Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/39/q/bon-sent-III-d39-a3-q3
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### Question III. *Whether an incautious oath is binding.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether an incautious oath is binding. Now by an *incautious* oath I mean one that tends toward an evil outcome, or toward a less good outcome. And that an incautious oath which tends toward an evil outcome is binding, is proved:

1. *First*, by the example of Joshua, of whom Ambrose says in his book *On Duties*: « Joshua judged that the peace which he had given should not be revoked, because it had been confirmed by the religion of an oath, lest while he reproved another's treachery he should break his own faith »: therefore Joshua was bound to keep the oath which he had made; but that oath was incautious and tended toward an evil outcome, because it was against the precept of God, by which the Lord had commanded that he should not enter into a covenant with those nations: therefore it seems that such an oath is binding.

2. *Likewise*, Augustine says that a harlot who swears that she will keep faith with her seducer is worse if she does not keep faith than if she were to observe it; but that oath has an evil outcome, and yet it binds, otherwise she would not be worse in not observing than in observing: therefore an oath which simply tends toward an evil outcome is binding.

3. *Likewise*, this same thing seems [to hold] concerning an oath that tends toward a less good outcome, as for one who swears that he will not enter religion, because someone can bind himself by the bond of matrimony so that he does not enter religion, so that that matrimony is truly binding: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [to hold] also of the oath itself.

4. *Likewise*, it is lawful for someone to be unwilling to enter religion, and what is lawful to be unwilling [to do] it is lawful to confirm, and what is lawful to confirm it is lawful to swear; but a lawful oath is a binding oath: therefore it seems that when someone swears that he will not enter religion, he is bound by that oath. But such is an incautious oath, which tends toward a less good outcome: therefore it seems that that oath is binding.

**On the contrary:** 1. Bede says, and the Master adduces in the text: « If it should happen that we swear something rather incautiously, which when kept would tend toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is to be freely changed by a more wholesome counsel »: therefore according to this an incautious oath, which tends toward an evil outcome or a less good one, is not binding.

2. *Likewise*, Isidore: « A sacrament by which an evil is incautiously promised is not to be kept ». If you say that this authority is to be understood only when someone swears what is evil and unjust, but not when someone swears that he will not do a perfect good, to which he is not bound; against this it is objected: because no oath is just which assails the perfection of justice; but an oath by which someone swears that he will not enter religion nor undertake perfection is destructive of perfect justice: therefore [it is] also an iniquitous oath. But no such [oath] is binding: therefore it seems that no one is bound by an incautious oath which tends toward a less good outcome.

3. *Likewise*, no oath is discreet which is against the counsel of the Holy Spirit; but when someone swears that he will not enter religion, that oath is against the counsel of the Holy Spirit; but no such oath has judgment in its company, and no such [oath] is binding: therefore the same as before.

Connected with this it is asked, if someone swears that he will never accept a prelacy, whether he is bound by such an oath. And that he is, it seems: because it is lawful to flee a prelacy: therefore it is lawful that someone should swear not to accept it. On the contrary is the fact that the state of prelacy is of greater perfection than that of religion, as is commonly said, and the common usefulness is to be preferred to the private good.

> **Conclusion.** An incautious oath, which tends toward the detriment of salvation, or directly toward the impediment of perfection, is not binding.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that an oath happens to be incautious in many ways: in the first way, when something is sworn which simply tends toward the detriment of salvation, as when someone swears that he will do something which cannot be carried out without mortal sin. In the second way an oath is said to be incautious when someone swears something which tends toward the loss of his salvation and the impediment of perfection, as for instance when someone swears that he will never enter religion. In the third way an oath is said to be incautious when someone swears something *in every event*, which, in one contingency, tends toward the loss of salvation, and in another contingency, tends toward the advancement of salvation; as when someone swears that he will never accept a prelacy, which indeed is to the loss of salvation, if he is useful and is canonically elected and it is enjoined upon him by a superior; but then it tends toward the advancement of salvation, if he is a person useless to himself and to others for being promoted to that state.

