Dist. 37, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/37/q/bon-sent-III-d37-dubia
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# DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about those things which are said in the explanation of the first commandment. For Origen says that *an idol is something that has nothing like itself.* For this seems to be false, because an idol is fabricated by a craftsman, and the craftsman fabricates only according to a likeness which he has in the soul; but « there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses »: and there is nothing in the senses which was not in a thing outside: therefore it seems that there is no idol which does not have a likeness in exterior things. — Likewise, it seems that he speaks falsely in this which he adds, that an idol is nothing because it *has nothing like itself:* since, if some craftsman makes something new, the likeness of which is not to be found outside, it is not on that account a nothing. — Likewise, every artifact is something; but an idol is an artifact: therefore it is something. How then is it said that an idol is nothing? — Likewise, to make idols and graven images is a thing belonging only to craftsmen: therefore it seems that that commandment does not extend except to craftsmen.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Lord, in the first commandment, enjoins that he be adored and that he alone be adored; therefore he enjoins worship (*latria*) and forbids idolatry. And since idolatry was wont to be committed among the ancients in two ways: either in this, that they fashioned a new sculpture, the likeness of which was not to be found at all *outside,* so that it might be shown that a special and singular worship was to be exhibited to it; or when some image was made which was a representation of some thing *outside,* which someone might believe was to be venerated in that image: therefore, in order to forbid these two, he touches upon those two in the prohibition of idolatry, according to what the Master says in the letter.

But to that which is objected, that there is nothing in the soul which was not first received from the senses; it must be said that that statement is to be understood thus, that the soul has no likeness which it has not received from outside either as a whole, or in part. When therefore it is said that the form of an idol does not have a likeness outside; this is understood as a whole, yet it has [one] in part, as is plain in the case of the chimera and the goat-stag and the golden mountain. For the soul makes new compositions, although it does not make new things; and as it imagines interiorly, so also it paints and sculpts exteriorly.

To that which is objected, that an idol ought not to be called nothing, but rather something, since it is an artifact; it must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking about an idol: either as regards the matter and figure which the craftsman impresses upon it, or as regards the excellence of divinity which the idolater, by believing, attributes to the idol itself. In the first way it is said to be nothing in the world, by Origen, not because it is nothing at all in itself, but because it has nothing like itself corresponding to it in the universe. But as regards the excellence of divinity which the idolater assigns to it, it is altogether nothing except in the mere fiction and false estimation of the idolater, which is founded altogether upon the vain and the nothing, because an idol has nothing at all of divinity.

To that which is objected, that that precept seems to pertain only to craftsmen; it must be said that in that word the Lord intends not only to forbid the fabrication of an idol, but every veneration of an idol; and in this he also includes that he wills all the worship of *latria* to be rendered to himself alone, and therefore there is prefixed: *The Lord your God is one God;* for one God alone and true is to be adored. Hence that precept has more of affirmation than of negation. Nor does anyone fulfill that commandment, if he only desists from idolatry, because there adoration is enjoined, which is to be exhibited to God alone. — But what that adoration is, and in what manner and to whom it is to be exhibited; this can be had from those things which were determined above in the ninth distinction, where the question was asked about *latria.* And from these things which are touched upon here and which were said there, the right understanding of the first commandment can in some manner be had.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about those things which are said in the exposition of the second commandment, which the Master expounds thus: *You shall not take the name of your God in vain;* which is to say according to the letter: *you shall not swear by the name of God for nothing.* But against this it is objected: because that seems to pertain to the fifth commandment of the second table, where perjury is forbidden: therefore it seems that either that commandment, or this one, is superfluous. — Likewise, « a thing is vain, as the Philosopher says, which does not include the end for which it exists »; but such is idle speech, from which no fruit follows: therefore it seems that whoever names the Lord in idle words, since he takes the name of God in vain, acts against that commandment: therefore he sins mortally. If you say that it is not understood of any taking whatever, but of taking in an oath; it is objected against this, that if anyone swears in common speech, where there is no necessity or utility, he acts against that commandment: therefore he will sin mortally by knowingly swearing; which seems very absurd. — Likewise, it is objected against the second exposition which the Master sets down, when he adds: « *Allegorically it is enjoined, that you should not think the Son to be a creature of God* »; because, since one may err about the Son in many ways, not only as Arius erred, but also as Sabellius erred: it seems that not only that heresy,

