Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/38/q/bon-sent-III-d38-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether every lie is mortal for perfect men.*

Fourthly it is asked whether every lie is mortal for perfect men. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

**Arguments for the affirmative side:**

1. First, upon that text of the Psalm: *Thou wilt destroy all* etc.; the Gloss: «It is *altogether* unbecoming for the perfect to lie»; but it says this only because it is a sin of another kind for the perfect and for the imperfect — for what is *altogether* not permitted is indicated to be mortal — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On Lying*: «How, he says, does he love his neighbor as himself, who, that he may grant him temporal life, loses eternal life»? he speaks of the perfect: therefore it seems that for an officious lie the perfect man loses eternal life: therefore he sins mortally.

3. Likewise, Augustine, treating that passage of Proverbs the twenty-ninth, according to the translation of the Septuagint: *A son receiving the word shall be far from perdition, and nothing false proceeds from his mouth;* Augustine, expounding this, speaks thus: «A son receiving the eternal Word through grace reckons it as much closed off to him to help a man through a lie as if he were compelled to pass through fornication». If, then, to pass through fornication is a mortal sin, it seems that for the sons of the heavenly Jerusalem to lie for the safety of someone is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, no one is to be believed, if perfect men are not believed; but if perfect men were to lie, they

would not be believable: but if no one is believed, faith perishes from the earth: therefore the lying of the perfect destroys and empties out the faith by which men and kingdoms are governed. If, then, such faith cannot be taken away without mortal fault, it seems that perfect men in any kind of lie whatsoever incur the guilt of mortal sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. A circumstance does not aggravate a sin infinitely: if, then, the state of perfection is a circumstance on the part of the person, it will not aggravate the sin infinitely. But the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely: therefore what is venial for the imperfect is not mortal for the perfect.

2. Likewise, *not to lie* by every kind of lie is either a *counsel* or a *precept.* If a *precept:* then since all are bound to a precept, all who lie sin mortally, which above was disproved. If a *counsel;* but to counsels no one is bound except by a vow: therefore since perfect men have not vowed this, it seems that they do not sin mortally even in any kind of lie whatsoever.

3. Likewise, if a lie repugns perfect charity generally, then either inasmuch as it is *charity,* or inasmuch as it is *perfect.* If inasmuch as it is *charity:* then for any charity whatsoever: then anyone would sin mortally. If inasmuch as it is *perfect:* then it seems that through a lie the perfect man does not fall from charity, but only from perfection: therefore he does not sin mortally through any lie whatsoever.

4. Likewise, the perfect man in an idle word, in a motion of anger, and in the motions of the flesh, and in other things which are venial by reason of their kind, is not said to sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning neither in a *jocose* and *officious* lie, since by reason of their kind they are venial.

### Conclusion.

> It can probably be conceded, according to Augustine, that to perfect men, whose perfection is public, a lie however small is imputed unto mortal sin.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there is a threefold manner of speaking.

*Opinion 1.* For some have wished to say that those lies which are venial for the *imperfect* are also venial for *perfect* men; yet nevertheless, because the perfect have less proneness to lying than the imperfect, hence it is that they sin more gravely. Hence Augustine does not wish to show, as they say, that every lie is *mortal* sin for the *perfect,* but since no lie can be done well, it is nevertheless more unbecoming and unfitting concerning the *perfect* than concerning the *imperfect,* not because the *perfect* man for any sin whatsoever slays his own soul and merits to go into perdition, but because by this very fact, while he adheres less to truth, he approaches iniquity and disposes himself to fall and ruin.

*An objection is raised.* But since the words of Augustine seem expressly to put forward that it is perilous for perfect men to lie — for it is said in the Gloss upon that text: *Thou wilt destroy all who speak a lie;* that «it is not becoming for the *perfect* to lie, not even for the temporal life of someone to be preserved»; and afterward it adds that «the *perfect* man should not speak a falsehood, lest for the life of another he slay his own soul»; and thus it seems expressly to say that an officious lie is mortal for perfect men — *Opinion 2.* therefore it seems that the matter must be put otherwise by others, namely that there is a perfection of *vow* or of religion, and a perfection of *charity,* by which a man perfectly adheres to the supreme Truth and Goodness through intellect and affection, as far as is possible in this life; and this is called the perfection of *tranquillity*. Of the *first perfect* Augustine does not understand [it], but of the *second.* For those *perfect,* by reason that they adhere most to the supreme Truth, do not have a proneness to lying; and therefore, when they lie, they are not excused, but there intervenes a *contempt* of truth, and any lie whatsoever deliberately spoken is for them *mortal* sin. *An example.* And the example is given of the first man, who in the state of innocence, on account of the tranquillity which he had, could not sin venially, because there was in him no proneness of infirmity excusing him, so that in his sin he might be said to be worthy of pardon or of temporal punishment. — *It is disproved on many counts.* But this is still open to objection, because very few or none are to be found in this perfection of charity. *Furthermore,* however perfect someone may be with the perfection of tranquillity, if he speaks some idle word, he does not sin mortally. And *again,* the more a man is of greater perfection in the present life, the more he is of greater piety; and the more of greater piety, the more prone he is to helping another's safety. When, therefore, the perfect man sees that he can help another's bodily or spiritual safety through the falsehood of his word; it seems that he should not a little be inclined by piety itself and sweetness, just as we see that a father is more prone to lying for the safety

of his son than for the safety of one stranger. Granted even that there be no proneness; since a *jocose* and *officious* lie is not prohibited, if someone has not bound himself to this by a vow; however perfect he may be, it does not seem that he incurs mortal sin.

