Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/39/q/bon-sent-III-d39-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether all perjury is a sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether all perjury is a sin; and it is shown that someone can perjure himself without sin.

1. For suppose that someone swears what is false, which he thinks to be true, for the benefit of his neighbor; that oath is not in contempt of the divine Truth nor is it to the harm of the neighbor: therefore it does not conflict with the precept of the first table nor of the second: therefore it is not a sin; and yet it is perjury, as was shown in the preceding: therefore not all perjury is a sin.

2. Likewise, no one sins by venerating and loving God; but Augustine says that «that by which one swears, he venerates and loves»: when therefore someone swears what is false by God, he venerates and loves God himself: therefore he commits no sin; and yet he commits perjury: therefore perjury is not a sin.

3. Likewise, just as sin is opposed to goodness, so perjury is opposed to truth; but truth pertains to the *intellect*, goodness to the *affection*; so too the false and the evil differ: since therefore vice and sin name what is opposed to virtue and goodness, which hold by the side of the *affection*, and perjury is opposed to truth, which holds by the side of the *intellect*, it does not seem that any perjury is a sin.

4. Likewise, it is possible that someone be compelled to swear what is false; but necessity has no law, indeed necessity makes licit things which are otherwise illicit, as is plain of the one who steals and is in extreme necessity: therefore it seems that at least in such a case perjury is licit, and so it is not essential to it to be a sin.

**On the contrary:**
1. Perjury is a graver vice and more deformed than a simple lie; but «it is necessary that every lie be a sin» according as Augustine says, and as was had in the preceding: it seems therefore that it is similar concerning perjury itself, indeed, much more strongly.

2. Likewise, whoever perjures himself swears inordinately, and he who swears inordinately swears unjustly or rashly; and everyone such sins: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everyone who perjures himself takes the name of God in vain, and everyone such does outrage to the divine Truth; but this is a sin and an evil *in itself*: therefore it is necessary that all perjury be evil.

4. Likewise, everything is evil to which a penalty is due; but a penalty is due to all perjury, according as it is said in Proverbs the nineteenth: *A false witness shall not be unpunished*: therefore if perjury is a false testimony, it seems of necessity that all perjury is a sin.

### Conclusion.

> Perjury is an evil not only in itself, but also of itself.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt perjury is an evil not only *in itself*, but also *of itself*, so that in no way can it be done well. — Now the reason of this is twofold: one on account of this, that for the most part perjury includes in itself a lie, which is of itself an evil; but the other reason is general, namely that everyone who perjures himself does outrage to the supreme Truth, while he adduces it for his confirmation, to which it ought not to be summoned. And therefore, because it not only disorders man toward his neighbor, but also disorders man toward God; hence it is that it is always evil. — Whence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary concerning the one who swears what is false, which he thinks to be true, for the benefit of his neighbor; it must be said that such a one sins on account of the contempt of the Truth; for although he does not contemn the Truth itself out of certain knowledge, by adducing it as testimony of a falsehood, he yet contemns it out of his very rashness. For so terrible and venerable is the name of the Lord, that no one ought to summon it as testimony, unless he know what he is saying. Whence ignorance does not excuse in such an oath. For this each one ought to know, that he ought not to affirm anything by an oath, unless he be certain of it. Whence even if such a one is ignorant of the matter about which he swears, by this very fact he knows that he swears ill, if he affirms it by an oath; and therefore he is not excused from fault.

2. To that which is objected, that that by which one swears, he venerates and loves; it must be said that that is true, when he swears by it rightly and in order; but when he swears falsely and inordinately by it, even though he may seem to venerate by his belief, he rather contemns and does outrage to it by his inordinate utterance.

3. To that which is objected, that perjury is opposed to truth, which is in the intellect; it must be said that, according as cognition is twofold, *speculative* and *practical*, so it happens in two ways to speak of truth itself: either as it is the rule of mere *speculation*, or as it is the rule of *utterance* and *action* itself. For the truth of faith and of prudence dictates how one must speak, and what must be done. When therefore it is said that a lie and perjury are opposed to truth, this is not understood of truth in the *first* way, but of truth in the *second* way. And this truth said in the *second* way is joined to goodness and holds the character of a virtue, and its act is under precept, according as it is said to the Ephesians the fourth: *Speak, every one, the truth with his neighbor*. But he objects concerning truth as it consists in mere speculation; therefore that reasoning is not valid.

4. To that which is objected concerning the one who perjures himself, compelled by necessity, that he does not sin; it must be said that it is false. For there is a necessity of *nature* and a necessity of *coercion*. Necessity of nature, I say, has no law and can excuse *from the whole*; but necessity of *coercion* does not excuse *from the whole* in those things which are of themselves evil, but excuses only *from so much*, because the will cannot be sufficiently coerced. And therefore, because perjury is of itself an evil, however much one is compelled to it, he is not *altogether* excused from sin, but rather a penalty is imposed on him by the canon. For the canon says, that «if anyone

perjures himself for the saving of the life of the body, because he loved the body more than the soul, let him fast three Lents». Nor is the case alike concerning theft; because theft is not evil except on account of the appropriation of things; but extreme necessity makes all things common, whereas no necessity removes the deformity of perjury, because by no necessity is it licit to take the name of God in vain: and so the case is not alike on the one side and the other. — But concerning the obligation of a coerced oath it will be determined more fully below.

---