly pursue what is just*. From this word it is gathered that the Lawgiver commanded not only justice in the deed, but also justice in the manner; but a work that is just in deed and in manner is a formed work: therefore through the commandments of the Law man is obligated to formed works.

2. Likewise, Matthew 19: *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments*: the observance therefore of the commandments of the Decalogue leads to life; but no one is led to life through any works unless they be done out of charity, and such are formed works: since therefore through the Law we are obligated to observe the precepts of the Decalogue, it seems that through the same we are obligated to formed works.

3. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found at the end of the preceding distinction, that all the precepts of the Decalogue are reduced to two precepts; but those precepts no one fulfills except out of charity — as is plain of the precept by which it is commanded: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart*, etc. — it seems therefore likewise that we are bound to fulfill all the commandments of the Decalogue out of charity: therefore through the Law we are obligated to formed works.

4. Likewise, we are obligated to the works of the commandments according to the intention of the one commanding; but the intention of the one commanding was to give those commandments so that through them we might serve him and by serving please him; but this is not done except through works informed by charity and grace: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, information and deformation are opposites, command and prohibition are opposites; and « if the opposite [is said] of the opposite, then the proposite [is said] of the proposite »; since therefore the deformation of works is in the prohibition, the information of the same will be in the command.

**On the contrary:** 1. Jerome says that « let him be anathema who says that God commanded what is impossible »: since therefore those precepts obligate the just as well as sinners, and it is not in the power of the sinner to inform his works, since that must come about through charity and grace; it seems that to this no one is obligated by the divine commandments.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the Gloss on that text of the Psalm: *Turn away from evil and do good*: « To turn away from evil always avoids punishment, although it does not always earn the palm »; but as often as a man turns away from evil out of charity, he earns the palm: therefore a man is not always bound to turn away from evil out of charity. But by turning away from evil, the negative precepts are observed: therefore it does not seem that they obligate to formed works.

3. Likewise, a certain son, having parents and existing in mortal sin, honors them out of natural piety, when place and time and opportunity present themselves; it is established that this man does not sin in honoring his parents, neither by commission nor by omission: therefore that commandment by which the Lord commanded: *Honor thy father and thy mother*; did not obligate to this, that the work be rendered out of charity: by parity of reasoning, neither do the other commandments.

4. Likewise, formed works are not [done] except through grace; but no one knows whether he has the grace of the Holy Spirit: therefore no one knows whether his works are formed or unformed. But no one is obligated to that which he cannot know: therefore the precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works.

5. Likewise, whoever is obligated to something is obligated consequently to that which is inseparably annexed to it; but works cannot be formed by anyone unless grace be had: therefore whoever is obligated to formed works is obligated to have grace. Since therefore having grace regards every time indifferently, the time of sleeping as well as the time of waking; it seems that man omits at every instant and at every time, and through this in one day he will sin infinitely. But if this is manifestly false, it remains that the precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works.

### Conclusion.

> The precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to a properly formed work by an absolute obligation, if we speak of any single work taken singly; nevertheless of them collected into one this can be granted, and also speaking of conditional obligation.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there are three modes of speaking.

For to some it has seemed that the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works, yet by the obligation of an *affirmative* precept, not of a *negative* precept. For the obligation of a negative precept is *always* and *unto always*; but the obligation of an *affirmative* precept, although it is *always*, is nevertheless not *unto always*, but according to place and time. On account of which they said that the commandments of the Decalogue obligate man to formed works for that time in which he has charity and grace; for then he has the power to go forth into meritorious works and is bound to make good use of the grace received.

But there is another mode of speaking, that the commandments of the Decalogue do not obligate except to works good in their kind. For formed works are above our power and above the certitude of cognition; and therefore we ought not to be obligated to such works through the commandments of the Decalogue, but only to works good in their kind. The sign of this is that, if someone existing in charity honors his parents out of natural piety, by such a work he is absolved from the obligation of the commandment.