*Opinion 3.* And therefore there is still a third manner of speaking, namely that a man is bound to something specially beyond others *(grounds of obligating):* either by reason of a *vow taken,* or by reason of an *office committed [to him],* or by reason of *imminent scandal*, or by reason of *conscience dictating.* If, then, we say that perfect men are bound to not lying by any kind of sin; since this is not from a *precept* nor from an *office committed* nor from a *vow,* *(an axiom)* this will be on account of *scandal* and the *bond of conscience.* — *(the perfect public and hidden).* On account of which note that some are *perfect public,* some are *perfect hidden.* To *publicly perfect* men faith is granted as to preservers of truth. And because a lie detected makes a man not believe another; if *perfect* men were to lie, then neither would they themselves be believed nor any others, and great prejudice would be done to truth itself, and occasion of scandalizing would be given to others. And therefore such *perfect* men ought to have a *conscience* such that for nothing should they knowingly speak a falsehood; when therefore they speak [it], they sin mortally, both because they act against the *dictate of conscience,* and also because they *actively scandalize* others. — Not so, however, are men scandalized about those who are *imperfect,* or even about the *hidden perfect;* therefore such are not bound in the same way to avoiding every lie. *An example.* And there is an example of this: that, if someone were to assail the faith, it would be lawful for the imperfect to flee and hide; but perfect men are bound to stand and freely confess, lest by their flight and concealment the weak people fall from the faith; whence conscience ought reasonably to dictate this to them.

*Conclusion.* It can therefore be conceded, according to Augustine, that to *perfect* men, whose perfection is *public,* a lie however small is imputed unto mortal sin, since on account of *scandal to be avoided* their *conscience* ought to dictate to them that in no way is there to be lying, lest they make truth come into contempt. And this Augustine seems to have held, who was a chief lover of truth; and every man who loves truth vehemently hates a lie. Whence it is said in Ecclesiasticus: *Better is a thief than the constancy of a lying man.* — Whence also the authorities and reasons brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

**Solution of the opposed [arguments]:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that a circumstance of the person does not aggravate a sin infinitely; it must be said that that is true, as far as it is in itself; *(to be noted)* but where some *circumstance* introduces another's scandal and a bond of conscience, consequently it changes the kind of sin and makes that to be mortal which otherwise would be venial. For the *bond* of conscience even in indifferent matters makes others sin mortally, how much more in those things which it reasonably dictates?

2. To that which is objected, that not to lie by every kind of lie is either a counsel or a precept etc.; it must be said that as to certain kinds of lie it is prohibited, as to certain others it is not properly prohibited, but restrained. *(to be noted)* For venial sins are not called prohibited, but restrained. But those which by divine precept are not altogether prohibited — because a precept regards all — by the bond of conscience and by scandal, which regards special persons, are made prohibited. And thus it must be understood to hold in this part.

3. To that which is objected, that a lie either repugns charity simply, or perfect charity; it must be said that a lie repugns both. For it repugns charity by reason of the superadded perfection, since the very perfection of the just man, manifest to others, introduces occasionally scandal and a bond of conscience, and consequently sin, which not only takes away perfection, but also charity itself.

4. To that which is objected, that the perfect man does not sin in an idle word nor in first motions, just as neither does another imperfect man; it must be said that it is not alike: because from other venial sins there does not so arise scandal, nor does truth so come into contempt, as in the case of a lie, if it be found about a perfect man, according to what was explained above.

*Restriction of the conclusion.* These things, however, have been said about lying according as the words of blessed Augustine put forward, who on account of his great zeal for truth most greatly detested a lie, and since he could not exclude lying from all, [wished] at least to remove it far from *perfect* men, so that truth might find a solid seat in some. *Explanation of Augustine's words.* And therefore, if someone wishes to understand that a lie which is venial to others is not mortal for perfect men; he will be able to answer to the words of Augustine, understanding by them that a lie is always unbecoming and evil for perfect men, who by lying dispose themselves and others to evil; but not that it is always mortal sin for them. And by this all the reasons brought forward for the opposite can be set aside. — *(to be noted).* Whatever of these be true, nevertheless for a man who professes perfection, every lie is to be most exceedingly avoided.