Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/38/q/bon-sent-III-d38-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether a lie is a mortal sin by reason of its kind.*

Thirdly it is asked whether a lie is a mortal sin by reason of its kind. And that it is, it seems:

1. *First*, by that which is said in the Psalm: *Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie*; the Gloss: « To destroy is more than to hate »; but God hates no one except on account of mortal sin: therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 1: *The mouth that lieth killeth the soul*; treating which word Augustine says in the book *On the Conflict of the Vices and Virtues*: « Neither by an officious lie nor by a simple word ought one to deceive anyone, because, in whatever way one lies, he kills the soul »; but no one is killed except by a mortal sin: therefore in whatever way one lies, he sins mortally.

3. Likewise, on that text: *Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie*; there the Gloss: « If anyone does not wish to betray a man to death, let him keep silent the truth, but let him not utter a falsehood, lest for the body of another he kill his own soul »; but no lie is a lighter sin than an officious lie: therefore if that one kills the soul, so does every other. Since therefore the soul is not killed except by a mortal sin, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *reason*. Everything that is contrary to truth and destructive of it is a mortal sin; but every lie is repugnant to truth, as fornication to chastity: therefore just as fornication is a mortal sin by reason of its kind, so too is a lie.

5. Likewise, « everyone who acts against conscience builds toward Gehenna »; but everyone who lies speaks against conscience, because he says what is false with the intention of deceiving: therefore one who utters a lie builds toward Gehenna; but a man is not said to build toward Gehenna except by mortal sin: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every sin in which there is full consent, and which is done from certain knowledge, is a mortal sin, because in a sin in which there is full consent, the higher portion of reason eats; but a sin which is from certain knowledge is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is the gravest: since therefore every lie by reason of its kind is a sin from certain knowledge, and one in which there is full consent; it seems that every lie is a mortal sin.

**On the contrary:** 1. *First*, the Gloss on the first [chapter] of Exodus: « To the weak it is granted to lie »; but no mortal [sin] is granted to anyone: therefore a lie is not a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, Gregory, speaking of the lie of the midwives, says: « This kind of sin we readily believe to be remitted »; but a sin which is readily remitted is in the genus of the venial: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, nothing is a mortal sin except where lust intervenes, or contempt; but an officious lie of its own account does not name lust nor contempt: therefore it does not seem that it is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, when someone jests with his neighbor by telling him a tale, he does not act against any prohibition: therefore it does not seem that he sins mortally; but he lies with a jesting lie: therefore not every lie is a mortal sin.

### Conclusion.

> Not every lie is a mortal sin, but by reason of its kind it is indifferent both to the mortal and to the venial.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt not every lie is a mortal sin; nay, as regards what is by reason of its kind, it is indifferent both to the mortal and to the venial. — And the reason for this is: because the tongue is set on a slippery place, and it is easier to speak than to be silent; therefore the act of the tongue is not always weighed, nor can it easily be weighed. On account of which it is said in James 3: *He that offendeth not in word, this man is a perfect man*; on account of which also the sin of a lie is not generally mortal. — But it becomes mortal by reason of the *matter about which* and by reason of *contempt* and by reason of *harm* and also by reason of the *lust* of lying, which make a lie to be pernicious and a mortal sin; and because these do not always concur to the *being* of a lie: therefore it can be sometimes venial, sometimes mortal, as the reasons brought forward to this side show.

1. To that indeed which is objected from the authority of the Psalm, that all are destroyed who speak a lie; it must be said that, as the Gloss explains, this is not understood as said of a lie *generally*, but *according to the difference of the pernicious lie*; whence that distribution is not referred to the lie itself, but to the persons who lie with that kind of lie. And so in that process there is the fallacy of *figure of speech* on account of the change of the supposition of that which I call *lie*, because a process is made from the determinate to the confused.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Wisdom, it can be said that likewise that authority is not understood of every lie, but of the *pernicious* lie. — And *if it be objected* that Augustine explains that in whatever way one lies, he kills the soul; it must be said that not even there does Augustine intend to distribute over all the differences of a lie; but understanding it of the *pernicious* lie, which is in the teaching of religion, he says that by no means, by no end, can one lie without killing the soul; and that can better be gathered from the text that follows.

3. To that which is objected, that a man ought not to lie for the salvation of another, lest he kill his own soul; it can be said that that word extends only to the *perfect*, of whom Augustine speaks in the original, whence that Gloss is taken. — It could also be said that that word is said *by way of counsel*, because a man is not bound to lie for anyone, nor is he bound to harm his own soul for the bodily welfare of another. Since therefore any lie whatever, even if it does not induce death, because nevertheless it is a sin, disposes toward death; therefore he counsels that one not lie for the preserving of the bodily welfare of another. And so from this it is not had that every lie is a mortal sin, but that it is a mortal sin, or prepares [for it].

4. To that which is objected, that every lie is destructive of the virtue of truth; it must be said that the *virtue of truth* is rather the will of speaking the truth, when it is fitting and expedient, than that it is a continual enunciation of the true. But although the uttering of the lie itself is repugnant to the *act* of speaking the truth, nevertheless it is not repugnant to *truth* itself, by which one shuns the *pernicious* lie. — Nor is it similar concerning fornication with respect to chastity, since that act is universally prohibited; but not so every difference of a lie, and this is on account of the slipperiness of the tongue itself. Whence there are certain exterior lies which are not opposed to the virtue-of-truth itself, like venial sins, and like the first motions to chastity. But certain ones are opposed like mor-

tal sins; and these are prohibited in the fifth commandment, in which the Master says that lying and perjury are prohibited.

5. To that which is objected, that he who acts against conscience builds toward Gehenna; it must be said that conscience dictates that something be shunned as contrary to justice, and something as that which makes [one] in some way turn aside from justice. He who in the first way acts against the dictate of conscience sins mortally on account of the intervening contempt, and he is the one who builds toward Gehenna. But he who [acts] in the second way does not build toward Gehenna nor is he properly said to act against conscience, but *beside* conscience. And in the first way pernicious lies are against conscience, in the second way the *others*. For conscience does not dictate that all lies are equally to be avoided, but some as mortal, some as venial. And *if thou object* that everyone who lies, with whatever kind of lie he lies, always says directly the contrary of that which conscience dictates; it must be said that conscience dictates concerning something that it is true, and concerning something that it is to be said, or the contrary of it. And when someone utters what is false knowingly, although he acts directly against the conscience which dictates that something is true, nevertheless he does not act against that conscience which dictates that something is not to be said. And as regards the second dictate of conscience, which directs in things to be done, the magnitude of the sin is weighed, not as regards the judgment of conscience, which governs in things to be known.

6. To that which is objected, that in every lie the higher part of reason eats, and certain knowledge concurs; it must be said that, as was determined in the second book, the eating of the higher portion makes a mortal sin only in those whose acts are *simply* and *universally* prohibited, as in the sin of the flesh; but this has no place in the sin of a lie. — Likewise not every sin which is done from certain knowledge is a sin against the Holy Spirit, but that in which malice itself concurs together with certain knowledge. — And if thou object that every lie impugns the truth that is recognized, which is one species of the sin against the Holy Spirit; it must be said that not any kind of impugning of *truth* nor any kind of *impugning* is the sin against the Holy Spirit, but the impugning of truth according to *piety*, and further an impugning which is with a certain *insolence* and *obstinacy* of mind, which is not to be found in every lie. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that every lie is a sin against the Holy Spirit, nor even that it is universally a mortal sin.

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