Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/4/q/bon-sent-III-d4-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether Christ can be called the Son of the Trinity.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ can be called the Son of the Trinity, for the greater clarity of the foregoing. And that he can, it seems.

1. *(To the contrary.)* In the Canticle of Deuteronomy: *Is he not thy father, who possessed thee and made and created thee?* But all this can be said of Christ by reason of the assumed nature; and according to those three things he is said to be the Son of the whole Trinity, whose it is *to possess, to make,* and *to create*: therefore it seems that this can be quite catholically attributed to Christ.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter eight: *That he might be the firstborn among many brethren;* the Gloss: « According to that whereby he is *only-begotten,* he has no brothers; according to that whereby he is *firstborn,* he has deigned to call all men brothers »: if therefore the brothers are of the same Father and are sons of the whole Trinity, it seems that this too can fittingly be attributed to Christ.

3. Likewise, whenever certain things are related indifferently to some operation, according to that common and uniform operation they receive a denomination; but the whole Trinity wrought the mystery of the incarnation: therefore if the person of the Father is said to be the father of Christ not only as regards the deity, but also as regards the humanity, it seems that likewise the whole Trinity can be called father.

4. Likewise, although in the Trinity there is one alone who is Father on account of the eternal generation, nevertheless in time, on account of temporal effects, the whole Trinity is said to be father, and the person of the Father is said to be the father not only of the Son, but also of other things, in such a way that the proper character of the Son is in no way prejudiced: therefore since the Son in time took on a nature, and has an equal and uniform comparison to the whole Trinity, it seems that just as, as regards the divine nature, he is said to be the Son of the Father, so according to the humanity he is the Son of the whole Trinity.

5. Likewise, in Christ there is a threefold substance, namely the supreme, the middle, and the lowest: the supreme, namely the divine; the *middle,* namely the soul; and the *lowest,* namely the body; but Christ by reason of the *supreme* nature is the son of someone, namely of God the Father; by reason of the *lowest* nature the son of someone, namely of the Mother, from whom he drew his flesh: therefore also by reason of the *middle* he will be the son of someone. But the middle, namely the soul, is from the whole Trinity equally: therefore it seems that he can be called the Son of the whole Trinity.

6. Likewise, there is not a greater confusion in properties from the comparison of some property to many things than if two opposites are said of the same thing, indeed much less; but of Christ truly and catholically two opposites are said by reason of the twofold nature, mortal and immortal, passible and impassible: therefore much more strongly, by reason of the assuming nature, he can be called the Son of the Father, and by reason of the assumed nature the Son of the whole Trinity.

**On the contrary:** *(Foundations.)*
1. Augustine, in the book *On the Trinity,* book two: « Jesus can be called neither his own son nor the son of the Trinity »: therefore he cannot be called the Son of the Trinity.

2. Likewise, filiation is a personal property, whence it regards the hypostasis; but in Christ there is one sole person and hypostasis, which cannot be distinguished from the whole Trinity according to the relation of that respect: therefore it does not seem that he can be called the Son of the Trinity.

3. Likewise, Christ is not only a son, but the only-begotten Son, according to what is said in John, chapter one: *We saw his glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father;* but the Trinity has no only-begotten son, since it is compared equally to all: therefore it does not seem that Christ can be called the Son of the Trinity.

4. Likewise, filiation presupposes generation, and generation implies an agreement in nature and a distinction in supposit; but this is impossible to find in Christ, neither according to the divine nature nor according to the human: therefore the aforesaid expression is in no way to be conceded.

### Conclusion.

> *(Conclusion.)* It is not conceded that Christ is the Son of the Trinity.

**I respond:** It must be said that among theologians, according to common usage, it is not admitted that Christ is the Son of the Trinity. But of this different men assign the reason in different ways.

*(Reason according to opinion 1.)* For some have wished to say that this is on account of the *property of filiation,* which regards the person and the hypostasis: and since the hypostasis of the Son of God, or his eternal person, neither has nor draws its origin from the whole Trinity, but only from the person of the Father: hence it is that, although in Christ a human nature created by the whole Trinity is to be found, it is not to be conceded that Christ is the Son of the whole Trinity, on account of the repugnance which is found in the hypostasis, that is, the person, which is eternal. — *(Does it satisfy?)* But if this reason be considered inwardly, it does not seem of great efficacy, because, although the hypostasis of Christ is eternal, nothing nevertheless prevents him from being called the Son of the Virgin by reason of the assumed nature. If therefore the respect of filiation can arise in that hypostasis in comparison to the Mother, from whom that *nature* was drawn, why can it not arise with respect to the whole Trinity, by which it was made? And therefore from the side of the *property of filiation* and of the *eternity of the hypostasis* it does not seem that an efficacious reason can be taken for the repudiation of the aforesaid expression.

