Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/39/q/bon-sent-III-d39-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether every coerced oath is binding.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning a coerced oath, and the question is whether every coerced oath is binding. And that it is, seems to be the case.

1. Every oath which has judgment and justice and truth is binding; but a coerced oath can have these three: therefore it seems that it is binding.

2. Likewise, « a coerced will, as Augustine holds, is truly a will »; but an oath is called *coerced* because it is made by a coerced will: therefore a coerced oath is from a true will. But when one swears something with the will, unless it be evil, he binds himself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a sin perpetrated through coercion induces an obligation to eternal punishment: if therefore an oath by its own nature binds to keeping the truth, just as a sin binds to bearing punishment; it seems by likeness that a coerced oath is binding.

4. Likewise, this very thing seems to be the case from the authority of Augustine. A certain man, coerced, swore to a certain concubine that he would take her as wife and would no longer maintain his parents. Blessed Augustine responds, from the counsel of blessed Ambrose, that he should keep the marriage and do penance for the rest: therefore it seems, according to the judgment of blessed Augustine, that a coerced oath is binding.

**On the contrary:** 1. Coerced vows do not bind, because a vow is a *spontaneous promise*; but the obligation of an oath likewise proceeds from our will: therefore it does not seem that coerced oaths are binding.

2. Likewise, « the praetor says — and Tully also in the Rhetoric — what has been done by force or fear I do not hold ratified »: if therefore the law holds ratified every just obligation, it seems that coerced oaths are not binding.

3. Likewise, the cause of the fear of death falls upon a steadfast man; but fear which falls upon a steadfast man excuses *wholly*, according to what the jurists say: therefore it seems that an oath which is made from such fear is not binding.

4. Likewise, coercion excludes the marriage contract; but marriage itself is of as much strength and obligation as an oath: if therefore a marriage contracted from coercion is not binding, by the same reasoning it seems that neither is an oath.

### Conclusion

> A coerced oath, with respect to a licit matter, seems to be binding in the forum of God, unless it be relaxed.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold way of speaking.

For some say that, since an oath is twofold, namely promissory and *assertory*, with respect to an assertory oath coercion does not excuse *wholly*, but *in part*. For if anyone, coerced, swears and asserts that what is false is true, he incurs the crime of perjury. But in an obligatory or promissory oath, the coercion which arises from fear—fear that can fall upon a steadfast man—excuses *wholly*; for such an oath is licit and not against God, by which one promises that he will give or do something to someone—and therefore with respect to such an oath there can intervene a coercion sufficient to incline even a steadfast man. And because a sufficient coercion intervenes, that will is not to be judged a will; and consequently neither is that oath truly binding, as they say.

But since the words of Augustine and also his counsel

seem to be to the contrary—for blessed Augustine seems to judge such an oath binding—therefore there is another way of speaking, namely to distinguish a twofold forum, that is the *ecclesiastical* and the *divine*, in such a way that the obligation of a *coerced* oath is related contrariwise to the obligation of a *deceitful* oath with respect to this twofold forum. For in the forum of the *Church* a coerced oath is not binding: both because the Church presumes that this man who swore under coercion did not swear with the will of fulfilling the oath, but rather of escaping the danger; and also because he who compelled the swearing, since he proceeded maliciously and deceitfully, acquired no right nor ought to have reaped advantage from his malice; whence he has no right of reclaiming. — But in the forum of *God* a coerced oath is binding, because, since God beholds the interior will, and the will cannot be coerced by a *sufficient* coercion, but [only] by an *inducing* one, and thus the coerced will is a will, God judges such a man to be bound. And therefore in the forum of conscience, according to the theologians, it must be counseled to him who has so sworn, unless he find a relaxation, that he fulfill the oath; and this I say, if that oath was with respect to a licit matter. — Whence the reasons which are for this part can be granted.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary concerning the obligation of a vow; it must be said that it is not alike; because a vow regards an obligation to God, who wills sacrifices not coerced, but voluntary. Yet if anyone be compelled by an inducing coercion to make a vow, namely that, being in danger of death, he be freed by the Lord, it does not seem absurd to say that he is bound.

2. To that which is objected concerning the praetor and the law, that it does not reckon ratified an oath made through fear; it must be said that the law speaks in the *judicial* forum, because it does not concern itself with the forum of *conscience*. Whence according to that forum it is true that a coerced oath does not bind. Yet from this it cannot be concluded that it does not bind with respect to God.

3. To that which is objected, that fear which can fall upon a steadfast man excuses wholly; it must be said that, although with respect to human acts a sufficient fear can fall upon a steadfast man; nonetheless with respect to those things which belong to justice, a sufficient fear cannot fall upon a steadfast man. For as to those things the Lord says: *Do not fear those who kill the body*. Therefore with God such fear is not reckoned a cause sufficient to excuse a man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath.

4. To that which is objected concerning the obligation of marriage, it must be said that it is not alike: because marriage has this from the account of its signification and institution, that it be contracted from a sincere and free will. For it signifies the conjunction of Christ and the Church of God and the soul, in which no coercion intervenes, but the sincere love of kindness. But it is not so on the part of an oath. — And if you ask concerning him who, coerced, swore to contract marriage, whether he is bound; it must be said that he is bound, unless he be absolved by a supervening cause. Yet if he contract with another, in contracting he sins mortally and is no longer bound, but for the fault of perjury a penance is to be imposed on him: and concerning this more is had in the fourth [book] in the treatise on marriage.

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