Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/37/q/bon-sent-III-d37-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the commandments of the Decalogue with respect to their distinction and order.*

Consequently it is asked concerning the commandments of the Decalogue with respect to order and distinction. And concerning this three things can be asked. First it is asked concerning the number and sufficiency of the commandments themselves, whether they are ten. Secondly it is asked concerning their order to one another. Thirdly it is asked concerning the number and order in comparison to the distinction of the tables.

### Question I. *Whether the commandments of the Decalogue ought to be only ten, or more, or fewer.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the commandments of the Decalogue ought to be only ten, or more, or fewer. And that they ought to be *fewer*, it seems:

1. Because in Romans 13 it is said: *He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law*: therefore in the commandment of the love of neighbor the whole Law can be included: it seems therefore that the commandments ought not to be multiplied to the number ten, since they are sufficiently contained in fewer.

2. Likewise, on that text of Romans 7: *I did not know concupiscence*; the Gloss: « Good is the Law, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils »: if therefore in the prohibition of concupiscence the other evils are forbidden, it seems that the other commandments are superfluous.

3. Likewise, whoever sins mortally kills himself: therefore since in killing there is forbidden not only bodily homicide, but also spiritual, not only of deed, but also of will; it seems that in that prohibition all sins are forbidden: therefore all the other commandments are superfluous.

4. Likewise, the difference between the Law and the Gospel is that the Law forbids the hand, not the mind; but the Gospel forbids not only the hand, but also the mind: therefore it seems that only the exterior act ought to be forbidden, and not that which would regard the interior act: therefore the commandment about not coveting is superfluous. If you say that the concupiscence which proceeds into deed is forbidden; *to the contrary* is this: because that is not distinguished from the sin of deed: therefore the precept about the prohibition of that concupiscence ought not to be numbered along with the precept about the prohibition of the exterior deed.

**But on the contrary:** that they ought to be *more* than ten, it seems.

5. We are more debtors to God than to neighbor: therefore there ought to be more commandments ordering toward God than ordering toward neighbor: therefore since the commandments ordering toward neighbor are seven, it seems that the commandments ordering toward God are more, or at least as many.

6. Likewise, we are obligated to do good to neighbor just as much as we are obligated not to do him evil: since therefore there are six commandments according to which we are forbidden to offend our neighbor; it seems that there ought to be at least six according to which we would be obligated and ordered to do good; and if this is so, all the commandments would be at least fifteen.

7. Likewise, there are seven capital sins so great, as far as their own nature is concerned, as the sin of avarice and lust: therefore just as there is a special commandment in which avarice is forbidden, and in which lust is forbidden; so there ought to be a special commandment for prohibiting the other vices, such that there would be some precept in which pride would be specially forbidden, some in which envy, and so of the others. If you say that they are implicitly forbidden in the prohibition of concupiscence; it is objected against this, that there are three roots of sins, according as it is said in 1 John 2: *The concupiscence of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life*: if therefore the concupiscence of the flesh and of the eyes is forbidden explicitly, it seems that the pride of life too ought to have a special prohibition.

8. Likewise, just as it happens to covet another's wife, and for the concupiscence to be consummated in deed; so too it is to be found with respect to homicide and false testimony and the other commandments: therefore just as there are two diverse precepts concerning the concupiscence of another's wife and of another's property in deed and in will; so the other precepts ought to be doubled; and if this were true, then there would be more than ten.

It is therefore a question why there are ten and not more nor fewer.

### Conclusion.

> The ten precepts of the Decalogue have been suitably assigned.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the sufficiency and number of the commandments is taken according to the account of the order of *general* justice itself, whose office is to order man toward God and toward neighbor; whence some commandments order man toward God, and some order toward neighbor. — Now those which order man toward God are called the precepts of the first table; and these are three and not more nor fewer. Their number and sufficiency can be taken in three ways, namely from the side of the *object* and from the side of the *subject* and from the side of the *middle act*.

From the side of the *object* thus: for since in God there are three *persons* and three *appropriated [attributes]* and a threefold *kind of cause*, according as he is compared to the creature; there is a threefold precept, according as the rational creature has to be ordered toward God. For according to the account of *majesty*, which is appropriated to the *Father* and befits God, according as he is the *efficient* cause of the creature, [the creature] is ordered through that precept: *Thou shalt not have strange gods*. — According to the account of *truth*, which is appropriated to the *Son* and befits God, according as he is the *formal exemplar* cause of the creature, [the creature] is ordered through this: *Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain*. — According to the account of *goodness*, which is appropriated to the *Holy Spirit* and befits God, according as he is the *final* cause, [the creature] is ordered through this: *Remember to keep holy the Sabbath day*; in such a way that through those three man is sufficiently ordered toward God, namely that he be subject to the supreme Majesty, believe the supreme Truth, and cleave to the supreme Goodness. And this sufficiency is taken from the side of the object.

