Dist. 38, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/38/q/bon-sent-III-d38-dubia
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# DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about this which he says concerning the lie of the midwives, that *on account of mercy it was a venial sin, yet not no [sin] at all.* But against this it is objected through that which Gregory says in the Gloss upon the first [chapter] of Exodus: « The reward of their kindness, which could have been recompensed in eternal life, was changed, through the fault of the lie, into an earthly recompense »; but nothing changes the eternal reward into a temporal one except mortal sin: therefore it seems that they sinned mortally. — Likewise, it seems that here Jerome contradicts Gregory. For Jerome says that the Lord built spiritual houses for them: therefore it does not seem that he requited them in the present.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking. Some wish to say that the lie of the midwives had a twofold respect, namely to the life of the boys and to their own life; for they lied for the preservation of both. And according as it had respect to the life of the boys, thus it was out of *piety;* but according as it had respect to the preservation of their *own* life, which they loved more than the truth, thus it was out of *lust.* And in the first way it was a *venial* sin, because it was an officious lie; in the second way it was a *mortal* sin, because it proceeded from an evil root, namely from a lustful love of their own life, and at that time when the truth ought to have been confessed: and therefore this fault took away from them the reward which they had merited out of the piety which they had previously had in preserving the little ones out of the fear of God. And according to this they say that the diverse authorities of the Saints are reconciled. — But this manner [of speaking] is quite open to censure, because it seems hard to say

that someone should sin mortally for the preservation of his own body's safety, by speaking some light lie.

Another manner of speaking is that in the midwives themselves there are two things to consider, the preceding *benefit of piety* and the *lie* that follows. And the *first* was out of a certain natural piety, and was not meritorious, but disposed toward merit; but the *lie* that followed disposed toward the contrary: and therefore the preceding piety was *temporally* rewarded on account of the lie, not because that lie took away the life of grace previously had, but because it would block the way to the having of grace, which indeed a *venial* sin can well do. And this is what Gregory means to say, when he says: « The reward of their kindness, which *could have* been recompensed in eternal life »; *could,* I say, not by a power disposed and proximate, but by a remote power. — And from this it is plain that there is no controversy between Gregory and Augustine, nor is there any contrariety between them and Jerome, because Jerome does not mean to say that the midwives had spiritual houses through the attainment of grace, but because in a certain manner they were prepared for grace through fear and piety.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *the fourth [kind] is made by the lust of lying and deceiving alone, which is mere lying.* For against this it is objected: for it seems that no such thing is a lie, because, according to what Dionysius says, « no one works while looking toward evil ». If therefore to lie is of itself evil, it seems that no one ever lies merely looking toward the lie itself. — Likewise, *lust is the root of all evils*: therefore it belongs not only to the fourth kind of lie, but also to every lie that is made out of lust: therefore no kind of lie ought to be assigned according to this. — Likewise, the lie which is made by the lust of lying alone has nothing excusing [it]; and the less excuse a sin has, the graver it is: therefore it seems that that lie is the first and chief among all lies and is not a fourth kind.

**I respond:** To this it must be said that that lie is said to be made out of *lust,* by which indeed a man lies only that he may please himself. — On account of which it is to be noted that *lust* is said in many ways. In one way lust is called a *wicked will;* and thus it is the root of mortal sins. In another way lust is called any *immoderate delight* whatever; and thus lust is named from *taking pleasure* (*libendo*), and in this way it is the root not only of mortal but also of venial [sins]. Now this can be taken in two ways: either *commonly,* according as it seeks the end in its own act, or in a consequent [act], or *specially,* according as it rests in its own act. In the first way indeed it is *common* to every sin; but in the second way the *difference* of that lie is taken with respect to it, [the lie] which is made out of lust, which, I say, is not said to be made out of lust because it proceeds from an evil will, but because man in lying seeks nothing other than *to delight himself* in the lie itself. And a [lie] of this kind is a lesser evil than that in which one intends *to harm another,* and a greater evil than that in which one intends *to benefit another;* and therefore it holds a middle place among the kinds of lies.

To that, then, which is first objected, that no one works while looking toward evil; it must be said that in a lie there are two things, namely the *absence of truth* and a certain *art and cunning.* And although one is not delighted in the *absence of truth;* yet it happens that someone is delighted in a certain *art and cunning* of lying; and this in some manner has the appearance of good. And by reason of that Augustine says that by the lust of lying alone it happens that someone lies.

