Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/39/q/bon-sent-III-d39-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the guilt of perjury.*
### Question I. *Whether every perjury is a lie.*

Concerning the first the inquiry proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it belongs to every perjury to be a lie. And that it is so seems true:

1. Because perjury is forbidden by the fifth precept of the second tablet: *You shall not speak against your neighbor false testimony*; but there falsity in word is forbidden, which knowingly cannot exist without a lie: therefore it seems that, since perjury is forbidden in that very place, every perjury includes in itself a lie.

2. Likewise, he who takes the supreme Truth as witness to truth takes it rightly; and he who takes it rightly does not sin: therefore when the supreme Truth is adduced for the confirmation of truth, there is no perjury: in order, therefore, that there be perjury, it is necessary that Truth itself be adduced to confirm a lie: there returns therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, he who asserts what he holds in mind does not sin, because he uses speech for that for which it was instituted; if then the one perjuring sins in his assertion, he therefore bears one thing in mind and asserts another with his mouth. But every such person is a liar: therefore a lie belongs to the being of perjury.

4. Likewise, perjury is a sin of the tongue; but «the tongue does not make [a man] guilty unless the mind be guilty» and ill-conscious to itself: therefore, in order that the guilt of perjury be committed, it is necessary that an intention of deceiving precede. But that makes a man lie: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Jerome *on Jeremiah*, on *Foundations*, says that «an oath has three companions, namely judgment and justice and truth»; and just as from a defect of truth it happens that an oath is made disordered, so [it happens] from a defect of judgment and justice: if therefore perjury generally embraces a disordered oath, it seems that not every perjury is a lie.

2. Likewise, someone, intending to commit adultery and homicide, confirms this by an oath; let it be so; but such a person either swears rightly, or perjures himself; it is agreed that he does not [swear] rightly: therefore he perjures himself, and yet does not lie: therefore it is not essential to every perjury to be a lie.

3. Likewise, he who swears adduces God as witness to truth; let it be then that he swears something false which he believes to be true: such a one, since he adduces Truth as witness to falsity, is a perjurer; but because he believes and intends to speak the truth, he is not a liar: therefore not every perjurer lies, nor is every perjury a lie.

4. Likewise, for the *being* of a lie there is required not only an intention of deceiving, but also falsity of speech; but it happens that someone incurs the crime of perjury, if he swears what is true and intends to swear what is false and to injure his neighbor by that oath: therefore it seems that somewhere the perfect account of perjury is found where the full account of a lie is not found: therefore etc.

### Conclusio.

> It is not essential to every perjury, whether assertory or promissory, to be a lie, if a lie is taken properly; but if [taken] broadly, then every perjury includes a lie.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there is a threefold way of speaking.

For some have said that perjury underlies a lie to itself. And these said that if someone swears something false which he believes to be true, he does not perjure himself, because he does not lie. — But this position is refuted through Augustine, who says that «when a man swears what he thinks is true, and yet it is false, he swears rashly». And from this it is had that that oath is rash and disordered and so perjury, and yet there is no lie in it.

Therefore others said that not every perjury is a lie, for the reason that it happens that one incurs the crime of perjury not only on account of a defect of truth, but also on account of a defect of justice and judgment. — But this instance which is brought forward seems to have place rather in an *obligatory* oath than in an *assertory* oath. For in the former, judgment and justice are properly found. And therefore there still remains the question whether every perjury that is opposed to an assertory oath is a lie, since it is privative of truth.

Therefore in a third way it can still be answered that, as appeared from the preceding distinction, something is a lie *simply* and according to the complete account; something is a lie *in a certain respect*, namely as to the *matter* of the lie itself; something is a lie *in a certain respect*, because it has the *form* of the lie itself. A lie *simply* is what has falsity *in word* and *in intention*. But a lie *in a certain respect* and according to *matter* is what has falsity *in word*, but *not in intention*. A lie *in a certain respect* and according to *form* is what has falsity *in intention*, but *not in word*.

When therefore it is asked whether perjury opposed to an assertory oath universally encloses a lie in itself; if a lie is taken *broadly*, the name extended to a lie *simply* and *in a certain respect*; thus every perjury includes a lie in itself. And this is what the Master says in the text, that «perjury is either to speak something false while swearing with an intention of deceiving, or to speak something false while swearing without an intention of deceiving, or to speak something true while swearing with an intention of deceiving». — But if a lie is taken *properly*, thus it is not essential to *every* perjury, nor to perjury as it is opposed to an *obligatory* oath, nor to perjury as it is opposed to an *assertory* oath, as the Master says in the text, and the reasons adduced before for this part prove it.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary, that perjury is forbidden in the fifth precept; it must be said that it is not only forbidden there, but rather is also forbidden in the second [precept] of the first tablet, inasmuch as through perjury itself one does insult to the supreme Truth, taking it in vain, while he takes it for the confirmation of something falsely known, or falsely opined, or even doubtful. — Yet it could be said that in the fifth precept false testimony is forbidden not only as to falsity of *speech*, but also as to falsity of *intention*, both conjointly and severally; and as they are forbidden severally, they do not state a lie according to the full account, but only according to the half-full [account], as is clear from the foregoing.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that he who adduces the divine Truth as witness to truth swears rightly; it must be said that that is not always true, because he can adduce it as witness to truth while intending to adduce it as witness to falsity; and that perverse intention introduces the guilt of perjury, although it does not have the complete account of a lie. *Moreover*, there is another defect in that reasoning: because not every falsehood is a lie; and therefore it does not follow that, if perjury includes falsehood, that on this account it includes a lie.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that he who asserts what he holds in mind does not sin; it must be said that it is true, if he so knows in mind that he can outwardly assert it in speech, and this is when he is *certain*; but when he *is deceived by a false belief*, if he dares outwardly to affirm by an oath, he is not excused, because, just as an *erroneous conscience* in morals does not excuse an unjust deed, so a *false estimation* in the things that are believed does not excuse a false oath.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the tongue is not

guilty unless the mind first be guilty; it can be answered in two ways: because that is true in *indifferent* utterances, but in utterances that are *evil* and disordered and forbidden by God, the excess of the tongue introduces guilt of mind and conscience. — Otherwise it can also be said that the mind and intention are called guilty not only because in swearing one intends to deceive, but also if he intends to swear something concerning which he has no certitude, for the reason that he withdraws from the supreme Truth itself its due honor.