Dist. 40, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/40/q/bon-sent-III-d40-dubia
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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says, that the sixth precept is: *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife.* For if to covet is prior to committing adultery, it seems that that commandment ought not to be set down in the sixth place, but rather in the third place among the precepts of the second tablet. — Likewise, nothing ought to be commanded except what is in our power; but nature, so long as it is corrupted, has a proneness to coveting: therefore it seems that concupiscence ought not to be forbidden in the Decalogue. — Likewise, just as it happens that one covets a man's wife, so too it happens that one covets his daughter and his concubine: therefore it does not seem that the concupiscence of the flesh is sufficiently forbidden in that commandment.

**I respond:** It must be said that adultery stands by an addition over concupiscence, since to commit adultery is in heart and in deed, but to covet is in the heart. And since a prohibition states the negation of both; and negations stand contrariwise to affirmations: therefore the prohibition of concupiscence adds something over the prohibition of adultery; and generally the prohibition of the sin of the heart adds something over the prohibition of the sin of deed. For it is more to forbid the sin of the heart than the sin of deed, since the sin of deed presupposes the sin of the heart. And therefore those two commandments, in which concupiscence is forbidden, are ordered in the last place. — And by this is made plain the answer to that which is objected first.

To that which is objected, that nothing ought to be commanded which is not in our power; it must be said that there is a concupiscence which consists in sensuality, and there is a concupiscence which is in the consent of reason moving forward to a deed. The first is venial and is not forbidden, but is restrained. But the second is mortal sin, and is forbidden, insofar as it moves forward to a deed. Hence the explanation and meaning of this commandment is intimated in Ecclesiasticus 18, where it is said: *Son, go not after thy lusts;* where to covet is not simply forbidden, but to walk after one's lusts by consenting and proceeding into act.

To that which is objected concerning the concupiscence of a daughter and a concubine, it must be said that a daughter and a concubine can be coveted in two ways: either into possession, that one may be reduced to servitude and service, or for the consummation of a carnal deed. And the first is forbidden by the seventh precept: *Thou shalt not covet the thing;* but the second is forbidden by that commandment, since the concupiscence of the flesh against the lawful marriage-bed is forbidden. Hence to desire someone's daughter for a wife is not forbidden, but to desire her for fornication and as a harlot; and this is comprised under the sixth prohibition.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *The seventh precept is: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house:* since what it is lawful to acquire for a price it is lawful to desire by affection; but it is lawful to buy one's neighbor's house for a price: therefore it is lawful to desire and covet it. If you say that there concupiscence is taken for an inordinate desire; in this way likewise it is not lawful to covet one's own property. — Likewise, just as it happens that one inordinately desires a neighbor's house, so it happens that one inordinately desires a neighbor's dignity: therefore just as the former is forbidden, so also the latter ought to have been forbidden. If you say that the latter is comprised under this prohibition; against this is: that the concupiscence of dignity pertains to pride and vainglory, the concupiscence of a house to avarice: therefore since these belong to diverse genera, it seems that they are not comprised under one prohibition.

**I respond:** It must be said that in this saying there is forbidden the concupiscence of another's thing, insofar as one covets something into possession, seeking in it sufficiency. Hence not only is the concupiscence of temporal goods forbidden, such as a house and cattle, but also of any other thing whatsoever which one would wish to snatch away from another. And this indeed is forbidden, understood in itself, so that one not covet another's thing while it remains another's; or it is also understood as against the order of right, that is, when one would wish his neighbor to be harmed in his property for his own advantage; for then he does not love his neighbor as himself. Hence in this saying all avarice and cupidity are forbidden.

To that, therefore, which is objected first: that what it is lawful to acquire for a price it is lawful to covet; it must be said that *to covet* there means an immoderate appetite of having with harm to one's neighbor, and in this very thing there is also comprised the immoderate appetite, and the prohibition even with respect to one's own thing, in which the sin of cupidity and avarice consists.