but also others ought to be forbidden. — Likewise, faith in the Trinity was not explicit to all in the time of the Law: if therefore all were bound to all the commandments of the Decalogue, it seems that nothing was enjoined which would pertain determinately to any [particular] person.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as through the first commandment man is ordered with respect to the highest Majesty, which is appropriated to the Father, so also through the second man is ordered with respect to the highest Truth, which is appropriated to the Son. Now this ordering is attended to in the confession of Truth itself without the admixture of any falsity, such that neither is anything false believed about it, nor is it taken up to confirm a falsehood. Hence in that commandment there is forbidden, according to the literal sense, the falsity of swearing by the name of God, and according to the spiritual sense there is forbidden the falsity of error concerning faith in the Truth. And in these two ways the Master in the letter expounds [it] according to the letter and according to allegory.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that perjury is against the fifth commandment of the second table; it must be said that two things are to be considered in false testimony, namely one, that an injury is done to the highest Truth, which is invoked into false testimony; the other, that an injury is done to the neighbor, who is damaged by the false testimony. And by reason of the first, perjury is forbidden in the second commandment of the first table; by reason of the second, in the fifth commandment of the second.

To that which is objected, that a thing is vain which is done to no purpose; it must be said that sometimes a thing is vain, as far as concerns *itself* and its own intention, sometimes a thing is vain *by accident*. But the name of God is then taken in vain when it is taken up for the confirmation of some speech which, as far as concerns itself, is not ordered to any utility, as for the confirmation of a false speech: and he who takes it up in this way sins against that commandment. But when it is taken up for the confirmation of something true, although that speech be idle; yet that taking-up is not altogether in vain, because it is ordered to this, that one may give credence to the word of the speaker, which even if one does not attain in another, yet it does not work altogether to no purpose, just as neither does the orator, if by composed and ordered speeches he does not always persuade. — Nevertheless, frequent swearing by the name of God, where there is no expressed necessity or utility, is not altogether without fault, but rather is very reprehensible, especially in perfect men, as will better appear below, when oath and perjury are treated, where the understanding of this second commandment is made clearer.

To that which is objected against the second exposition, it must be said that, according to what the Master himself says, that exposition was given by way of allegory and a certain exposition. Hence also in the exclusion of that error the others are by consequence understood to be excluded; nor does it regard every state, but the state of manifested and divulged faith.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says in the exposition of the third commandment: *Remember that you sanctify the day of the Sabbath;* where according to the letter the observance of the Sabbath is enjoined. But against this it is objected: because the observance of the Sabbath is ceremonial, according to what is said in Ezekiel: *I gave them my Sabbaths, that they might be a sign between me and them:* therefore it seems that the observance of the Sabbath ought not to be enjoined among the moral [precepts]. — Likewise, the moral precepts always remain; but the observance of the Sabbath has been done away with: therefore it seems that the observance of the Sabbath ought not to have been enjoined among the moral commandments. If you say that the observance of the Sabbath was changed into the Lord's day: it is asked, why was it changed into another day? — Likewise, if the observance of the Sabbath has been changed into the Lord's day; since the Jews were bound not to walk on the Sabbath, it seems that those sin who travel on the Lord's days.

Alongside this it is also asked, from what things one must cease on the Lord's days and on solemn days. — It is also asked: why in this commandment the manner of speaking is changed, and *remember* is said rather than in another commandment, since those commandments ought to be held in memory just as well as that one?

**I respond:** It must be said that in the commandment of the Sabbath there were two things to consider, namely the *cessation from servile work,* so that man might be free for God and attend to him; the other thing to consider there was the *signification of the day* and the *determination of the exterior works* from which one was to cease. As regards the first, the commandment

concerning the Sabbath was *moral;* for the Lord required at all times that man should prepare for himself a dwelling-place of the heart and be free for it from time to time, so that through love he might cleave to it; and as regards this it was not only *moral,* but also in a certain manner contributed to the integral fulfillment of the other moral [precepts], because, while man is free for himself and for God, he better knows what is to be done and what is to be shunned. And on this account *remember* is specially prefixed to this commandment, because in its remembrance the rest are remembered.

