Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/39/q/bon-sent-III-d39-a2-q3
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> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk. This quaestio opens lower on p.872, beneath the tail of the preceding quaestio, and begins a fresh per-page footer band (nothing is carried over from a2-q2).

### Question III. *Whether it is lawful to receive an oath made by idolaters.*

Thirdly it is asked whether it is lawful to receive an oath made by idolaters. And that it is, seems to be the case:

1. First, by the example of Jacob, Genesis thirty-one. For he received an oath from Laban; and it is established that Laban was an idolater, as is clear from the fact that Rachel had stolen his idols: therefore if Jacob acted rightly, and Scripture does not reproach him, it seems that it is lawful to imitate him in this respect.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the example of Judas Maccabaeus, First Maccabees eight, where Judas received an oath, when he entered into a treaty and friendship with the Romans; and it is established that they swore by the idols which they worshipped: since therefore Judas Maccabaeus is not reproached for entering into that friendship, it seems so, etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine to Publicola: «Although it has been said that we should not swear, nevertheless I do not recall ever having read in the holy Scriptures that we should not receive an oath from others»: therefore, since receiving an oath is not prohibited in sacred Scripture, it seems that it is no sin, from whomever it is received.

4. Likewise, it is lawful to trade and to make truces with unbelievers; but the good faith of trade and of a treaty has to be confirmed by a mutual oath: if therefore it is lawful for a Christian to tender an oath of good faith to an unbeliever and idolater, it seems that likewise it is lawful to receive one from him.

5. Likewise, it is lawful for me to receive alms given to me with grumbling, just as those given to me with good will — and this is because what one person bestows with bad will another can receive with good will — therefore, granted that the idolater sins in swearing by idols, it seems that the Christian does not sin in accepting his oath.

**On the contrary:**

1. To the Romans, chapter one: *Not only those who do such things are worthy of death, but also those who consent to those who do them*; from which word it is gathered that he who consents to one sinning mortally sins mortally; since therefore the one receiving an oath from an idolater consents to that oath, in which the idolater sins mortally; it seems that he himself sins mortally.

2. Likewise, Augustine says that «he who asks an oath from another whom he knows will swear falsely, kills his soul», as is found at the end of this distinction; since therefore a man knows that the idolater swears wickedly and damnably, he who asks an oath from him by the same reasoning kills his soul; but it is not lawful to kill his soul: therefore it is not lawful to receive an oath from an idolater.

3. Likewise, one ought to love the soul of one's neighbor more than any temporal advantage, because according to blessed Augustine, nothing after God and the soul itself is so to be loved as the salvation of one's neighbor: since therefore the idolater swears against the salvation of his own soul, it seems that he who receives his oath for some temporal benefit perverts the order of charity. But it is not lawful to pervert the order of charity: therefore it is not lawful to receive an oath from idolaters swearing by idols.

4. Likewise, an idol is nothing in the world, therefore the good faith from an idol is nothing; but that which has nothing of good faith cannot lend confirmation to speech: since therefore an oath by an idol makes rather for the subversion than for the confirmation of faith, it seems that it should in no way be received.

5. Likewise, it seems that not only from idolaters, but from no one is it lawful to receive an oath,

because, upon that text of Matthew five: *What is more than this is from evil*, the Gloss says: «Not from yours, but from his, by whom you are compelled to swear»: therefore it is evil to receive and to exact anyone's oath.

### Conclusion.

> Although it is unlawful to swear by idols, nevertheless, where necessity or the common advantage requires it, it is lawful to receive an oath even in a form that is not conceded.

