Dist. 38
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/38/q/bon-sent-III-d38-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXXVIII.

#### Chap. I. — *On the threefold kind of lying.*

It must be known, nevertheless, that there are three kinds of lie. For there are certain lies told for the welfare or advantage of someone, spoken not from malice but from kindness, in the manner in which the midwives lied, and Rahab. — And there is another kind of lie, which is done in jest, which does not deceive. For the one to whom it is said knows that it is said for the sake of a jest. And these two kinds of lie are not without fault, but not with a great one. But to the perfect it is not fitting to lie, not even for

the temporal life of someone, lest for the sake of another's body they should conceal their own soul. Yet it is permitted to them to be silent about the truth, but not to speak a falsehood, so that if someone does not wish to betray a man to death, he may keep silent about the truth, but not speak a falsehood. — But the third kind of lie is that which proceeds from malice and duplicity, greatly to be avoided by all. — By this it seems to be intimated that those lies which are done in jest, or for the welfare of someone, are venial sins for the imperfect, but that for the perfect that lie which is told for the advantage of another is damnable; which can also be thought of the jesting lie, especially if it is repeated. — But concerning the lie of the midwives and of Rahab, that it was venial, Augustine hands down, saying: « Perhaps, just as the midwives were not rewarded because they lied, but because they delivered the infants, and on account of this mercy the sin was venial, yet not nothing; so Rahab was delivered on account of the deliverance of the spies, for which it was a venial sin. But let no one suppose, in the other sins, that if they are done for the deliverance of men, pardon can thus be granted. For many detestable evils follow such an error ». « For we can also by stealing benefit someone, if the poor man to whom it is given perceives the advantage, and the rich man from whom it is taken does not perceive the disadvantage; so also by committing adultery we can, if some woman, unless this be consented to her, appears about to die from love, and, if she lives, to be purged by repenting. Nor on that account will so grave a sin as such adultery be denied ». — « But in these matters each one sins so much the less, when he lies, the more he withdraws from the first. But whoever shall have supposed that there is some kind of lie which is not a sin will deceive himself basely, since he reckons it honorable to be a deceiver of others ». — Therefore flee with all your might every kind of lie, because every lie is not from God.

#### Chap. II. — *On the eight species of lying.*

It must also be known that there are eight kinds of lie, as Augustine hands down in the book *On Lying*, which are to be diligently noted, so that it may appear which lie is venial and which damnable. « The first is the capital lie, far to be fled, which is done in the teaching of religion, to which no cause ought anyone to be led. — The second, which is such that it profits no one and harms someone. — The third, which so profits someone that it harms another. — The fourth, by the mere lust of lying and deceiving, which is a pure lie. — The fifth, which is done from a desire of pleasing by smooth speech. — When all these have been avoided, there follows the sixth kind, which both harms no one and profits someone, as if someone, knowing where the money of another unjustly to be taken away is, should lie that he does not know. — The seventh, which both harms no one and profits someone, as if someone, unwilling to betray a man sought for death, should lie. — The eighth, which harms no one and is for this profitable, that it may protect someone from bodily defilement ».

#### Chap. III. — *What a lie is.*

Here it must be seen what a lie is, and what it is to lie; then, whether every lie is a sin, and why. — « A lie is, as Augustine says, a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving ». In order, therefore, that there be a lie, it is necessary that a falsehood be uttered and with the intention of deceiving. « For this is the evil proper to the one lying: to have one thing closed up in the breast, another ready on the tongue ».

#### Chap. IV. — *What it is to lie.*

But to lie is to speak against that which one feels in the mind, whether that be true or not. Everyone, therefore, who speaks a lie, lies, because he speaks against that which he feels in the mind, that is, with the will of deceiving; but not everyone who lies speaks a lie, because he sometimes speaks what is true while lying, just as conversely he is sometimes truthful by speaking what is false. Whence Augustine says: « No one indeed is to be judged a liar who says what is false which he thinks true, because, as far as in him lies, he himself does not deceive, but is deceived. He is not therefore to be accused of a lie who too incautiously believes what is false and holds it for true; and rather, on the contrary, that man lies who speaks what is true which he thinks false. For as far as concerns his mind, he does not speak the truth, because he does not say what he feels, although what he says is found to be true. Nor is that man free from a lie who unknowingly speaks the truth with his mouth, but knowingly lies in his will ».

Here it is wont to be asked, if a Jew should say that Christ is God, while he does not so feel in his mind, whether he speaks a lie. What he says is not a lie, because, although he holds otherwise in his mind, yet what he says is true; and therefore it is not a lie; yet he lies, in saying that which is true. — But that every lie is a sin, Augustine suggests. « To me, he says, every lie seems to be a sin. But it matters much

with what mind, and concerning what matters, each one lies. For he does not sin in the same way who lies with the will of counseling as he who lies with the will of harming; nor does he harm as much who by lying sends a traveler onto a different road, as he who depraves the way of life by a lie ».

#### Chap. V. — *That every lie is a sin, whether it profits or not, and why.*

« Furthermore, every lie is for this reason to be said to be a sin, because a man ought to speak that which he bears in his mind, whether that be true, or be thought true, and is not. For words were instituted for this, not that by them men should deceive one another, but that by them they should carry their thoughts into the knowledge of another. To use words, therefore, for deception, not for that for which they were instituted, is a sin. — Nor for this reason is any lie to be thought not to be a sin, because we can sometimes profit someone by lying. For we can, as has been said before, profit also by stealing and by committing adultery ». « We can also say that a lie is not only then [a lie] when someone is harmed. For when a falsehood is spoken by one who knows, it is a lie, whether anyone or no one be harmed ». — Behold, from these things it is established that every lie is a sin. Yet not of every lie is that to be understood: *Thou shalt destroy all that speak a lie*; nor that: *The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul*; nor does every lie seem to be prohibited by that precept, nor, by the description set forth above, is the lie of jest included.

#### Chap. VI. — *In what matters one errs with danger, or not.*

This too must be known, that « in some matters we are deceived with great evil, in some with small, in some with none ». « In which matters it makes no difference for the attaining of the kingdom of God, whether they be believed or not, or whether they be thought true or false, whether they be so or not; to err in these, that is, to suppose one thing for another, is not to be reckoned a sin; or if it is, the least and lightest. — And there are things true, although they do not appear so, which unless they be believed, one cannot attain to eternal life ». « And although error is to be avoided with the greatest care, not only in greater but also in lesser matters, nor can one err except through ignorance of things; nevertheless it is not consequent that he should at once err, whoever does not know something, but whoever supposes himself to know what he does not know. For he approves the false for the true, which is proper to error. Yet, in what matter each one may err, it matters very much. For there are things which it is better not to know than to know. Likewise, to some it has at some time profited to err, but in the way of the feet, not in the way of morals ».

It is wont to be asked concerning Jacob, who said that he was Esau, while feeling otherwise in his mind, whether he lied. Concerning this Augustine says: « Jacob, in what he did with his mother as the prompter, that he might deceive his father, if it be diligently attended to, seems not to be a lie, but a mystery ». For he intended to obey his mother, who through the Spirit knew the mystery. And therefore, on account of the intimate counsel of the Holy Spirit, which his mother had received, Jacob is excused from a lie.