But another thing there is the *signification of the day* and the *determination of the work;* and as regards this it is *ceremonial* and *figural,* signifying that from which one is to *cease:* namely, from the work of sin; and what is to be *believed* and *awaited,* namely the rest of the Passion of Christ in the tomb. And as regards this it has to be placed among the *ceremonial* [precepts]. And this is the reason why that commandment is expressed more frequently in the Law than any of the others, because according to its diverse conditions it pertains to diverse genera of commandments. Hence it is sometimes named among the ceremonial and sometimes among the moral; and inasmuch as it is moral, it remains in the new Law; inasmuch as it is ceremonial, it has been done away with, the truth having come. Hence the observance of the Sabbath has been done away with in the new Law.

But the observance of the Lord's day and of the other solemnities was introduced for another cause, namely in memory of the benefit of redemption and in prefiguration of the future resurrection and for the removal of error: because according to the gentiles the Lord's day is the first, since at the beginning of that day the principal planet begins to dominate, as they say, namely the sun; on account of which they called it the day of the sun and exhibited veneration to it. In order, therefore, that that error might be excluded, and that the reverence of worship might be exhibited to God alone, the Lord's day was appointed, on which the Christian people might be specially free for the worship of God and might set aside earthly affairs, which distract the soul, lest it attend to God. Hence those works are especially prohibited by the Church herself; and such are called servile works, those especially in which man gapes after earthly gains, and which are beyond the necessary, through which the soul is most of all detained about these lower things, so that it recollects neither itself nor its God.

Nor are only servile works of this kind prohibited, but rather more and more diligently carnal works, such as drunkenness, quarrels, and brawls, which most of all are repugnant to the liberty of the spirit. And this is what Augustine says in the book *On the Ten Strings*: « It is said to you, that you should observe the Sabbath spiritually, not as the Jews observe [it] in carnal leisure: for they wish to be free for their trifles and luxuries. For a Jew would do better doing something useful in his field than persisting in seditions at the theaters. And their women would do better making wool on the Sabbath day than dancing shamelessly all day at their new-moon feasts ». But Augustine says this, not because one ought not to cease on solemn days from the business of exterior actions, but because the priests and prelates of the Church themselves, whose office it is to announce and determine such feasts, how and in what manner one is to cease from exterior work, ought rather to recall [people] from those things which afford a greater occasion of sinning. Hence in order to avoid leisure or unfitting entertainment, Augustine says that they ought rather to exercise themselves in works of piety and mercy than to attend to disordered and lascivious dealings. On account of which on those days they ought to frequent the churches, hear Masses, recall the benefits of God, hear the words of preaching, and imbue themselves with spiritual teachings; and this is to keep Sabbath unto God. — Through this the objections can be answered, and some understanding can be had concerning the aforesaid commandment. But concerning the cessation of the Sabbath and of the other ceremonial [precepts], something is treated in the fourth book, in the third distinction.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says in the exposition of the first precept of the second table. For he says that this is the first precept of the second table: *Honor your father and your mother, that you may be long-lived upon the earth,* namely of the living; and he adds the manner: *Parents are to be honored thus, that due reverence be shown to them, and the necessities be ministered.* Against this it is objected: first, because parents ought to be more solicitous about their children than vice versa: therefore it ought rather to be imposed on fathers that they minister to their children, than that the children minister to their parents. — Likewise, since we are bound not only to minister and do good to our parents, but also to other men; it seems that the aforesaid commandment was insufficiently given, since it makes mention only of parents. — Likewise, since we owe honor and benefits to parents, why is it enjoined to honor rather than to do good? — Likewise, since eternal beatitude corresponds to all the commandments, it is asked: why is length of life promised to this commandment; and to this commandment rather than to another?