In a second way the sufficiency is taken from the side of the orderable *subject*, which indeed is the rational soul, in which there is a threefold motive power, according to which it has to be ordered toward God, namely the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. The commandment of adoration regards the irascible itself; but the second commandment regards the rational itself; but the third commandment, concerning sanctification, regards the concupiscible itself, as appears sufficiently to one who considers. And this sufficiency is taken from the side of the subject.

But in a third way the sufficiency is taken from the side of the *middle act*. For there is a threefold act, according to which man has to be ordered toward God, namely the act of the heart, of the mouth, and of the deed. With respect to the act of deed the commandment of adoration is attended to. With respect to the act of the mouth the second commandment is attended to, by which the false invocation of the divine name is forbidden. According to the act of the heart the third commandment is attended to, in which the sanctification of the mind is enjoined. — And thus appears the sufficiency of the commandments ordering man toward God, since they are only three and not more nor fewer.

Now the sufficiency of the commandments of the second table can be assigned according to this mode in three ways, namely from the side of the *object* and of the *subject* and of the *middle act*.

For from the side of the conditions of the *object* itself it can be taken thus. For in the neighbor, toward whom the commandments of the second table order, there shines forth the property of the *Father* and of the *Son* and of the *Holy Spirit*. According as the property of the *Father* shines forth in the neighbor, so we owe him honor and reverence; and with respect to this that commandment is attended to: *Honor thy father* etc.; in which there shines forth the property of the supreme Father in this, that they have the account of *a principle*. — But according as the property of the *Son* shines forth in the neighbor, so we owe him truth; and so is that commandment: *Thou shalt not speak against thy neighbor false testimony*. — But according as the property of the *Holy Spirit* shines forth in the neighbor, so we owe him love and purity of innocence. And since we can harm our neighbor or damage him in many ways: in his own person and in a conjoined person and in his goods, and this in two ways: either by interior act, or by exterior; therefore there are further five commandments. For against the harm which

has to be done in the person of the neighbor, there is that precept: *Thou shalt not kill*. — But against the harm which has to be done in a conjoined person, there is that precept: *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, according as it is exercised in deed. — Against the harm which is done in goods, there is this: *Thou shalt not steal*. — And because that harm is twofold, namely in a conjoined person and in goods, [and] is more frequently done in the will through concupiscence than it is done in deed; therefore there are two other commandments, in one of which the concupiscence of the wife is forbidden, in what is said: *Thou shalt not covet [thy neighbor's] wife*; in the other the concupiscence of goods is forbidden, in what is said: *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's property* etc. Thus therefore appears the sufficiency from the side of the conditions of the object.

But from the side of the *subject* according to the threefold power [it] also happens to assign the sufficiency in this way. For there is a threefold power of the soul, according to which it happens to be ordered toward neighbor, namely the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. Now as regards the irascible power man has suitably to be ordered toward the superior through reverence and honor, and so is that: *Honor thy father* etc.; but toward neighbor through peace and the avoidance of hatred, and so is that: *Thou shalt not kill*. — But according to the rational virtue we are ordered toward neighbor through the speech and attestation of truth; and so is that commandment: *Thou shalt not speak against thy neighbor false testimony*. — But according to the concupiscible power man has to be ordered toward neighbor through its restraint. And since that [power] is in many ways corrupted through cupidity and concupiscence; therefore cupidity and concupiscence are forbidden in the exterior act through two commandments, namely through this: *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, and: *Thou shalt not steal*; they are forbidden also in the interior act through two others, namely through this: *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife*; *nor his field nor any property*. And thus the sufficiency can be taken from the side of the powers of the soul in the commandments of the second table.

But from the side of the *act* it can be taken thus. For we have to be ordered toward neighbor according to *innocence* and according to *beneficence*. If according to beneficence, so is that commandment: *Honor thy father and thy mother*. If according to innocence, this is in three ways: either according to the act of the heart, or of the mouth, or of the deed. If according to the act of deed, either this is in prohibiting a disorder which is against the *being of the individual* himself; and so is that: *Thou shalt not kill*. Or against the due preservation of the *species*; and so is that: *Thou shalt not commit adultery*. Or against the possession of *temporal sustenance*; and so is that: *Thou shalt not steal*. — But if we are ordered toward neighbor according to the act of the *mouth*; so is that commandment: *Thou shalt not bear false testimony*. — But if according to the act of the *heart*, which indeed consists in the affection, this happens in two ways: either liberally against cupidity, or honorably against pleasure; and according to this there are two commandments: one against the concupiscence of pleasure, and so is that: *Thou shalt not covet the wife*; but the other against cupidity and avarice, and so is that: *Thou shalt not covet the property*.

