Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/37/q/bon-sent-III-d37-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the obligation of the Decalogue's commandments is attended to according to the law of nature or the written law.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue is attended to according to the law of nature, or according to the written law. And that it is according to the law of nature, it seems.

1. For that is natural which is common among all; but all are obligated to the commandments of the Decalogue: therefore that obligation is according to the law of nature.

2. Likewise, an obligation that extends to every time is attended to according to that law whose dictate runs in every time; but the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue remains in the state of the law of nature and of the written law and of the law of grace: therefore the obligation of those commandments is attended to according to the law of nature.

3. Likewise, the commandments that obligate man, with Scripture and grace set aside, must obligate according to the law of nature; but such are the commandments of the Decalogue — for they are from the dictate of right reason, with the law of Moses and the law of the Gospel set aside — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, certain things are prohibited because evil; certain are evil because prohibited; likewise certain things are good because they are in a precept; but certain are in a precept for this reason, that they are good; but those things which are prohibited or commanded in the Decalogue are of themselves evil or good, according as right reason dictates — as that God is to be worshiped, and parents to be honored, this surely is good of itself; false testimony and homicide, this surely is of itself evil — but such things pertain to the implanted law: therefore the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue is attended to according to the bond of the natural law.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Exodus 20 it is read that first those commandments were heard from heaven; and afterward it is added how they were written on tablets: if therefore there the written law was being handed down, it seems that the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue must principally be attended to according to the written law.

2. Likewise, to the Romans 7: *I had not known concupiscence, unless the Law had said: Thou shalt not covet*;

Gloss: « *I knew not concupiscence to be sin* »; but a commandment that obligates according to the law of nature is manifest to man even without the written law: therefore that commandment: *Thou shalt not covet*, etc.; does not pertain to the law of nature, but rather to the written law.

3. Likewise, what is from the dictate of the law of nature pertains to the state of innocence; but the distinction of the commandments of the Decalogue does not pertain to the state of innocence, because in that state homicide had no place, nor theft, nor adultery: therefore it seems that the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue does not follow the instinct of the natural law.

4. Likewise, those things that are according to the dictate of the law of nature extend not only to the state of the wayfarer, but also to the state of the fatherland; but this obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue does not extend to the state of the fatherland, because there theft cannot exist, where nothing is one's own, nor concupiscence, where there can be no vice: therefore it seems that the obligation of commandments of this kind does not follow the instinct of the natural law.

Alongside this it is asked: if the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue follows the law of nature, whence is it that those commandments were rather written on tablets of stone than the other commandments of the Law?

Likewise, it is asked: for what reason did the Lord propose the ten words of the Law immediately to the people itself, as is read in Exodus 20, rather than the other commandments, namely the judicial and ceremonial ones, which came to the knowledge of the people by the mediation of Moses?

### Conclusion.

> The obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue radically follows the law of nature, but as to its explication and distinction it follows the written law.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a threefold way of speaking of the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue, according as there is also of the sufficiency of faith itself. For according as it happens to believe the articles of faith in three ways, namely implicitly, and explicitly, and some implicitly and some explicitly; so too it must be understood of the precepts of the Decalogue.

And according to this threefold mode, the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue regards a threefold state, namely the state of nature-as-instituted and the state of nature-as-fallen and the state of the written law, so that it regards the state of the written law *simply explicitly*, where lucidly or distinctly those ten commandments were pronounced and written by God. — But the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue regards the state of fallen nature *implicitly*, according to the two precepts of natural right which nature always dictated, namely that one should do to another what he would wish to be done to himself, and should not do to another what he would not wish to be done to himself. — But it regarded the state of instituted nature in one way implicitly, in another way explicitly. For certain precepts order toward God, but certain order toward neighbor. For to those precepts which order toward God, man was *explicitly* obligated in the state of instituted nature, where he was fit and disposed to worship God wholly and perfectly. But to the commandments which order toward neighbor, he was obligated *implicitly*, for the reason that the necessity of explicating those commandments arose from the manifold disorder which followed upon the first transgression. And this can be gathered from what is said in Ecclesiasticus 17, speaking of the condition of man: *He filled their heart with sense, and showed them both good and evil, he set his eyes upon their hearts* etc., up to where: *Beware of all iniquity, and he gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor*; where there is gathered the explicit obligation of man with respect to divine worship, and the implicit with respect to avoiding the harm of one's neighbor.

