Dist. 39, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/39/q/bon-sent-III-d39-dubia
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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *It must be noted that an oath has three companions: truth, justice, and judgment.* For it seems that there is a redundancy here. For whoever swears with the judgment of discretion swears truly and justly: therefore, given that judgment is set down there, truth and justice are superfluous. — Likewise, since all our works ought to be done with

discretion and rectitude and truth, it is asked: why rather is an oath said to have three companions than any other word and deed of ours?

In connection with this it is asked: with respect to what is the number of these three companions taken?

**I respond:** It must be said that an oath is compared to three things, namely to the *one swearing*, from whom it proceeds, to the *thing* about which it is made, and to the *cause* for which it is made. According to its comparison to him from whom it issues, *judgment* is owed to it; according to its comparison to the thing about which it is made, *truth* is owed to it, that there may be a conformity of the thing and the speech. But according to its comparison to the cause for which it is made, *justice* is owed to it, that it may be made for a just cause. And since every oath has these three comparisons, therefore every right oath has these three companions. — And by this is made plain the answer to that which is asked last.

But to that which is objected, that where one is present, namely judgment, there are the rest, and therefore the others are superfluous; it must be said that that reasoning is invalid. For such a manner of speaking fails in things that are related by *connection;* for since the virtues are connected, if one is had, all are had; and yet it does not follow that, if one is had, the rest are superfluous. — In another case too it fails, namely when some things are related by *addition.* For when the posterior is posited, the prior is posited too, just as, when the rational power is posited in man, the sensible and the vegetable are posited; and yet, from the fact that the rational is had, the others are not on that account superfluous. So too it must be understood in the matter at hand. For a certain oath is made *justly*, which nevertheless is not made *truly;* and another is made *justly* and *truly*, and yet not *discreetly*, because without premeditation. And therefore that reasoning is invalid.

To that which is asked: why does an oath rather have these companions than any other act of ours? it must be said that this is because an oath is in the assertion of our speech; but our speech has uncertainty, according to what is said in Wisdom 9: *The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our foresight is uncertain.* Therefore, in order that our speech may be confirmed by the divine Truth directly and

fittingly, it needs companions governing it, lest it be found unlike the Truth invoked.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *he is more bound who swears by God than he who swears by creatures, or by the Gospel.* And he assigns the reason for this, that an oath is the firmer in proportion as that by which one swears is the holier. **On the contrary:** one swearing by a creature swears only by God, since he does not intend to invoke the creature as witness, but the Creator: if therefore that by which one swears is the same in both cases, then the obligation is the same and uniform: therefore one is not greater than the other. — Likewise, the more solemn an oath is, the more infamous is the transgressor, and the greater the obligation; but an oath which is made by the Gospel is wont to be made with greater solemnity than one which is made by God: therefore etc. — Likewise, it is greater to despise many goods than one; but he who swears by a creature, if he perjures himself, despises the Creator and the creature together; whereas he who swears by God and perjures himself despises one only: therefore an oath which is made by a creature is more obligatory than an oath which is made by God.

**I respond:** It must be said that the answer of the Master and the confirmation of Chrysostom is generally true, because the holier that is by which one swears, the more obligatory is the oath; and I say this *all else being equal*, where solemnity is observed. Hence, as Chrysostom says, more obligatory is the oath which is made by God than that which is made by a creature.

But to that which is objected, that in swearing by a creature a man swears by God; it must be said that when one swears by a creature, the intention is borne to God, but only *habitually*; whereas when one swears by God, it is borne not only *habitually*, but also *actually.* And since the *actual* turning is fuller than the *habitual*, hence it is that according to it a greater obligation is reckoned, and the transgression itself is of greater fault.

To that which is objected concerning the oath made by the Gospel, which is more solemn; it can be answered in two ways: first, because an oath is made not only by the Gospels, but by the Gospels of God; so that not only is a *habitual* turning made to him by reason of its effect, but also an *actual* one in itself and toward the assumed humanity and toward the manifested truth; and therefore such an oath ought reasonably to be made with greater solemnity and induces a fuller obligation. — In another way it can be said that this happens on account of the superadded solemnity which all observe in that form.

To that which is objected, that it is greater to despise two than one; it must be said that a creature in comparison with the Creator is nothing, whence it adds, as it were, nothing above the divine excellence, and through this neither does contempt of it exceed contempt of God. *Furthermore*, God is not despised in a creature so much as he is despised in himself.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *to swear by God is to call God to witness.* For if this is true, then it seems that this form of swearing: *God is my witness*, and *I swear by God*, are not different forms of swearing.

In connection with this it is asked: since we sometimes swear by this preposition *by*, sometimes by this preposition *in*, according to what the Apostle says to the Romans 9: *I speak the truth in Christ Jesus and I do not lie*, what is the difference between these. — Likewise, it is asked: since in the Old Testament one swore in this manner: *The Lord lives, and may he do this to me and add this*, but in the primitive Church in this manner: *God is my witness*, and in the present time one swears by God; whence comes this difference of forms according to the diverse times.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the form of an oath the very Truth is introduced into testimony. And this can be in many ways: either insofar as it holds the character of *originating principle*, and thus one swears *by God*, so that *by* imports the relation of a principle; or insofar as it imports the relation of *originating principle* and of *knower*, and thus is that form: *God is my witness*, or *God knows*, which is the same; or insofar as it imports the relation of *rewarder* with respect to goods, and thus one swears: *God lives*, who gives life to others; or insofar as it imports the relation of *rewarder* with respect to evils, and thus one swears with this form: *May God do this to me and add this.* — And since the very Truth is now manifestly brought forward for the confirmation of truth as the principle and exemplar of all truth; hence it is that in the new Law one swears in two ways. And because in the time of the primitive Church the Truth was not yet manifest, but needed greater evidence; hence it is that there was then held that form: *God is my witness.* But because in the Old Testament the divine Truth is considered as avenging and punishing, since under the aspect of severity and equity; hence it is that they kept a twofold form in the Old Testament, namely *God lives*, and *may God do this to me and add this.* — And from this is plain the distinction of the aforesaid differences and their sufficiency and their use according to the diverse times.

To that which is asked: what difference is imported by this preposition *by*, and by this preposition *in?* it must be said that *by* rather expresses the very Truth under the aspect of one testifying and originating, but this preposition *in* imports the relation of the divine Truth under the aspect of one testifying and exemplifying. Hence in reality it is the same to swear *in God* and *by God* and to say: *God is my witness*, although there is a difference on the part of the *manner of speaking*.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Without doubt it is a lesser evil to swear truthfully by false gods than to swear deceitfully by the true God.* **On the contrary:** idolatry is a greater sin than perjury, whether it be true or false; the idolater in swearing commits idolatry, since he venerates the idol by the very act of swearing by it: therefore he who swears truly by false gods sins more than he who swears falsely by the true God.

**I respond:** It must be said that in that oath by which someone swears by false gods there are two things, namely that which is asserted, and that by which it is asserted. Regarding that which is asserted, in this way it is a lesser evil, and thus Augustine speaks, because on that side the truth is asserted, and on the other side falsehood. But regarding that by which one swears, it is a greater evil to swear truly by false gods than falsely by the true God; and along this path the objection proceeds.