*(According to opinion 2.)* And therefore there is another manner of speaking, namely that the aforesaid expression is not received, because it *approaches an error.* For since Christ is the only-begotten Son of God the Father, it is not received that he is the Son of the Trinity *simply,* on account of the fact that such an expression approaches the error of *(The error of Sabellius.)* Sabellius, who held that the property of fatherhood can fittingly be attributed to any one of the three persons. Nor is it received that he is the Son of the whole Trinity *by creation,* because such an expression approaches the error of *(The error of Arius.)* Arius, who held that Christ is a pure creature. Nor is it received that he is the Son of the whole Trinity *by grace;* because such an expression approaches the error of *(The error of Nestorius.)* Nestorius, who held in Christ two natures and two persons, namely the divine and the human; and as regards the human person he called Christ the Son of God by grace. Therefore the aforesaid expression in every way approaches the impiety of error: and therefore it is rejected by those who are skilled in sacred Scripture. — *(To be noted.)* Hence the reasons for this side are to be conceded, although they do not greatly compel.

*(Solution of the opposing arguments.)* 1. To that which is objected, that the whole Trinity possessed and made and created according to the human nature; it must be said that the Trinity made other men *simply* according to *all* their nature; but Christ it did not make *simply* according to *all* his nature, because according to the divine nature the Father alone begot him; and therefore it is not alike in the case of Christ and other men. For although other men can be called creatures of God, this nevertheless is not received concerning Christ, as will be seen better below.

2. To that which is objected, that we are brothers of Christ; it must be said that from this it does not follow that Christ is the Son of the whole Trinity, but that we are called sons of God the Father through him, although « we by grace, but he by nature », as Gregory says upon that text: *I ascend to my Father and your Father,* John, chapter twenty.

3. To that which is objected, that the three persons are related to the assumed nature indifferently; it must be said that this is true; but they are not so related indifferently with respect to the assuming person, because it has one respect to the person of the Father and another to the person of the Holy Spirit. But when Christ is said to be the Son of God the Father, this is said more with respect to the assuming nature than to the assumed; which is clear, because he is called the only-begotten and natural Son of the Father. And therefore that reasoning does not compel, because it proceeds from an insufficient ground.

4. To that which is objected, that the Father is not called father only with respect to the Son, but also of others, of which he is the cause and principle in time; it must be said that just as the Father, from the fact that he adopts certain ones in time, is called their father in time, so also Christ by temporal generation can be called the son of the Virgin; nevertheless it cannot be concluded that he is the Son of the whole Trinity. For it is not alike. For no confusion of properties is incurred, nor is any prejudice done to the truth, nor is any error approached, if the Father is said to be the father of the Son only by generation, and of others by creation; but it is not so when Christ is said to be the Son of the whole Trinity. For if it be understood by generation, we fall into the error of Sabellius; if by creation, we approach the error of Arius; if only by the gratification of adoption, the error of Nestorius.

5. To that which is objected concerning the supreme, the middle, and the lowest nature, the response is already clear through the foregoing, because, since that one is created, no filiation of anyone is received concerning Christ by reason of it. — *(Otherwise.)* It can nevertheless be said that it is not alike concerning the *extreme* substances and the *middle,* because both by reason of the divine substance and by reason of the flesh he is begotten and is assimilated to his producing principle, namely to the Father and to the Mother: to the Father in deity, and to the Mother in humanity; but it is not so by reason of the soul; and therefore it is not alike.

6. To that which is objected last concerning absolute properties,

that they do not make a confusion; it must be said that it is not alike, because *those properties* principally regard *nature,* such as to be passible and immortal; but *filiation* regards the *hypostasis* itself, around which there have been many errors, which the aforesaid expression seems to approach; and therefore, although those are received by catholic men as catholic, this is rejected as contrary to the Christian faith.

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