According to this, therefore, it is plain that the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue radically follows the law of nature, but as to its explication follows the law of Scripture. — For the full explication of the commandments of the Decalogue was opportune according to the state of sin, on account of the obscuration of the light of reason and on account of the obli-

gation of the will. For since the corrupt will was prompt to manifold disorder, it was fitting that it be bound by manifold commandments. Again, since the interior writing of the heart was overshadowed on account of sin, and man, who had been endowed with a spiritual mind, was made sensual and carnal; it was opportune that he should read and hear exteriorly through the senses of the body those things by which he could be regulated unto the rectitude of justice. And therefore the explication and distinction of the commandments of the Decalogue pertained to the written law, although the obligation pertained to the implanted law, as the reasons brought forward for the first part show, which can be granted, since they conclude what is true.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that the words of the Decalogue were heard in the giving of the Law; the response is already plain: because this was not for the sake of introducing a new obligation, but rather for the sake of the explication of the obligation itself, which indeed was necessary on account of the overshadowing caused by sin.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Apostle, that he knew not concupiscence to be sin; it can be said that he speaks in the person of the carnal man; or certainly he says this, because, although he might in some way have known it through the law of nature in general, nevertheless he did not know it in particular except through the written law; whence he himself in the same place says that through the Law there is the knowledge of sin. Therefore from that word it is not had that the obligation of commandments of this kind arises from the written law, but only that the explication of the obligation itself was made in that law.

3. To that which is objected, that the things which are from the dictate of the law of nature befit the state of innocence; it must be said that this is not true of those things which are from the dictate of the law of nature *in particular*; but the things which are from the dictate of the law of nature *in general* and implicitly do befit that state; and in this way the commandments of the second table pertained to that state.

4. To that which is objected, that the things which are from the dictate of the law of nature remain in the state of glory; it can be answered in two ways. First indeed, because, as is said of the virtues, that they remain in the fatherland according to more excellent and nobler uses and acts; so it can be granted that the fulfillment of the commandments of the Decalogue will be preserved in the fatherland, yet in a far nobler and more excellent manner than it is in the way, according as there it will be ordered in a more excellent manner both to God and to neighbor, and according as the will will be in a more excellent manner ordered to the good and removed from evil. — It could also be said otherwise, as was touched upon before, that it [the dictate of the law of nature] is taken generally, and in some things with multiplication, and in those things which nature dictates specially, whether implicitly or explicitly; and again, among those things which nature dictates explicitly, it either dictates according to every state of nature, or according to the state of fallen nature; and what is from the dictate of the law of nature *simply* and *explicitly*, that will remain in the state of glory. But the explication and distinction of the commandments of the Decalogue regards the state of fallen nature and the instruction of the written law.

To that which is asked, why these ten words were written on tablets of stone rather than the others, since they pertained less to the written law; it must be said that this was because in them especially consisted the rule of justice, and the others had to be reduced to these; and these indeed were stable and were not to be made void by a supervening law: therefore they were written on tablets of stone, so that their prerogative might be shown as to dignity and as to stability.

To that which is asked, why the commandments of the Decalogue were given to the people itself immediately by God rather than the judicial and ceremonial ones; it must be said that this

was because, since the commandments of the Decalogue were from the dictate of the law of nature, they needed little exposition, whence the simple could grasp them at once. But the ceremonial and judicial ones needed greater instruction; whence the knowledge of them pertained more principally to judges and priests; therefore they were not so given to the people immediately, but by the mediation of the lawgiver.

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