Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/38/q/bon-sent-III-d38-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether it is essential to a lie to be a sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is essential to a lie to be a sin. And that it is, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of Augustine, *Against Lying*, who says thus: « It seems to me that every kind of lie is a sin ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Lying*:

« Either one must not believe good men, or one must believe that those whom we believe ought sometimes to lie, or one must not believe that good men ever lie; of which the first is *pernicious*, the second *foolish*: it remains, then, that good men never lie ». If therefore someone lies, it is necessary, insofar as he lies, that he be evil: therefore it is essential to a lie itself to be a sin.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the same place: « Whoever shall have thought that there is some kind of lie which is not a sin, basely deceives himself »: therefore the same returns as before.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by *reason*: because it is essential to a lie itself to be a privation of truth both with respect to the *thing* and with respect to the *intention*; but wherever there is obliquity of intention, there is necessarily fault: therefore it is necessary that the lie itself be a sin.

5. Likewise, every iniquity, speaking essentially, is a sin; but wherever there is a lie, there is deceit, because a man bears one thing in his heart, says another with his mouth; but where there is deceit, there is iniquity: therefore *from the first*, it is impossible that any lie not be a sin.

6. Likewise, words were instituted for this, that a man should express through them what he bears in his mind; but whoever lies uses words contrary to what he bears in his mind: therefore whoever lies uses words contrary to that for which they were instituted; and everyone who uses a thing contrary to that for which it was instituted, necessarily abuses it; and everyone who abuses [a thing], sins: therefore everyone who utters a lie, sins.

**On the contrary**, it is objected: 1. *First*, by *examples*: because, in Genesis 22, Abraham, when he intended to immolate the boy, said that he would return to the servants with the boy; and Isaac said of his wife that she was his sister, in Genesis 26; and concerning Joseph likewise an example is had, in Genesis 42 and 44. If therefore Scripture narrates the deeds of the Patriarchs not as to be reprehended, but as to be imitated; and they themselves lied; it seems that someone can lie without sin.

2. Likewise, in the Scriptures many *expressions* are set forth which according to the intention of the letter are false, as is plain from what is said in Judges 9: that *the trees went to the bramble* etc.; and disputants set forth many things which they know to be false: since therefore sacred *Scripture* was given and written and inspired without any sin, and *disputation* for inquiring after truth is praiseworthy and meritorious; it seems that some lies can be told without any fault: therefore it is not essential to a lie itself to be a sin.

3. Likewise, according as Ambrose says, « there is a lie not only in *words*, but also in simulated *deeds* »; but it happens that one does simulated deeds without any sin, as Joshua did, who simulated that he fled before the inhabitants of Ai; and David, who simulated that he was mad before King Achish; and Jehu, who simulated that he was a worshipper of Baal; and these did not sin, but are rather commended: therefore it seems by like reasoning that a lie can be made in words without sin.

4. Likewise, homicide and theft are a greater evil than a lie is; but theft and homicide can be done well, nor is it necessary that they always be a sin — as is plain concerning those who kill by the authority of the law, and steal in time of necessity, or by the command of the Lord, as did the children of Israel — therefore it seems much more strongly that some lie can be done well: therefore it is not essential to it to be a sin.

5. Likewise, the lie by which one lies to a neighbor is against a commandment of the second table; but in the commandments of the second table, as Bernard says, the Lord can dispense, so that they may be done well: therefore also in the lie itself: therefore it does not seem that it is essential to it to be a sin.

6. Likewise, it is possible that someone lie for the sake of preserving the chastity of another, whom he loves out of charity; but everything that is done out of charity is done well and meritoriously, and such a thing is not a sin: therefore if it is possible to lie out of charity, it is possible that a lie not be a sin.

