Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/38/q/bon-sent-III-d38-a1-q6
----------------------------------------
### Question VI. *On the degrees of the species of lies.*

Sixthly and last it is asked concerning the degrees of the species of lies. For Augustine says that «the first kind of lie is the gravest, and the last is the lightest. And by however much, among the kinds of lie, some lie draws near to the first, by so much is it graver; and by however much it is removed farther and draws near to the last, by so much is it lighter». «But the first kind of lie, as he says, is in the *teaching of religion* »; «and the last, as he says, is *for the preservation of another's chastity* ». Against this which he says, that the *first* is the gravest, it is objected thus.

1. Suppose that someone says that Christ did not ascend upon the ass, out of a certain pleasantry, and another lays a false charge upon his neighbor, by which the neighbor is condemned to death; it is established that the second sins more gravely than the first; but the first sins by the first kind of lie, the second sins by the second kind of lie: therefore the second kind of lie is graver than the first.

2. Likewise, someone tells some lie in the teaching of religion, which corrupts the faith in one simple person; but another tells a lie by which the unity of ecclesiastical peace is split apart; it is established that the second sins more gravely than the first, because he *sows discords among brothers*, which the Lord most of all detests; and yet the first sins by the first kind of lie, but the second by the second: therefore the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, it is possible that someone lie by the first kind of lie out of infirmity, but by the second kind of lie out of settled malice: if therefore a sin out of settled malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is graver than the others: it seems that the second kind can be graver than the first.

4. Likewise, the first kind of lie is against faith, the second is against charity, generally speaking; but charity is a greater good than faith: if therefore privations are discerned by their habits, the second kind of lie is a graver sin, speaking generally, than the first.

It is therefore a question: why does Augustine say that the first kind of sin is the gravest?

5. Likewise, it is objected against the last degree. For he says that the lie which is made for the preservation of another's bodily chastity is the lightest of all and lighter than that which is made for the preservation of life. But on the contrary: that lie is graver in which the *account of lying is more preserved*; but a lie which is made in earnest has more of the account of lying than a lie which is made in jest: if therefore every officious lie is made in earnest, every officious lie is graver than a jocose one.

6. Likewise, one cannot lose chastity unwillingly, [but] one can lose bodily life unwillingly: therefore one has more need of help and succor for the preservation of life than for the preservation of continence: it seems therefore that it pertains more to the office of piety, and is a lighter sin, to lie for the preservation of *bodily life* than for the preservation of the *continence of the flesh*.

7. Likewise, he who loses life loses the space of meriting and of repenting, but not so he who loses the continence of the flesh: therefore it is more perilous and more harmful for someone to be killed than to be carnally violated: therefore it is more pious in such a case to lie.

In connection with this it is asked: if someone is set in danger of losing his own or another's chastity, what ought rather to be chosen by him, whether to lie, or to allow himself or another to be carnally violated.

It is also asked whether he does better who lies, in order to draw another from a perilous state, that he may enter religion, of whom he strongly presumes that he can attract him by the lie; or he who simply neglects and is unwilling to lie for someone's salvation. And it seems that the *first* does better, because it is no great thing to do one venial sin, that another may attain eternal salvation. But that the *second* does better seems [to be the case], because it is of greater perfection in no case to lie for any cause whatever, according as blessed Augustine shows in many ways.

### Conclusion.

> The greatest lie is that which is made in the teaching of religion; but the lightest [is that] which is made for the preservation of bodily chastity, or for something similar.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as blessed Augustine says, the degrees of lies follow an order, in such a way that the first is great, and the last least. — And the reason of this is this: that, according as the Philosopher holds, «if the greatest in one genus exceeds the greatest in another genus, this genus simply exceeds that one ». Whence, for some *genus* to exceed another, it is not necessary that the *individuals* of that genus exceed the individuals of the other genus, but that the *highest* in that genus be greater than all the rest of the other genus. Since therefore among all lies that is the greatest by which someone intends to harm another in the *way of truth and of salvation*, because he inflicts upon him a spiritual and irrecompensable harm and as regards the greatest goods; hence it is that the lie which is in the *teaching of religion*, since it is ordered to this, is among the other lies the greatest and highest. — Further, since one cannot be moved to lying by a greater cause than for the preservation of a spiritual good or of one annexed to the spiritual; hence it is that that lie is the lightest which is made for the preservation of bodily chastity, or for something similar; and thus, descending and ascending step by step, it is to be seen in the other [cases] also. Whence very reasonably did blessed Augustine distinguish the species of lies and order their degrees.