To that which is objected, that lust is the root of all evils; it must be said that lust is there taken *broadly;* but here it is appropriated to the delight which is had in the very act of lying, by which one seeks the end in himself and not in another; which therefore constitutes a species of lie, since in the other species of lie man seeks the end not only in himself, but also in others.

To that which is objected, that that lie is said to be the greatest; it must be said that this is not true, because the magnitude of a lie is attended to according to the greater deviation of the intention; but he deviates more who in a lie intends *to offend another,* than [he who intends] *to delight himself:* and therefore that argument is not valid.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving.* For against this it is objected, that of the abstract and the concrete the definition is the same. But one can lie without a false signification of the voice, according to what the Master says afterward, namely when someone, intending to say what is false, says what is true: therefore this is not a correct definition. — Likewise, just as a lie happens to be in words, so also it happens to be in deeds: therefore it ought to be called not only *a false signification of the voice,* but also *a false signification of the deed.* — Likewise, it seems that the aforesaid definition does not befit every lie, because he who lies with an officious lie does not intend *to deceive,* but *to benefit;* and he also who lies with a jocose lie intends nothing but to *delight* himself: therefore it does not seem that this definition befits every lie.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was touched upon in the preceding [discussions], to the complete *being* of a lie two things concur, namely a *false signification of the voice* as the material, and the *intention of deceiving* as the formal; and therefore the aforesaid description of a lie is correctly assigned.

But to that which is objected, that of the abstract and the concrete the definition is the same; it must be said that a *lie* (*mendacium*), as was touched upon before, states a relation not only to the *one lying,* but also to the *thing itself,* about which the speech is made; but *to lie* (*mentiri*) properly states a relation to the *one lying* himself; and therefore a *lie* encloses more in itself than *to lie,* nor is *to lie* and *to speak a lie* altogether the same, as the Master in the letter plainly says. Nor does it follow that, if anyone *lies,* he *speaks a lie,* if a lie is taken properly, unless perhaps a lie be taken *broadly,* [taking] a lie for a lie *in a certain respect* and *simply.*

To that which is objected, that a lie is not only in words, but also in deeds; it must be said that although in some manner it is in deeds, according to what Ambrose intimates, yet properly speaking it is in words, according to what Augustine says. For words are properly signs indicating the concept of the mind, for the reason that they proceed from within and are voluntarily formed; and since a lie states a relation to that which is in the mind interiorly: hence it is that it is properly in speeches and voices and is defined through a false signification of the voice, although it is also found in others in some manner *analogically* and *by way of the posterior.*

To that which is objected, that this description does not befit the jocose and officious lie; it must be said that this description befits the pernicious lie first; but it befits the jocose and officious lie in a certain manner as it were *by way of the posterior.* Hence the word *deceiving* in the description of a lie does not only import *to deceive,* but also *to speak what is false;* and this is common and general to every lie. For *to speak* what is *false* exteriorly is in a certain manner to deceive, while a man says that which can lead a man to falsity and, by leading [him] to falsity, deceive and beguile [him].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that Jacob, *with his mother as the author, acted so as to deceive his father, [and yet] it seems not to be a lie, but a mystery.* For it seems that this does not have truth, because Jacob spoke what was false with the intention of deceiving his father; for he intended to signify that he himself was Esau: therefore it seems that it was simply a lie: therefore it seems that he simply lied. — Likewise, a lie is so evil that it can in no way become good, neither of itself nor through any dispensation: it seems therefore that by no counsel of the Holy Spirit nor by the command of his mother could Jacob himself be excused from a lie.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to blessed Augustine and also Ambrose, Jacob, a simple

man, is excused from a lie both as regards that which he said by *word,* and as regards that which he did in *deed;* for by *word* he said and by *deed* he simulated that he was Esau. As regards that which he said by *word,* he is excused, because he did not intend to *deceive* his father, but to *direct* [him]; nor did he intend even to say that he was Esau as regards the *person,* but as regards the *dignity* of the birthright and of the blessing, which he had claimed for himself from God. And this, I say, he said not by his own authority, but by the command of his mother and the counsel of the Holy Spirit; which Holy Spirit indeed in one and the same word has a manifold understanding. — Also as regards that which he did in *deed,* by simulating that he was Esau, he did not sin, because according to Ambrose that *deed* held forth a figure of things to come. Hence on account of the prefiguration and the right intention, which was directed according to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, Augustine says that Jacob did not commit a lie, but fulfilled a mystery, according to the testimony of Scripture, which calls him *a simple man,* not crafty.