To that which is objected concerning the ambition of dignity and honor, it must be said that if dignity and honor be sought under the aspect of *sufficiency*, in this way it pertains to the crime of avarice and is to be forbidden in this commandment. But if under the aspect of *excellence*, in this way it can be said that it is forbidden by the first commandment, in which reverence of God is enjoined. — Yet it could be said that in both ways it is comprised under the prohibition of the seventh, since in both there is love of one's own good, and there is one ground of disorder with respect to one's neighbor, although the ground of disorder with respect to oneself is manifold. Therefore under one prohibition both concupiscences are to be comprised; and the concupiscence of a house is forbidden more than the concupiscence of dignity, since it was more manifest and more perceptible, and also the Jews were more prone to avarice.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *the Sacraments of the new and the old Law are diverse, since the latter only signified, but the former confer grace.* Against this it is objected that no one can be saved without grace: therefore if the Sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace, it seems that no one was saved in that Law; which it is impious to say. If you say that in those Sacraments grace was given, but yet not by the power of those Sacraments; whereas in the Sacraments of the new Law grace is given by their power, since they are "sanctifying from sanctification," as Hugh says; it is objected against this: that grace is by creation: therefore God alone has the power of conferring grace: therefore if it conferred it in both these and those, it seems that there is no difference between these Sacraments and those.

**I respond:** It must be understood, as to this, that concerning this question there is a twofold celebrated and famous opinion.

For some wished to say that in both kinds of Sacraments grace is given, but differently: because in the former it was given by reason of the faith and devotion of the very recipient, so that in no way by reason of the Sacrament or of the work worked. But in the Sacraments of the

new Law it is otherwise, since they consist of word and element; and when the Lord instituted the word, he gave it a power, by which it flows in and acts upon the soul either by disposing it to the reception of grace, or by imprinting the con-signification of a character, or by ministering to grace itself for the healing of the soul and the weakening of the tinder of sin. And this Augustine seems to say: "What is the power of water, that it touch the body and wash the heart, except by the action of the word?" And master Hugh of St. Victor seems to feel the same thing, who says that "the Sacraments of the new Law are first sanctified through the word and afterward sanctify, so that thus they are sanctifying from sanctification." And this manner of speaking is upheld by men skilled and worthy of faith:

But it seems difficult to me to understand that that power is conferred simultaneously upon word and element, as to its essence and nature, as to its existence, as to its measure of duration, and also as to the efficacy of its operation; all of which it is necessary to posit and explain concerning that power, if one says that some quality is given to word and element, by which it may act and flow into the soul itself.

For it is difficult to understand the essence of that power. For since it is not a substance, but a certain accident and in the genus of the good; it is doubtful whether it ought to be placed among the greatest goods, or the middling, or the least. And if it be placed among the greatest goods, it will now be grace; but grace existing in one subject does not have the power of acting upon another. But if it is neither grace nor a power, how then is it said in truth to sanctify the Sacrament itself and him who receives the Sacrament? — In what genus too it is and of what species it is, namely whether in diverse Sacraments that power is formally diversified, is difficult for a man of little understanding to grasp. — And if it be placed among the middling goods, or the least, how does such a power produce the rectitude and healing of the soul itself, which are reckoned among the greatest goods?

But not only is it difficult to understand the essence of this power, but also its subsistence. For how will a spiritual accident be substantiated in a corporeal subject, since according to the order of nature, which God does not overturn by miracle, a substance is nobler than its property? — Or if that spiritual power is posited as in a subject in word and element, why is not grace itself likewise so, which ought to be infused into the soul? which I know not whether anyone rightly understanding would say. — Or if it is in a corporeal subject, how will one absolute power and quality be able to be simultaneously in two subjects, namely word and element, of which, even if one Sacrament is made, nevertheless one thing is not made by nature and essence? But the unity of a power, according to what Damascene holds, corresponds to the unity of substance and nature. Either therefore in one Sacrament there is not one power, but several; or that power is composite; or one simple and spiritual and indivisible accident will be simultaneously in diverse subjects; all of which is very difficult to understand concerning that power.

Nor are these two things alone difficult to understand concerning that power, but also its measure of duration. For it seems doubtful whether God gave that power when he first instituted it, or gives it anew. But how did he from the beginning give to those things which did not yet exist, such as words, which are daily formed anew? If he gives it anew, then daily in the Sacraments he creates not only grace, but also other accidents; and yet it is not wont to be said that the work of creation runs now except in regard to the soul's coming into being and in regard to the infusion of grace. — And if it ceases to be at once, the word having been uttered, how did God create so noble a power, that it should fail so quickly? — And again, if it is given to the word, since it is not given to the word in writing nor in the mind, it is given in the utterance; and then it will be difficult to explain whether it is given at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end: since neither at the beginning of the word nor in the middle is there the action of that power. But if at the end, then, when the word ceases to be, and the word failing, the power of the word would cease, the power will begin and cease at once. Or if it were given before the end; when it is given before and how long it lasts, it is difficult to indicate.