### Conclusion.

> Every lie is a sin; nay, this is so essential to it that by no means, by no end, by no dispensation, whether human or divine, can it be done well.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt every lie is a sin; and it is so essential to a lie itself to be a sin that by no means, by no end, by no dispensation, neither human nor divine, can it be done well. And this Augustine says expressly and strives to prove in many ways; and in this the doctors commonly agree. But the *reason* for this is difficult to assign, and toward this we can strive in diverse ways.

For one reason can be rendered on the part of that *against which* a lie is. For a lie is against *Truth*, but homicide and theft are against a *creature*. Now God cannot act against his own truth — nor can anyone justly go against the divine truth — although he can subject any *creature* to another at his pleasure and dispose and order it. Therefore although it is possible to dispense in homicide and theft, nevertheless not in a lie. — But this reason does not seem to suffice, because not every lie is against *uncreated Truth*. For just as there is created and uncreated *goodness*, so too is there created and uncreated *truth*; and just as God is above *created goodness*, so too is he above *created truth*: therefore just as he can dispense that someone destroy some created good, yet so that no prejudice be done to his goodness; so it seems likewise concerning truth.

Therefore there is another way of speaking, that a lie can in no way be done well, neither by any *end* nor by any *dispensative precept*, because there always remains in it a disorder, which indeed is from the *discord* of voice and understanding; but it is not so to be found in the others — for a supervening divine command takes away that disorder which is in homicide and theft — therefore malice adheres more to a lie itself than to theft or homicide. — But not even this yet seems to suffice: because, if God can make two men disagree with one another without sin, as we say of Paul and Barnabas; it seems likewise that, the discord of understanding and speech remaining, all fault could be removed by divine dispensation. And therefore a sufficient reason does not seem to be taken on the part of the *discord* of intention and speech.

And therefore there is still a *third* way of speaking, that a thing is said to be evil in two ways: either from the *kind of act*, as when the act passes upon an undue matter, or from the *malice of the intention*. But when the act passes upon an undue matter, this can be in two ways: either with respect to God, or with respect to a neighbor. If with respect to God; thus it is evil *in itself* and *according to itself*, nor can it in any way be done well, as is to hate the highest Good and to blaspheme God. — If with respect to a neighbor, as is to inflict harm on a neighbor in person or in goods; thus it is evil *in itself*, and can by some end be done well, because a right intention can supervene from a dispensation. — But when a thing is evil from the *malice of the intention*, then whether it be with respect to God, or with respect to a neighbor, it is *absolutely* evil and can by no end be done well, because it names a privation of the due end. Hence to make this evil to be good is nothing other than to make some one thing be at once good and evil. But such is a lie. — For a lie names an evil not only from this, that the act passes upon an undue matter, but also from an *indirect intention*; for to the *being* of a lie these two concur, namely to say what is false and the intention of deceiving. And the first is evil *in itself* and can be done well by one who ignorantly says what is false; but by reason of the second it is evil *according to itself* and can by no end be done well, nor can there be a dispensation concerning it; just as in no way can it be done well that someone know another [woman] with the intention of adultery or out of depravity of will. — One must therefore concede, according to this, the reasons showing that it is essential to a lie itself to be a sin, and that the lie itself is evil *according to itself*, as Augustine says, since from the account of its name it includes a disordered intention, as has been shown.

1. To that indeed which is objected first to the contrary by the *examples* of the Old Testament, concerning the lie of Abraham, Isaac, and Joseph; it must be said that none of them lied. For although Abraham was willing to immolate his son, nevertheless he believed, from the greatness of his faith, as the Apostle says, that the Lord would raise him up; for he knew that the promise was firm, by which it had been said: *In Isaac shall thy seed be called*. — Likewise neither did Isaac lie,

because Rebecca was a sister and a wife, and by saying that she was his sister, he indeed kept silent the truth, but yet did not utter a falsehood. — Likewise too neither did Joseph lie, because he was not saying those words by affirming, but rather by testing, when he was saying that they were spies. Hence they are rather to be understood *interrogatively* than *affirmatively*. And when he said that he was skilled in the *science of divining*; the word *divining* is taken broadly for the foresight of future things. *Moreover*, this same thing too he said *interrogatively*, rather expressing the report of the people which he had concerning this, than willing to attribute that report to himself. So too concerning similar matters one must judge.