1. 2. 3. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, concerning him who lies by saying that Christ did not ascend upon the ass, or something similar, who does not so lie as he who by his lie kills his neighbor; it must be said that it is true; but yet from this it does not follow that that degree does not exceed this one, for the reason that this is not the *highest* lie in the teaching of religion, but [it is] when someone out of settled knowledge and malice attacks the truth *according to piety*, so as to subvert the Christian faith and good morals — in this way of lying, I say, it does not happen to find a graver lie in the second kind. — And by this is plain the response to the two following reasons, namely concerning the lie which induces schism, and concerning the lie which is out of settled malice: since a lie in the teaching of religion not only induces infidelity, but rather schism and other evils as well; nor is it only out of infirmity, but rather out of settled malice.

4. To that which is objected, that the first kind of lie is opposed to faith, but the second is opposed to charity; it must be said that that reasoning fails in two ways. First indeed, because it does not follow that, if any two *goods* are so disposed that one exceeds the rest, that the like is to be found also in their *privations*, since, just as negations are disposed contrariwise to affirmations, so too it can be in privations and habits. Whence nothing prevents charity from being a greater good than faith; and yet infidelity is a greater evil than hatred. And the reason of this is, because infidelity deprives more than hatred itself. — There is also another defect there, because a lie which is in the teaching of religion not only conflicts with faith, but also with good morals. For the *truth according to piety*, which is in the teaching of religion, consists not only in things to be believed, but also in things to be done; whence if someone were to say that fornication is not to be avoided, and that parents are not to be honored, he would lie by the first kind of lie. And because in the teaching of religion not only is it taught what is to be believed, but also what is to be done according to each virtue: hence it is that that lie can be opposed to any virtue whatever and to a spiritual good, although first and principally it is opposed to faith itself.

5. To that which is objected further, that a *jocose* lie is lighter than an *officious* one; it must be said that it is false, because in neither of those lies does someone intend to *deceive* another; he intends nevertheless *to say what is false* in the one, in order to delight, in the other, in order to benefit. But the intention is less disordered when it intends to *benefit* than when it intends to *be delighted*. When therefore he says that a jocose lie is not made in earnest; it must be said that it is false, because someone lies in earnest by that lie, not however for the purpose of seducing, but for the purpose of delighting.

6. To that which is objected, that it is more pious to lie for the preservation of life than for the preservation of continence; it must be said that it is false. For although one cannot take from someone unwilling the virtue of continence, as regards that which is of the *mind*; yet because one can take away that which is *annexed to it*, namely the continence of the *flesh*, in the taking-away of which there is the greatest danger on account of the slipperiness of the flesh: from this it is that it draws nearer to piety to lie for the preservation of that continence than for life, according as the spiritual life is preferred to the carnal life. Whence although *natural* piety in some way moves more to the preservation of the life of nature, yet *gratuitous* piety, which is moved according to the rule of faith, moves more to the conservation of the life of grace and of virtue.

7. To that indeed which it objects, that he who takes away life takes away the space of repenting and of meriting; it must be said that together with this he also takes away the space of sinning, and it is not known whether a man delivered from death would spend his future life in good things, or in evil things; therefore it is not similar on the one side and on the other.

To that indeed which is asked concerning someone who is set in danger; it must be said that he who is set in danger of losing the integrity of the flesh is either a *perfect* lover of continence, or an *imperfect* one. If he is *perfect*, so that he can have confidence in the continence of the mind, he ought not on this account to tell a lie for the avoiding of the corruption of the flesh, since, as Lucy said, «if thou violate me unwilling, my chastity will be doubled unto a crown». For in such [a case] to endure that suffering can be without fault, but to lie cannot be without fault. But if he is *imperfect*, he ought reasonably to fear lest he succumb, if he come into that state; and therefore to such a one, on account of his infirmity, it is conceded to redeem the danger of a greater sin by a lesser sin. Whence if he probably sees that by a lie he can avert the rape, the sounder counsel is for him to say something false, than to endure that corruption. And this is what blessed Augustine says in the book *On Lying*: «Those sins which are so committed in a man as to make him unclean, we ought to avoid even by our [own] sins; and on this account they are not even to be called sins, because they are done for this, that that uncleanness may be avoided»; — which is to be understood, not that they are not simply sins, but that they are not grave. And just as we say of an imperfect man with respect to himself, so too it is to be understood of an imperfect man with respect to another imperfect [man]; and so a man ought to beware of another's danger, just as also of his own.

To that which is asked last, whether it be the sounder counsel to lie, in order that another be brought back to the way of truth; it must be said that it befits neither the perfect nor the imperfect to lie for this, that he provoke another to the way of truth, because God does not need our lie; nor ought anyone to believe that anyone is converted from evil by the suggestion of what is false, but rather by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, because, according as Gregory says, « the speech of the preacher labors in vain, unless within the grace of the Savior works ».

---