**I respond:** It must be said that in this commandment is enjoined the ordering of man toward his neighbor according to beneficence. And since the showing of beneficence is attended to according to the order of charity; and in the order of charity parents come first: hence it is that the Lord, wishing at the same time to intimate the obligation and the order of charity, expressed [it] of parents rather than of the other neighbors, wishing the other neighbors also to be understood under the name of parents. — There is also another reason: because, while we owe beneficence to other persons, to our parents we owe not only beneficence, but also the reverence of honor; therefore, in order to enclose both at once in one, the Lawgiver preferred to express parents rather than other men. — There is also a third reason: because parents, after the begetting of their children, frequently arrive at old age and at a decrepit age; and especially for that time they need to be cherished and sustained, and are burdensome and onerous to others: therefore, for the sake of preserving the order of charity and of intimating the obligation of right and on account of the relief of necessity and need, he preferred to express parents rather than other men.

And by this is made plain the response to that which is objected concerning children. For that did not need to be expressly explained, because men are by nature sufficiently inclined [to it]. — And likewise the response to the other [objection] concerning the other neighbors is plain. — And likewise to that which is objected concerning the word *to honor.*

But to that which is asked: why is length of life specially promised to this commandment? it must be said that in this commandment is enjoined a work of piety, of which the Apostle says in the first [letter] to Timothy, the fourth [chapter], that *it has the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.* Hence to the carnal people the present life was promised, but to the spiritual not only the present, but also the future. — And if you ask: why is it promised to piety rather than to another [virtue]? it must be said that this is for the sake of the commendation of mercy itself, in whose act man most of all merits the mercy and grace of God. — And life is promised rather than another gift, on account of this, that it is that which is most of all loved; and so that man, awaiting length of life, may not abhor the long life of his parents.

There can also be given another reason for this promise: because the Jews were most of all prone to idolatry and to avarice, which is a kind of idolatry; therefore to that precept which is about idolatry a threat is added; and to that precept which is about beneficence, which is against avarice, a promise is added, so that by the threat they might be drawn back from evil, and by the promise drawn toward good. — It could also be said that the threat set down concerning the first precept of the first table refers to the others; likewise also the promise concerning the first precept of the second, and therefore it did not need to be repeated.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says in the exposition of the second commandment of the second table, that in this precept: *You shall not kill,* there is forbidden the act of homicide, according to the spirit [also] the will of killing; and it is objected against this: because the will of killing is worse than the will of committing adultery; but the will of committing adultery is not only forbidden according to the spirit, but rather also according to the letter: therefore by parity of rea-

soning also the will of killing [should be]. — Likewise, in the twenty-second [chapter] of Exodus: *You shall not suffer evildoers to live;* in which commandment killing is enjoined: therefore it seems that there is a repugnance between the *moral* commandment and the *judicial.* — Likewise, when killing is forbidden, it is understood either generally of *any living thing,* or specially of the *neighbor.* If generally of *any living thing:* then he sins who kills a fly and a louse; which is absurd and erroneous. If specially of the *neighbor:* then he does not seem to sin who kills himself, or who kills another's ox.

There is therefore a question, what is forbidden in this commandment; and also what is superadded to this commandment in the Gospel.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking about the understanding of this commandment, namely according to the understanding of the *Lawgiver,* or according to the understanding of the *carnal people.* If according to the understanding of the Lawgiver; thus indeed there is forbidden *exterior homicide* and the deliberative *will* ordered to harming the neighbor out of anger. Hence anger is forbidden, with deliberative consent in the soul and with exterior expression in word and sign and with perpetration in deed. — But if it is understood according to the understanding of the carnal people, who reckoned that only to be forbidden for which a penalty was inflicted by the Law itself; thus anger was understood to be forbidden [only] when it proceeded to the work of homicide.

And this understanding the Master calls literal, not because the other understanding was not part of the principal intention of the one bearing the Law, but because it was there enclosed implicitly. And since the explication of it was made in the law of the Gospel, therefore the Master says that a superaddition was made to that commandment, not because something new is enjoined, but because the understanding of the aforesaid commandment is explicated, while it is given to be understood that in the aforesaid commandment there is forbidden not only the perpetration of homicide in deed, but also the consent in the heart, the manifestation in a sign, and the expression in a word; on account of which he says three things: *He who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment. And he who says raca shall be liable to the council. And he who says fool* — where there is the expression of a word — *shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna;* where he gives to understand a threefold degree of the sin of anger preceding the consummation of homicide. — And by this is made plain the response to the first objection.