2. To that which is objected concerning the *expressions* set down in Scripture, it must be said that the things which are said *by transference* are referred to the consequent meaning and are understood for that; and when they hold truth for that, there is no lie there. And this is what Augustine says in the book *On Lying*: « Whatever is done or said *figuratively* is not a lie; for every enunciation is to be referred to that which it enunciates. But everything done or said *figuratively* enunciates this, which it signifies to those for whom it has been brought forth to be understood »; and so there is no lie there, because they are not enunciated for the *first* meaning, but for the *second*, which is true. — So too neither in *disputation* is there a lie, when certain false things are set forth so that through them a man may lead [another] to a greater falsehood, and by leading to a greater falsehood may lead back to truth. For in disputations the propositions are rather interrogations than assertions of truth, unless perhaps in *doctrinal* disputations, in which « the learner must believe », where only true things are set forth, proved, and supposed.

3. To that which is objected concerning *simulation* in a *deed*, it must be said that there is a simulation of *caution*, and of *instruction*, and of *duplicity*. Simulation of caution was in Jehu, when he pretended to be a worshipper of Baal, and in David, who pretended to be mad. But simulation of *teaching* was in Christ, when he *pretended to go further*, as is said in the last [chapter] of Luke; in which he instructed his disciples in the office of hospitality, by which they compelled him to remain with them, through which they merited also to recognize him. But simulation of *duplicity* is in hypocrites, who in an exterior sign show that they are good, and inwardly are filled with malice. The first two simulations do not hold the account of a lie, but the third holds the account of a lie; and that is not without sin. — *Moreover*, it is not similar concerning *word* and *deed*, because a *deed* is not principally instituted to signify the concept of the mind. But *speech* is instituted for this, that it be « the *messenger and interpreter of the mind itself* », and that a man signify to another what is with him, and that truth be constituted in the hearer, which is in the speaker; and therefore he who uses speech itself for another purpose abuses it and incurs the sin of a lie. But it is not always so on the part of a *deed*.

4. To that which is objected, that theft and homicide are a greater sin than a lie; it must be said that although each of them is a graver sin when it is done with a bad intention and a bad end; nevertheless, because it happens that they are separated from a bad end, therefore they can be done. But it is not so to be found in a lie, because from the very *account of its name* it names the obliquity of intention.

5. To that which is objected, that it is against a commandment of the second table; it must be said that in the commandments of the second table as regards the *act* it happens well that God dispense, but as regards the *disorder of the intention* never, so that someone be excused from sin on account of the divine precept, the disordered intention remaining.

6. To that which is objected concerning him who is moved out of charity to lie; it must be said that charity presupposes truth, whence it moves to nothing that is repugnant to truth — to truth, I say, on the part of the soul. Hence Bernard says that for a work to be praiseworthy, it is necessary that there be « charity in the intention and truth in the choice ». And because truth is not preserved in the uttering of a lie; hence it is that a lie cannot be told out of charity. For just as out of charity an evil cannot knowingly be committed, which indeed would remain evil, so that good might come of it; so too out of charity what is false cannot be said,

so that truth or good might follow from it. And there is a likeness: because, just as the *operative* power serves the *affective*, so the *interpretative* power serves the *intellective*; and just as the end of *affection* is good, so the end of *understanding* is truth. Just as therefore no work can be done out of charity unless one intends the *good*, and that work be orderable to the *good*; so too no speech can be uttered out of charity unless in the uttering of that speech one first intends the *true*. And because a lie is ordered to the contrary of the true, namely to the indicating of what is false from the very intention of the one bringing it forth; therefore it cannot be done out of charity nor meritoriously, but always badly. And this reason was touched upon in the very response made to question 3.

---