But since the first mode of speaking seems to go too far, in this namely, that it posits man to be obligated to that of which he cannot have certitude; while the second mode of speaking seems to say too little, in this namely, that it posits man to be obligated through the commandments of the Decalogue only to those things which one can fulfill while existing in the state of sin, whereas the observance of the commandments of God is the way of arriving at the state of grace and justice: therefore there is yet a third mode of speaking, which holds as it were a middle between the two, and answers the proposed question by a distinction in this manner. When it is asked whether the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works; it must be answered that formed works can be spoken of in two ways: in one way by the *exclusion* of the deformity of sin, in another way by the *positing* of the dignity of merit. If formed works are taken in the first way; then they certainly obligate to formed works; for they obligate to the avoiding of all mortal sins. — But if formed works are spoken of in the other way; then they are taken properly, and then a distinction must be made in the obligation itself: for there is *absolute* obligation and *conditional* obligation. Absolute obligation is that by which one is simply obligated to do something, in such a way that, if he does not do it, he incurs the guilt of omission; but conditional obligation is that by which one is obligated to do something, if he wishes to attain a reward. And this obligation, in him who omits it, does not induce the sin of omission, but posits the defect of an implicit condition.

If therefore we speak of *conditional* obligation; the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works. For if anyone wishes to enter into life, it is necessary to keep the commandments out of charity, which charity indeed is the principle of merit. — But if we speak of *absolute* obligation; then a distinction must be made in the commandments themselves, since it happens to speak of them in two ways: either of them *collected into one*, inasmuch as they are reducible to the two commandments of charity, or of each one *by itself singly*. If of them collected into one; since in them is contained the rule of justice according to the order toward God and toward neighbor, by which all sin is excluded; then it can be granted that they obligate to some formed work either *in itself*, if a man has the means by which he can go forth into it, or *in disposition* or preparation

toward it. For man is bound so to fulfill the commandments of the Decalogue that through their fulfillment he prepares a place for grace itself; which once obtained, he may go forth, when there is place and time, into meritorious works, by fulfilling the two precepts of charity. — But if we speak of each one *singly* and *by itself*; then taking a formed work properly, that is, a meritorious work, and speaking of *absolute* obligation, the commandments of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works, as the reasons show that are brought forward for the second part, and therefore they are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that the Lawgiver commands not only to do a just work, but also to do it justly; it must be said that there is a *certain* mode of justice, which makes the work pleasing to God and meritorious: and this properly renders the work formed. But there is another mode of justice, which excludes around the act of the just man the disorder of intention, which makes the soul unjust, and the perverse ordering of the work; and this mode is in the precept, not the first. But from this mode the work is not called formed, except by taking it *broadly*, as was touched upon before in responding.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Lord in Matthew: *If thou wilt enter into life*, etc; the response is plain through what has already been said: because from that word it cannot be gathered that man is obligated to do meritorious works except by *conditional* obligation, namely if he wishes to enter into life. But if one wishes to proceed from *conditional* obligation to *absolute*; the reasoning does not hold, rather there is here a sophism *secundum quid et simpliciter*.

3. To that which is objected, that all the commandments are reduced to the two precepts of charity; the response is likewise plain: because the two precepts of charity are not fulfilled in each commandment taken *singly*, but out of a certain *full* understanding and perfection, arising from the aggregation and entire observance of all the commandments. And in this way it is true that the commandments obligate to a formed work *in itself*, or *in its disposition*. But from this it does not follow that any single commandment by itself obligates to this. For just as it does not follow, *ten men draw a ship, therefore each one by himself draws it*; because ten can do more than one; so too in the matter at hand it must be understood in its own way.

4. To that which is objected, that we are bound to observe the commandments according to the intention of the one commanding; it must be said that this is true of *conditional* obligation, if we wish to enter into life. — Yet it could also be said otherwise, that the intention of the Lawgiver was not only to this, that man should arrive at glory, but that he should avoid punishment; but the commandments, if they be observed, as far as concerns works done outside of grace, suffice for avoiding punishment; and therefore it does not follow that through the commandments one is obligated absolutely to meritorious works.

5. To that which is objected last, that deformation is in the prohibition, therefore information in the command; it must be said that according as information is taken *properly*, the reasoning does not hold, for the reason that *information* and *deformation* are not opposites immediately, but rather between a meritorious work and a work of sin there falls a middle, namely the good *in genus* and the good *from circumstance*. But when it is said that if something is in the prohibition, its opposite is in the command; this is understood of *immediate* opposites, as *to steal* is prohibited, and *not to steal* is in the command; and therefore that consequence does not have place in the matter at hand.