Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/39/q/bon-sent-III-d39-a3-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article III. *On the obligation of an oath.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the obligation of an oath; and concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath. Second it is asked whether it is contracted through a coerced oath. Third it is asked whether it is contracted through an incautious or indiscreet oath.

### Question I. *Whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath. And that it is, seems to be the case:

1. From the authority of Isidore, which the Master adduces in the text. For he speaks thus: « By whatever artifice of words one swears, God accepts it just as he to whom one swears understands it »; but he to whom one swears understands it simply and believes that the other wishes to bind himself by his word: therefore it seems that God reckons him bound: therefore in truth one is bound through a deceitful oath.

2. Likewise, « fraud and deceit ought to give patronage to no one »; but if he who swears deceitfully were absolved from the obligation, his own fraud and deceit would give him patronage: if therefore it is unfitting to say this, it seems that a deceitful oath introduces an obligation.

3. Likewise, words are those in which contracts consist: therefore if the form of words is obligatory, it is necessary that an obligatory contract intervene: therefore whether he intends or does not intend, provided only that the words of the oath put forward an obligation, the one swearing is bound: therefore a man is bound by a deceitful oath just as by a simple and true oath.

4. Likewise, if only faithful and pure words bound in an oath; since the fidelity of another is evident to no one, it would be evident to no one whether anyone was bound through his own words; but a man is rendered certain of the obligation through the oath presented: it seems therefore that whether the oath is made through faithful or through fraudulent words, the one swearing is equally bound.

**On the contrary:** 1. Gregory: « Words serve the intention; and God judges such words as are brought forth from the inmost parts »: therefore if a man does not intend to bind himself, however much he speaks outwardly; it seems that God does not reckon him bound.

2. Likewise, according to that which is said in the first book of Kings, chapter sixteen: *Man judges those things which appear, but God beholds the heart*; whence however much works may be outwardly praiseworthy, they are nonetheless not pleasing to God unless they proceed from a sincere and pure intention: therefore God weighs the obligation of an oath according to the intention of the heart: therefore if a man does not

intend to bind himself, whatever he speaks outwardly, before God he will not be bound: therefore a deceitful oath in truth is not obligatory.

3. Likewise, the obligation of an oath is not from *natural law* alone, but also from natural law and a *proper act*; but no one is bound by a proper act unless he wills and intends to bind himself: if therefore one swearing by a deceitful oath does not intend to bind himself, but to deceive another, he does not seem to be bound in truth.

4. Likewise, an oath is not obligatory except when it « has its companions, namely judgment and justice and truth »; but a deceitful oath lacks truth: therefore it does not seem that it introduces an obligation.

Alongside this it is asked, when the words of an oath are twofold, and the one swearing intends them in one sense and the one receiving in another, by whose intention one must stand. And that one must rather stand by the intention of the *receiver*, seems to be the case from the authority of Isidore held above; but that one must rather stand by the intention of the *swearer*, seems to be the case from the authority of Gregory held above, in which he says that « words serve that intention from which they are brought forth ».

### Conclusion

> It seems sufficiently probable that a deceitful oath in the forum of God is not simply obligatory, although in the forum of the Church it binds, and at the same time the crime of perjury is committed.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold way of speaking.

For some wished to say that a deceitful oath simply binds, since, even though the deceiver intends to deceive another, he nonetheless intends to speak obligatory words; and while he voluntarily brings them forth outwardly, he simply binds himself. Nor is he in any way excused by the fraudulence of his heart, because not only the receiver but even Truth itself accepts the words according to the sense which they make, and thus they say not only in the sight of men, but even in truth, that a deceitful oath is obligatory.

But since the obligation of an oath is obligatory, just like the obligation of a vow and of marriage; therefore it seems that it must be said by others that just as *marriage* is not true unless an interior consent be present, nor is a *vow* obligatory unless there be an intention of binding: so too neither must the *deceitful oath* itself be said to be *simply* obligatory, in which one swears in such a way that nonetheless he does not intend to bind himself through those words. And therefore according to these a twofold forum is distinguished, namely the forum of the Church and the forum of conscience. According to the forum of the Church such an oath is obligatory; for the Church judges concerning those things which can bind outwardly; whence since those words express an obligation, it judges the one swearing thus to be bound to that which the words convey. But in the forum of God, who judges according to the secrets of conscience and according to truth, this man indeed is not bound, because he did not will to bind himself. Yet because he swore deceitfully and took the name of God in vain, in that very act he straightway committed the crime of perjury. Nor does he reap any advantage from his malice, because before God by that oath he is judged worthy of eternal punishment.

And this way of speaking indeed seems sufficiently probable. And according to it the response to the question proposed is clear; the response to the objections is also for the most part clear. For the reasons which prove that that oath is not obligatory show this not simply, but in the forum of God, who judges

according to the intention, according to which the one swearing deceitfully did not intend to bind himself. But the reasons which are brought in for the opposite proceed according to the ecclesiastical forum; otherwise they do not conclude.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* Whence to the authority of Isidore, in which he says that God accepts the words according to the intention of the receiver; it must be said that he says this, not because God himself for this reckons the man bound, but because from the fact that this man does not intend to swear as the other intended to receive, God, who required this out of truth and justice, reckons him bound to punishment. — Or that statement can be understood causally, so that it be said that God so accepts because he so wills it to be accepted by the Church itself, and so wills it also to be judged.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that fraud and deceit ought to give patronage to no one; the response is clear from what has already been said: because fraud and deceit do not give patronage to this man in the forum of the Church—rather he is compelled by the Church itself to keep the oath, as if he had sworn truly and faithfully; nor do they give patronage even in the forum of God, because by this very fact he is bound and is made guilty of a great punishment. Whence if he comes to penance, a grave penance is to be imposed on him; and it is sound counsel and fitting that, by the merit of his fault, it be imposed on him to fulfill the oath in which he intended to deceive his neighbor, although it cannot be proved against him in the face of the Church itself.

*To 3, 4.* To the two following the response is likewise clear: because the obligation of words and the certification through a superadded oath regard the ecclesiastical forum; and therefore they conclude an obligation not simply, but with respect to that forum. And this indeed must be granted.

But to that which is asked, when the words are twofold, in such a way that no deceit intervenes, by whose intention one must stand; it must be said that those manifold words either rather put forward one of those senses according to common usage, or equally put forward both. If they rather put forward one sense, one must stand by that intention which understood that sense. But if they are held indifferently toward both; since neither can be proved, one must stand by the judgment of good men, who, the conjectures and reasons having been weighed, ought to condescend to the sounder and purer intention. — Yet that authority of Isidore does not bear on the matter, because Isidore calls him to swear by artifice whose swearing is deceitful; but it is not necessary that deceit or artifice always intervene when the words are manifold.