Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/38/q/bon-sent-III-d38-a1-q5
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### Question V. *On the division of a lie itself.*

Fifthly it is asked concerning the division of a lie itself. For Augustine and the Master divide a lie by three primary differences, namely into the *officious*, the *jocose*, and the *pernicious*. But against this division it is objected:

1. *First*, by reason of the *first member*. For a lie is called *officious* which benefits someone; but that a lie should benefit, this is very much *by accident*, since it is an evil: therefore in respect of this, that it *benefits*, no species of the lie itself can be assigned.

2. Likewise, the same lie according to *species* can *benefit* and can *harm*: therefore in respect of these it does not happen that diverse species of a lie itself can be assigned.

3. Likewise, it is objected against the *second* difference, which indeed is the *jocose* lie: since, just as the sin of a lie happens to be perpetrated in *jest*, so too the other differences of sins: therefore if other sins do not admit of being divided by the *jocose* and the *non-jocose*, it seems that neither does the lie itself.

4. Likewise, when someone says what is false intending to *jest*, he does not intend to *deceive*; « but a lie, as Augustine says, is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving »: therefore where jesting intervenes, there is no lie: it seems therefore that a jocose lie is not a species of lie, but rather a *defect* and *diminution* of it.

5. Likewise, it is objected against the *third* difference, which is the *pernicious* lie. For if that lie is called *pernicious* which induces death, and every mortal sin induces death; to be *pernicious* is general to every mortal sin: therefore it is not a difference of a lie.

6. Likewise, a *pernicious* lie, if it is distinguished from the others, this is either by reason of *matter*, or by reason of *will*. Not by reason of *matter*, as it seems, because in any matter whatever a man can lie gravely and perniciously, if he lie out of malignity. Nor by reason of *will*, since in any kind whatever of a lie the will can be moved inordinately and induce death or destruction in the one lying: therefore it does not seem that it is a special difference of a lie.

Likewise, it is objected against the *aforesaid differences*: since Augustine divides a lie into *eight* differences: therefore either that division is *superfluous*, or this one is *diminished*, or it is necessary that one be *reduced* to the other. If therefore it is *reduced*, it is asked, by what *way*; it is also asked, what is the *number* of the species of a lie, and what its *sufficiency*.

### Conclusion.

> There are three genera of lies, which, according to the variety of the intention of those who lie, are subdivided into eight members.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that, since a lie has for its *formal* and *completive* [element] the intention of deceiving, according to the intention of the one lying it admits of being diversified into species. Now the one who lies either intends to *benefit*, or to *delight*, or to *harm*. According as he intends to *benefit*, it is an *officious* lie; according as he intends to *delight*, it is a *jocose* lie; according as he intends to *harm*, it is a *pernicious* lie. But one can harm in two ways: either by *temporal* harm, or by *spiritual* harm. And if he harms by *temporal* harm, this can be in two ways: either he *simply* harms, or he so harms the one that he *benefits* the other. — And according to this there are three differences of the *pernicious* lie, of which one consists in that kind of lie by which someone lies in the *teaching of religion*; and this indeed makes for the harm of a spiritual good, namely of faith. Another difference consists in this, that the lie *simply harms*. But the third difference [consists] in this, that the lie *does not simply harm*, but benefits one and harms another. — But if someone lies in order to *delight*, thus it is a *jocose* lie; and thus it can be in two ways: either to delight *another*, and thus it is a *simply jocose* lie; or to delight *himself* in lying, and thus it is a *libidinous* lie. — But if someone lies in order to *benefit another*; either he lies to benefit in *things*, and thus it is *one* difference of the *officious* lie; or to benefit in the *health and life of the body*, and thus it is *another*; or to benefit in the *sanctity and chastity of the mind*, and thus it is *a third*.

And thus it is plain that there are three primary genera of lies, which are subdivided into eight members, in such a way that each division is taken according to the variation of the *intention* of the one lying, and one of them admits of being included in the other, and this quite reasonably, as has been touched on. And by this is plain the response to that which was asked last.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary, that it is accidental to a lie that it benefit; it must be said that this is true, as regards what is by reason of its *kind*; yet because in morals the *intention* imposes the name on the work, from the *intention* itself that condition can become so essential to the lie that according to it the diverse species of the lie itself are taken.

2. To that which is objected, that the same lie according to species can *harm* and *benefit*; it must be said that this is true, speaking of a lie as regards the *exterior speech*, but it is not true of it as regards the *interior intention*; for a lie does not take its species from the false utterance, but rather from the *intention* itself, as has been touched on.

3. To that which is objected, that other sins admit of being done in jest, just as a lie [does]; it must be said that denominations are not made from those things which rarely happen, but from those which frequently. Although therefore it may happen that other sins be perpetrated through jest; yet because the others are not so frequently committed in jest as a lie itself: hence it is that to be jocose is not a difference of another sin, as [it is] of a lie. *Moreover*, even though *all* works take their denomination from the intention itself, most of all does *speech* take its denomination from the intention; and because a lie is in *speech*: hence it is that it is more denominated jocose, when it is done with the intention of playing, than the other sins.

4. To that which is objected, that where jesting intervenes, there is no intention of deceiving; it must be said that, as will be explained in the text, when it is said: a lie is a false uttering of the voice with the intention of deceiving, according as it is taken *generally*, *to deceive* is not the same as *to delude*, but *to deceive* is the same as *to say what is false*. Whence the sense is: with the intention of *deceiving*, that is, of *saying what is false*; and this certainly belongs to a *jocose* lie, although less completely than to a *pernicious* one.

5. To that which is objected, that to be *pernicious* belongs to every kind of mortal sin; it must be said that *pernicious* is assigned to be a difference of the sin itself, not because it is proper to it *simply*; but this is by reason of the *officious* lie, against which the *pernicious* is distinguished, because that one *benefits* and this one *harms*; and since the other kinds of sins are not so distinguished by the *officious*, as a lie [is]: hence it is that neither are they so distinguished by the *pernicious*.

6. To that which is objected, whether it be distinguished by reason of *matter*, or of *will*; it must be said that [it is distinguished] by reason of *will* principally, although it could also be said that [it is] by reason of *matter* as regards that difference of the *pernicious* lie which indeed consists

in the *teaching of religion*. And if thou object that this depraved will can be in every kind of lie; the response is already plain, because that is false, according to what was explained: because, according as words serve the *intention*, the diversification of the species of a lie comes about.

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