If therefore we speak of an oath in the *first* way, then without doubt it is neither lawful nor binding, indeed whoever keeps it commits sin. — But if we speak of an incautious oath in the *second* way, then it is neither lawful nor binding, although to keep it is not a sin, because it is not a sin not to enter religion; yet it is a grave sin to swear that one will never ascend to a grade of perfection, because in this he in a certain way assails the perfection of justice itself and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. — But if we speak of an oath in the *third* way, then, in one contingency, it is to be observed, namely when it tends toward the advancement of salvation; but in the other contingency, it is unlawful and not to be observed, namely when it tends toward the detriment of salvation. — And by this the response to the proposed question is clear. For it must be granted that an incautious oath, which tends toward the detriment of salvation,

or which directly tends toward the impediment of perfection, is not binding, as the reasons brought in for this side show.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected on the contrary concerning Joshua, it must be said that that oath, when kept, did not tend toward an evil outcome, but rather toward good. For there was a threefold reason why the Gibeonites were spared and not slain. One, namely, *literal*, because it was better that they should be condemned to perpetual servitude than punished with death, especially since they were ready to serve and to undergo death, as appears from the text itself. — But another reason is *moral*, because in this it is signified that however much God may threaten someone and be indignant in the present life, yet if he turns back to Him with his whole heart, He does not close the bowels of mercy. — But the third reason is *figural*, because in this it is signified that there are always two peoples in us, just as there were two in the land of promise, namely of the Amorites and of the children of Israel, that is, of rational and of brutish motions; according to what Bernard says: « However much you labor, it is necessary that the Jebusite dwell within your borders ». — Whence for many reasons the keeping of that oath did not tend toward an evil outcome, but rather toward good. — And as to what is objected concerning the command of the Lord, that the Lord had commanded that he should not enter into a covenant with them; it must be said that this is to be understood with respect to those who were incorrigible.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the harlot, who swears to cleave faithfully to her seducer; it must be said that in the oath there are two things to consider: one, that the harlot swears that she will consent to a wicked act with her seducer; the other, that she swears that she will not give herself to another. And the first indeed is unlawful, and to this she is not bound; but the second indeed is lawful, and as to this she is bound. And therefore Augustine says that she is worse by not keeping than if she kept the oath. In this same way it is to be understood, if some robber were to swear to another that he would divide the spoil with him, and afterward retained the whole.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning him who swears that he will never enter religion, that he can lawfully swear, just as he can lawfully contract matrimony; it must be said that the case is not alike on either side, for a twofold reason. The first is, because matrimony does not only state a privation of good, but rather states a positing of good; whereas an oath by which someone swears that he will never enter religion is, of its principal intention, depriving of and impeditive of the perfect good; therefore it is not to be judged binding, but rather unlawful and iniquitous. — There is also another reason, because he who contracts matrimony, whether by the consent of his wife, or by death, can sometimes undertake perfection. But he who swears that he will never enter religion, so far as is in him, renders himself perpetually unfit.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is lawful to be unwilling to enter religion, therefore also to confirm it by an oath; it must be said that it does not follow: because to be unwilling to enter religion is [a matter] of imperfection, but to confirm this by an oath is [a matter] of a certain obstinacy and of an assailing of the grace of the Holy Spirit, which makes the lukewarm and negligent fervent and perfect. And therefore, although that [former] is lawful, this [latter] nevertheless is unlawful.

*To the incidental question.* To that which is further asked concerning him who swears that he will not accept a prelacy; the response is now clear from what has already been said: because that oath binds in [one] case, namely when it tends toward one's own harm and another's: but in [another] case it does not, namely when the person is useful not only to himself, but also to others. — Nevertheless, if the oath has gone before, one ought not to absolve himself from its bond by his own authority, but to require for this the will, command, and authority of a superior, to whose will rather than his own he ought in this case to be obedient.

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