Nor only that, but it is also much more difficult to explain the efficacy of the operation of that power, namely whether it acts by equivocal generation, or univocal, generating something like itself, or unlike. — It is also difficult whether it flows in something altogether from without, or draws something out of potency into act. The

first is possible to God alone, but the second is difficult to explain. — It is also difficult to understand how the impression of a character can be from that power, since a character seems to be in a higher part, into which God alone can flow. Hence a beatified intelligible substance, however great its excellence, according to what Augustine says, cannot do anything toward our justification or illumination by forming anything inwardly, but only by stirring outwardly. How then will a power given to element or word be able to do this, since it does not seem to be capable of so great a power? — Lastly, in the Sacrament of the altar, in which the transubstantiation of the bread according to its whole self into the body of Christ takes place suddenly — which indeed cannot be except from an infinite power — how will a word uttered by a man, since it is of finite power, be able to effect anything toward that transubstantiation? And surely, if that word does not have an acting power, much less do the words of the other Sacraments.

All these things and many others concerning this it is very difficult to understand and explain. Which things I do not relate because I believe them to be insoluble, or in order through them to disprove this position, but in order to show that I do not fully understand it, and therefore wish neither to affirm nor deny it; because, even though I do not clearly understand it, this nevertheless I know and understand, that God can do more, and even in the Sacraments themselves does more, than we can understand. Hence by taking refuge in the wonderful power of God, we can easily evade all these things. And according to this manner of speaking the answer to the proposed question would be plain enough, if the understanding of the manner itself were plain. And this position is more diffusely explained in the fourth book, where the foregoing is answered.

There is here another manner of speaking. Granted that in the Sacraments of the new Law "the divine power works more secretly", since this belongs to faith itself and to the common opinion: some have said that the Sacraments of the new Law have, with respect to justification, an influencing, a meriting, a disposing, and an efficaciously ordaining power: an influencing power by reason of the assisting Holy Spirit; a meriting power by reason of the merit of the Passion concurring with the Sacrament; a disposing power by reason of the devotion of the faithful one receiving the Sacrament; and finally an efficaciously ordaining power by reason of the divine covenant of the one instituting. For so the Lord instituted, that at the utterance of such a word and the reception of the Sacrament a wonderful operation should come to be in the recipients, and a healing and justification of those receiving; and to that extent the Sacraments of the new Law are said to have power. — And they differ in this from the Sacraments of the old Law, especially as to the efficacious ordination itself, since there did not intervene in those Sacraments a covenant by which an efficacious and infallible ordination to grace might be made, such as in the Sacraments of the new Law; as is plain in the institution of baptism, where he said: *He who believes and is baptized shall be saved.* — In the other three modes also of having power there is a difference in respect of the more complete and the less complete, since in the Sacraments of the new Law the Holy Spirit, flowing in justice, more fully assists, and the meritorious Passion of Christ more efficaciously concurs. In sign of which from the side of Christ flowed blood and water, and consequently the Sacraments, upon which the Church is founded. — More abundant too is the devotion of the recipient, both on account of the increase of one's own faith, which came about in the new Law, and also on account of the support of the faith of the whole Church, since the ecclesiastical Sacraments are received in the faith of the Church. — And on account of this fourfold mode of having power the Sacraments of the new Law are said to justify and to be a cause of grace. — Nor do those who uphold this position wish to posit anything more in the Sacraments of the new Law, both because these things seem sufficient enough for our healing and justification; and also because from this fourfold mode of having power the nobility of the Sacraments of the new Law in themselves is sufficiently manifested; and also because according to this the difference of the Sacraments of the new Law and of the old appears sufficiently; and also because neither express authority nor reason seems to compel one to grant them more, and the humility of faith ought to shrink not only from diminution, but also from superfluity, and in a certain way it seems more praiseworthy to speak by way of diminution than to enlarge.