But to that which is objected, that in judicial [matters] it is enjoined to kill evildoers; it must be said that there is no contradiction there, because in the one is forbidden the homicide of an *innocent* and just [person], in the other the killing of an *evildoer* is enjoined. In the one also there is forbidden homicide by *one's own* authority, in the other it is enjoined by the authority of the *Law;* and these two do not have opposition or repugnance.

To that which is asked: whose killing is forbidden there? it must be said that there is forbidden there the killing of a living thing with rational life, whether one's own or another's; whence he who kills himself acts against the aforesaid commandment. Hence the heretics extend the aforesaid commandment too far, to the life of any brute animal whatever. For these it is lawful to kill, for the reason that they have been given to man for food and temporal support, according to what is said in the ninth [chapter] of Genesis.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says in the exposition of the third commandment, there: *You shall not commit adultery,* that is, *that you should not mingle with anyone, except by the covenant of marriage.* For it seems that the exposition of the Master is not correct. For if from the prohibition of the graver [sin] the prohibition of the less grave is not understood; since adultery or fornication-with-another is a graver sin than fornication, it seems that the prohibition of fornication is not understood in this. — Likewise, since the sins against nature are graver than the sin of adultery, it seems that he ought rather to forbid those among the precepts of the Decalogue than the sin of adultery. — Likewise, upon that text of Matthew, the fifth [chapter]: *Whoever shall look upon a woman to lust after her;* the Gloss says that there every carnal lust, by which the soul commits fornication, is understood to be forbidden by God. Since therefore this happens through every sin, it seems that every sin is forbidden there: it seems, therefore, that, this commandment being had, the rest are superfluous.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the commandments of the Decalogue sins are forbidden, most of all in the commandments of the second table, according as they are ordered to the harming of the neighbor; and since as regards the sin

of the flesh the neighbor is most of all offended through adultery: hence it is that this is especially forbidden. Yet in it there is understood to be forbidden every illicit intercourse and abuse of those members, according to what the Master says, whether through the sin of fornication, or through the sin against nature. — And by this is made plain the response to the first two objections.

But to that which is objected concerning that Gloss, it must be said that that Gloss is understood morally of spiritual fornication; but according to the literal understanding, in that commandment there is forbidden the illicit use of the genital members outside the law of marriage. Now every deliberate effusion of seed apart from the law of marriage is illicit and is understood to be forbidden here through adultery, which is directly repugnant to marriage. — But whether simple fornication is a mortal sin, and from what cause; is found inquired into in the treatise on marriage; from which, together with the things that are said here, the understanding of this commandment can to some extent be had.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about the fourth commandment, which is: *You shall not steal,* where the Master says that sacrilege, robbery, and usury are forbidden. And there is a question, what is the difference among those three. And it seems that sacrilege is not a special difference of theft, since sacrilege is said to be [committed] when someone carries off something not-sacred from a sacred place: it seems therefore that, since the circumstance of place is an accident, it does not make a diverse species of sin. — Likewise, an objection is raised concerning usury: because theft is the handling of another's thing against the will of the owner; but usury is the handling of a thing with the owner willing: therefore it does not seem that usury is contained under theft. — Likewise, he who helps a thief to steal runs with the thief and sins mortally: therefore if usury is theft, whoever gives usury sins mortally; which indeed seems very unfitting. — Likewise, if someone were to give another money for the loan of a house, or even without any service done to himself; he who would receive [it] would not commit theft nor any sin: therefore much more strongly it seems that he who lends another money, from which he profits, and does him a service, if he receives a recompense, does not commit any sin.

On account of this there is a question: why is usury committed rather in the lending of money than in the renting of houses and of other things?

**I respond:** It must be said that in that precept there is understood to be forbidden every illicit usurpation of another's thing; and that can be done through violence, or through fraud, and this either simply, or where some consecration adjoins. Hence here there is forbidden simple theft, and sacrilege, which is theft perpetrated about a sacred thing or a sacred place; and robbery, which is done through violence; and also usury, for the reason that in usury there is a certain violence and a certain fraud: fraud in this, that he sells a man his own thing. For everyone is bound to assist his neighbor in a loan by divine commandment; while therefore he sells him that which he is bound to do for him, he defrauds and deceives him. — Again, while by agreement he exacts something from him, in a certain manner he compels him to that which he ought not. Hence at all times usury has been forbidden, just as theft also, according to what the Master intimates in the letter.

