Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/4/q/bon-sent-III-d4-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the grace in the conception holds the character of a natural property, or of a gratuitous one.*

Thirdly it is asked about that grace which was in the conception, in comparison to the dignity of the assumed nature, and the question is whether that grace holds the character of a natural property, or of a gratuitous one. And that it holds the character of a natural property is seen:

1. (*Arguments for the first side.*) *First*, by the authority of Augustine, which is set down in the text: "In the assumption of human nature there came to be in that man, in a certain manner, a natural grace, such that he could admit no sin."

2. Likewise, this is seen *by reason*. What is in a thing from its first origin is in it naturally; but the soul of Christ from the instant of conception had grace, and that grace neither can nor could be separated from it: therefore it seems that that grace was naturally inborn.

3. Likewise, what is in a thing from an intrinsic principle is in it naturally; but the grace of Christ took its rise from the person of the Word, which is not other than the person of Christ: therefore it was in him from his intrinsic principle; and if this, then it was in him by the mode of a natural property rather than of a gratuitous one.

4. Likewise, a property by which a thing is ordered to a natural act is natural; but by grace that man was and is the natural Son of God: therefore it seems that the grace conferred on him was in him after the manner of a natural property.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Arguments for the second side.*) Grace and nature are divided as opposites; but whenever two things are opposed, one does not denominate the other: therefore if "natural" is said from nature, it seems that no grace is natural, or if it is natural, it is not grace.

2. Likewise, the natural is more distant from the gratuitous, as such, than from the meritorious; but the perfect grace of Christ could not be from merits: therefore much more strongly it seems that it was not natural.

3. Likewise, "by natural things we are neither praised nor blamed"; but Christ was praiseworthy through the grace which he had: therefore it does not seem that that grace was natural to him.

4. Likewise, the union of human nature to the divine in the unity of person is more excellent than [conformity] through the conformity of glory; but nature is not elevated to glory, however much it may excel, except by the mediation of grace, which exceeds the limit of nature, and the more it exceeds, the more it holds the character of grace: if therefore what was conferred on Christ much more exceeded the limits of nature than what was conferred on other men; it seems that his grace had more of the character of the gratuitous and less of the character of the natural than the grace conferred on his members.

> ### Conclusion.
> The grace of union was in a certain manner natural to the man Christ, in a certain manner not.

**I respond:** It must be said that the grace of union (*The grace of union is spoken of in three ways.*), as was touched upon in the foregoing, can be spoken of in three ways. In one way the grace of union is called the grace disposing congruously to the union; in another way the grace of union is called the union itself freely effected; in a third way the grace of union is called the grace itself effecting the union. — And in whichever of these ways the grace of union is spoken of, it is true that it holds the character of the gratuitous (*Conclusion 1.*); it is also true that in some manner it has the property of a natural thing. And this the very text of Augustine intimates, when he says that "in a certain manner there came to be in that man a natural grace": he does not say that it came to be simply, but in a certain manner.

For if the grace of union is called, that is, the grace disposing to the union, in a certain manner it is natu-ral, in a certain manner not (*Reason.*). — For a natural property is compared to something as to a subject, and as to a cause. According to the comparison which it has to the subject, that is said to be in it naturally which is in it from the very beginning of the thing and inseparably, and does not depart from it. According to the comparison which it has to the cause, a property is said to be in it naturally which is caused by the principles of the subject, and through which the subject itself effects a natural operation. In the first way the grace of Christ is said to have been natural, by which he was disposed to the union, because he had grace from the beginning of his nativity and could not lose grace. But in the second way it was not natural, because it was rather ordered to an operation above nature; nor did it have its rise from the principles of nature, but rather from the divine will. And therefore according to this mode of taking it it is truly said that grace was in a certain manner natural to Christ, in a certain manner not. And these things can be gathered from what is said in the text.

Likewise, if the grace of union is called the union itself freely effected (*Conclusion 3.*), in a certain manner it was natural, in a certain manner not: Natural, I say, it was on account of inseparability, because human nature was so united to the divine from its first formation that it could not be separated from it. In a certain manner it was not natural, but gratuitous, namely in this, that it exceeds the limits of nature and proceeded from the mere will of God.

Likewise, if in the third way the grace is called the very power freely effecting the union, as the Holy Spirit himself (*Conclusion 4.*), thus in a certain manner it was natural to that man, in a certain manner not. It was natural through the communication of idioms by reason of the person of the Word, to whom the Holy Spirit is connatural. For the Son did not have the Holy Spirit through influence, but rather because he has in himself from the Father the power of spirating. And therefore it is said in John that the Spirit is not given to him by measure. But through the comparison to the assumed nature that grace was not connatural to that man, because the Holy Spirit was not in him through the principles of created nature, but through indwelling grace. — And thus it is clear that in every mode of understanding that grace was in a certain manner connatural to that man, in another way not.

And according to this the reasons run to both sides (*To the arguments.*), which according to diverse ways conclude truly. For it is true that "that grace, as Augustine says, was in a certain manner natural to that man": yet not simply, as the reasons show.

*To the 4th.* (*To the argument for the first side.*) That reason, however, by which it is shown that that grace is natural because it orders to a natural act, does not hold, because the assumption is false; for although by that grace he is disposed to be a natural son, yet not on this account is he ordered to a natural operation. For this is not said on account of this, that it belongs to that assumed nature to be eternally and naturally generated by the Father through that grace; but it is because by that grace he is disposed to the union, which effects the communication of idioms, and that union is above nature. And therefore it is no wonder if the grace which renders the nature congruous to that union is above nature.

*To the 3rd.* Likewise the other reason, which says that that grace is from an intrinsic principle, does not compel; for "intrinsic" is taken otherwise in the matter proposed, and otherwise when it is said that the natural is what is from an intrinsic principle. For "intrinsic," insofar as it falls under the notification of a natural property, is said to be that which is of the constitution of nature; but the person of the Word is not thus intrinsic to it.

*To the 1st and 2nd.* But the other two reasons are to be conceded, because they do not prove that that grace was simply natural, but that in a certain manner it had a conformity to a natural property. And this indeed holds the truth, as has already been shown.