And thus in every way appears the number and sufficiency of the commandments of the Decalogue: since there are three which order man with respect to the supreme Trinity; and there are seven which order man with respect to the whole lower totality; so that thus there is not only a fittingness of number from the side of the thing, but also from the side of the numerical proportion itself; which it happens most rightly to find in the number ten, according as Augustine teaches in the book *On Music*, where he shows that in the number ten there is a certain excellent perfection, on account of which there is a stop in that number, and beyond it in counting we do not proceed by a new numeration, but return to the head: and therefore it was fitting that the divine precepts, which are the way of arriving at the supreme perfection, be terminated and comprehended in that number. — It is to be granted therefore that there are ten commandments of the Decalogue, according as the Law says, neither more nor fewer.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law; it must be said that although in the love of neighbor the commandments ordering toward neighbor are enclosed in a certain generality, nevertheless on account of the obscuring of sin it was opportune and fitting that those commandments, through which special disorders are avoided, be explicated *in particular*. Whence just as the unity of a genus does not exclude the multitude of species, nor the unity of an end exclude the multitude of those things which are toward the end; so from the unity of the commandment of love toward neighbor it cannot be concluded that there is no plurality of commandments ordering toward neighbor.

2. To that which is objected, that the Law by forbidding concupiscence forbids all evils; it must be said that concupiscence is taken *generally* and *specially*. Generally, concupiscence is called any libidinous and immoderate appetite, but specially it is said to be the delectable appetite according to taste and touch. And in the first way indeed in the prohibition of concupiscence all evils are said to be forbidden; but in the second way it holds the account of a special commandment and is numbered among the commandments of the Decalogue.

3. To that which is objected, that he who sins mortally kills himself; it must be said that in the prohibition of homicide there is not forbidden the disorder of any power whatever, but the disorder of the irascible power, which is in the exterior act, or has in some way to be ordered toward the exterior act. Whence although homicide of deed and of will is forbidden there, nevertheless not every sin is forbidden. And therefore from this the superfluity of the other commandments of the Decalogue cannot be concluded.

4. To that which is objected, that the Law forbids the hand and not the mind: it must be said that this is not said, that the Law does not forbid the sin of the heart, but this is said, because the sin of the heart is not punished by the penalty of death, according as the sin of deed [is], which can be proved exteriorly; whence by the prohibition we can understand the infliction of penalty. And from this it cannot be had that the sin of the heart ought not to be forbidden in the commandments of the Decalogue.

5. To that which is objected, that there ought to be more, because we owe more to God than to man; it must be said that all the things which we owe to man, in a certain way we owe and pay also to God; therefore there are more things which are owed and rendered to God than to neighbor. Yet because we are ordered toward God according to the *contemplative* life, toward neighbor according to the *active* life; and in the contemplative life unity is sought, but in the active there is engaged a manifold variety of things: hence it is that there are more commandments which directly obligate toward neighbor than those which directly obligate toward God. Hence it is also that there are more sins by which one directly sins against neighbor than those by which one directly sins against God.

6. To that which is objected, that in as many ways as it happens to do good to someone, in just as many ways it happens [to do] evil; it must be said that because the corruption of concupiscence in us, as far as it is in itself, inclines toward evil; therefore we are difficult toward doing good, because we are prone toward perpetrating evil. Hence it is that there are more negative precepts ordering toward neighbor than affirmative; there are more in which it is forbidden that evil be done, than in which it is enjoined that good be done.

7. To that which is objected, that pride and envy ought so to be forbidden, as avarice and lust; it must be said that those two have rather to be forbidden explicitly, because on account of the wickedness of lust they more quickly proceed into the act of exterior deed; nevertheless the other capital sins too have to be forbidden in the commandments of the Decalogue. For pride is forbidden in the adoration of God and in the honoring of neighbor; but envy and anger in the avoidance of homicide; sloth in the sanctification of the Sabbath; but avarice in the prohibition of theft; lust and gluttony joined to it in the prohibition of adultery and fornication, where every illicit coitus and immoderate carnal pleasure is forbidden. — And if one should object that the pride of life ought so to be forbidden in particular, as the concupiscence of the flesh and of the eyes; it must be said that it is not similar: since, as is already plain, that root is not so progressive into the exterior act, according as the others.

8. To that which is objected, that homicide happens to be perpetrated in heart and in deed just as adultery and theft; it must be said that it is not similar, for a twofold cause: both because the irascible is not so corrupted as the concupiscible, which on account of its immoderate corruption is called corrupted and infected and more prone toward evil; and also because anger has its origin from concupiscence, according as Damascene says, since « anger is the avenger of injured concupiscence ». And therefore, when concupiscence is forbidden in its origin, in a certain way anger too is forbidden; therefore it was not so necessary to double the commandment which regards the act of the irascible or anger itself, as the commandment which regards the act of concupiscence or concupiscence itself. And from this same thing it can be had why it was not necessary to double the other commandments.