But to that which is first objected concerning sacrilege, it must be said that the circumstance of place and of person can well transfer [an act] into another genus of sin; just as the corruption of a consecrated woman by reason of consecration transfers [the act] into a new genus of sin. Likewise it is to be understood in the matter proposed. For what is an accident to an action in the genus of nature can be a completion in the genus of morals.

But to that which is objected concerning usury, that the usurer does not handle another's thing against the owner's will; it must be said that there is an *absolute* will and a *conditional* one. And when it is said that the usurer handles the things which he receives beyond the principal, with the owner willing; it must be said that this is true of the *conditional* will, but nevertheless [it is] against the will as regards the *absolute* will. For he prefers to lack the money rather than lose the benefit of the loan, although by absolute will he would wish that the favor of the loan be advanced to him without payment.

To that which is objected, that then the usurer runs with the thief, if usury is contained under theft; it must be said that if anyone gives usury beyond necessity, he is not immune from fault; but when he gives usury out of necessity, he does not sin, because it is lawful for everyone to ransom the harassment of his own right. Hence just as

he who gives his garments to a robber, before he allows himself to be killed, is not said to *run with the robber;* so he who pays usury in necessity is not said to *run with the thief.* But how great a necessity one ought to await, this is for unction and right reason to determine, for the reason that according to the diverse conditions of persons necessities ought to be weighed in diverse ways.

But to that which is objected, that it is lawful to give money for the loan of a house and even gratis; it must be said that it is not alike. First, because where money is given *liberally* apart from every agreement, there is there a *liberal donation;* and therefore the handling is not illicit. But it is not so where an *illicit agreement* intervenes. — Likewise, it is not alike concerning other possessions and concerning money; and this for a threefold cause. The first indeed is: because in the lending of money, the money is transferred into another's ownership. And the sign of this is that he is not bound to return that same [money] numerically, but one like it; but in the loan of a house or of a horse the ownership is not transferred. — But another reason is, because money, while it is turned to use, is not consumed nor deteriorated; but it is not so concerning other things, which, according as we use them more and longer, tend more to defect. — But the third reason is, because money, as far as concerns itself, does not by itself bear fruit, but the fruit comes from elsewhere; but it is not so concerning other things, which of themselves bring forth fruit and utility: and therefore it is not alike. — But many things could here be asked concerning usury and theft and robbery and sacrilege, but for the sake of brevity let these suffice.

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor.* Against this it is objected: because not only does he sin who bears false testimony against his neighbor, but also against himself: therefore not only that ought to be forbidden, but also this. — Likewise, if someone bears false testimony for the utility of his neighbor, it is certain that without doubt he sins; and he does not sin against the neighbor, but rather against God: therefore it seems that the prohibition of false testimony does not pertain to the second table, but rather to the first. — Likewise it is asked, since perjury is unto the injury of God and unto the injury of the neighbor, why does the Master say that perjury is forbidden rather in this commandment than in the second commandment? And why does he treat of perjury rather in the exposition of this commandment than in the exposition of the second?

**I respond:** It must be said that in this precept there is forbidden the falsity of the mouth, especially as it is ordered to the harm of the neighbor, and consequently nonetheless, inasmuch as it is ordered to the harm of oneself. For a word is [directed] toward another, and he who speaks a falsehood to another, in a certain manner, even if he does not harm [him] by taking anything away, yet deceives [him] by misleading. — And through this a response can be made to that which is first objected.

But to that which is objected, that one lies against God; it must be said that a lie which is in the doctrine of faith and religion and is against divine truth and is ordered to the harm of the neighbor, can be forbidden from diverse causes, both in the commandments of the first table and in the commandments of the second, as was said concerning perjury. And because the knowledge of perjury depends upon the knowledge of lying — for perjury includes lying — hence it is that, although it is forbidden both in the second commandment of the first table and in the fifth of the second, the Master reserves the determination concerning perjury to the explication of the fifth commandment. — And through this a response can be made to the objections.