**I respond:** It must be said that it happens that an idolater swears in a conceded form and in a prohibited form. If he swears in a conceded form, he does not swear insofar as he is an idolater; and in this way, in a certain case it is lawful to receive an oath from him, but in a certain case not at all: because the one who exacts it is either a public or a private person. If he is a public person, so far as belongs to the order of law, he can and ought to exact it as a judge. But if he is a private person, he can exact it in three ways: for he exacts it either for the confirmation of truth, or for the subversion of truth, or for the removal of his own doubt. In the first way an oath can be exacted without any sin, namely when it is exacted only that the promise and the assertion of truth may be firmer and more stable. — But when he exacts it for the subversion of truth, this cannot be without mortal sin; and that is when he compels someone to swear whom he knows to be swearing falsely. — But when he exacts it for the removal of his own doubt, because he suspects that the man without an oath may tell him a falsehood; then, if that suspicion remains in general, such an exaction holds rather the character of punishment than of fault; but if it descends to the particular, then it is a venial sin, while he holds an evil suspicion concerning his neighbor. And therefore the Gloss says: *What is more than this is from evil*, namely «of the one not believing»; not, I say, always from the evil of fault, but also from the evil of punishment. — And so in a conceded form it is lawful to receive an oath from idolaters and unbelievers, and likewise from Christians and the faithful.

And this is not what is principally asked in the proposed question, but the principal question is about the oath by which an idolater swears by an idol and in a form that is not conceded, whether it should be received. And for the understanding of this it is to be noted that in an oath made by an idol there are two things to consider, namely the veneration of the idol itself and the confirmation of the external word. Having regard to the first, it is lawful for no one to receive an oath from an idolater, nor to exact nor to make it, because the veneration of an idol is altogether to be detested. But if regard is had to the second, then it is lawful to receive an oath from them, especially for the common advantage. And thus Jacob received one for the good of his posterity, and Judas for the peace of his people; and thus Christians receive one from the Saracens for the peace and advantage of the community. Hence, although it is unlawful to swear by an idol, because that form is prohibited; nevertheless, where necessity or the common advantage requires it, it is lawful to receive such an oath. — Hence too the reasons can be conceded which show this. Yet that authority of Augustine, by which it is said: It is not prohibited in the holy Scriptures to receive an oath, does not compel, because this is understood of the form conceded by the Church itself.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected on the contrary, that he who receives an oath made by an idol consents to it; it must be said that, since there are two things there, as was touched on before, he does not consent to the veneration of the idol, but to the confirmation of truth, that the word may be firm and the pact remain solid. And as to this there is no sin there, because he receives what is his own, while what is evil there he detests; just as a poor man in need of alms receives alms given to him with grumbling, and does not sin, because the giving of the alms thus pleases him, while the attached grumbling displeases him.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from the authority of Augustine, that he who exacts an oath from one whom he knows to be perjuring himself kills his soul; it must be said that it is not the same: because that is for the subversion of truth and cannot be done with good intention; but an oath made by an idolater through an idol makes for the confirmation of truth, because frequently idolaters and unbelievers reckon themselves bound by unlawful oaths just as well as Christians by lawful and conceded ones.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that we ought to love the soul of our neighbor more than temporal advantage; it must be said that this is true of private advantage, but it need not be understood of the common advantage. — There is also another reason, because without the expression of that oath the idolater nonetheless venerates the idol in his heart. Hence the placing or the withholding of the external swearing does not of itself bring about a defect or detriment of salvation; therefore charity does not say that this is to be much cared

for. But if he were willing to recover from his error and to be converted to the true faith, then such an oath should in no way be exacted from him.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that an idol is nothing, and good faith in an idol is nothing; it must be said that, although it is nothing according to truth, nevertheless the idolater esteems it to be something; and from his very estimation and error the idolater clings to that vanity more strongly than many Christians by faith cling to truth itself, as we also see in heretics; and from that strong adherence and erroneous conscience, when they swear by idols, they confirm their words.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that it is lawful to receive no oath, because what is more than this is from evil; the response is now clear: because to receive an oath is sometimes a matter of mortal fault, sometimes of venial, sometimes of contracted penalty; and according to this *evil* in the text and the Gloss has to be taken differently: either for mortal fault, or for venial, or for the penal evil itself. For unless there had intervened uncertainty about the truth of another's conscience and a proneness to deceiving and to suspecting wrongly, an oath would not be necessary. And therefore from this it cannot generally be concluded that to receive an oath is unlawful.

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