This manner of speaking and the determination of this question many uphold who understand well. And lord William, bishop of Paris, in determining in the schools of the Friars Minor, approved

this manner of speaking in the presence of brother Alexander of good memory. — And this manner of speaking one can uphold and understand in two ways: either so that one altogether affirms that there is no power in the Sacraments of the new Law in any other way than the aforesaid ways; or so that one affirms in this way that there is power in them, yet in such a way that one does not deny that another mode, besides these, of a power existing in the Sacraments is possible. And the first mode is repugnant to the former manner of speaking; but the second mode of speaking is not repugnant to the former opinion, since it says nothing which that does not say, nay rather it says nothing which the common opinion does not hold — for no one rightly thinking denies that in all the said modes the Sacraments of the new Law have power — but if one says more, he does not contradict this position, but adds to it.

But perhaps it will seem to someone open to calumny, what has been said, that the power of the Holy Spirit assists the Sacrament, since rather it ought to be understood as comprised within the name of the Sacrament as belonging to its integrity, on account of that which is said in 1 John 5: *There are three that give testimony on earth: the spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three are one;* and in the book *On Unity and the One* it is said that they are one in the Sacrament: and therefore it ought not to be said that the Holy Spirit assists the Sacrament, as though it were numbered along with it; but on account of that unity which was aforesaid, which the Holy Spirit effects in the Sacrament, it ought to be attributed to the Sacrament itself.

But surely, even though this manner of speaking seems to differ from the aforesaid, nevertheless in reality it is the same, although the words are diverse. For that these three are said to be one in the Sacrament, this is not that out of them one thing is made by essence, but that one thing is made by order, since namely they are ordered to one effect; and this is to say nothing other than that one assists another. — Likewise, everything that belongs to the integrity of a Sacrament is either thing only, or signification only, or thing and sign. If therefore the Spirit flowing in justice be posited as belonging to the unity of the Sacrament, since it is neither a sign nor a thing-and-sign, it will be only as a thing, and thus it will not have the character of a cause, but rather the character of an effect; and thus the Spirit would not stand for the influencing power itself, but rather for the very grace of the Holy Spirit infused into the soul in the reception of the Sacrament. — Likewise, there is no question whether the Holy Spirit infuses grace into the Sacrament, but about this is the question, whether the Sacrament, according as it is said to be "the visible form of invisible grace, so that it bears its likeness and exists as its cause," has any power by which it may flow into the soul. This therefore does not seem to make for the purpose. — Lastly, the sanctifying Holy Spirit and the merit of the Passion and the external element are found not only in the Sacraments of the new Law, but also in the Sacraments of the old Law. This therefore does not suffice to say for assigning the difference of these Sacraments and those. — Either therefore this manner of speaking says nothing else, or if it says something, it says little and makes little for the purpose.

And therefore let whoever of the aforesaid modes pleases more be upheld, since the first is pious enough, but the second is sober enough, if it be upheld in that way in which it has been said; and in this way it is upheld in the fourth book, as is plain to one who considers. And for this reason I have repeated it here, not on this account, that new things might be added, but that it might be shown that it is not dissonant from the common position, to which, to the best of my powers, in all the preceding books I have adhered as to the safer way, and, as I know and am able, I persuade myself and others of like little understanding that it ought to be adhered to; and since throughout the whole book I have observed this more diligently — as will appear more clearly to one who attends — that in these doubtful and difficult questions, in which I could not discern what was the common way, since the wise have opinions contrary to the wise, I have thus upheld one part as the more probable, yet so that I might in no way disprove the other.

For it suffices in doubtful matters to know what the wise have thought, nor is it useful to be a slave to contentions. *We say many things and fall short in words, but the consummator of words is he himself*, our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the discourse has been made in this third book, to whom I render boundless thanks, because he helped me to come to the consummation of this little work, having pity on the poverty of my knowledge and ability; in which this third book was set down last. Whom I ask, that he may cause it to come to merit for me through obedience and to the profit of the brethren, on account of which two things this labor was undertaken from the beginning. To him therefore, of whom the discourse has been made, our Lord Jesus Christ, *the immortal and invisible King of the ages*, who for us was made man and underwent the cross and bestowed manifold grace and gave commandments, according to what has been explained in this book, be all honor and glory through the infinite ages of ages. Amen.

HERE ENDS THE THIRD BOOK OF BROTHER BONAVENTURE UPON THE SENTENCES.