Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/5/q/bon-sent-III-d5-a1-q5
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### Article I. *On the assumption on the part of the one assuming.*
### Question V. *Whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.*

Fifth and last it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh. And that it is so, it seems.

(*To the opposite.*) 1. John Damascene, and it is found in the text [of the Master]: «We say that the whole and perfect nature of the deity was made incarnate into one hypostasis»; but to be made incarnate is nothing other than to be made flesh: therefore if this is true: the divine nature is made incarnate, then this also, namely: the divine nature is made flesh.

2. Likewise, to say *the Word is made flesh* is nothing other than that human nature has been assumed by the Word; but human nature has been assumed not only by the Word, but also by the divine nature, as was shown above: therefore it seems that the divine nature is made flesh.

3. Likewise, for *the Word to be made flesh* is nothing other than for the Son of God to be made man; but the Son of God is the divine nature or essence, and on account of the union there is a communication of idioms: therefore it seems that, just as this is conceded: *the Word is made flesh*; so this ought to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.

**On the contrary:** (*Fundamental arguments.*) 1. The Master, in the text: «I think it better to deny this than to assert it»: therefore, according to the opinion of the Master, the aforesaid locution seems to be denied.

2. Likewise, because the Son of God is made flesh, it is conceded that the Son of God suffered and died; but it is not conceded: the divine nature suffered or died: therefore neither ought this to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.

3. Likewise, whenever any two things are so related that they are formally distinct; if one is said to become the other, it is signified that the one is converted into the other, as for instance if water is said to be made wine; but flesh and the divine nature are so related: since therefore the divine nature is not converted into flesh, it seems that this is not to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.

(*An incidental question.*) There is therefore a question, why it is conceded rather: the divine nature is made incarnate, than this: the divine nature is made flesh.

### Conclusion.

> The locution: the divine nature is made flesh, is not to be admitted.

**I respond:** (*Conclusion.*) It must be said that this ought to and can be conceded: the divine nature is made incarnate, because it is read as written and is not simply improper.

(*A twofold sense.*) For it yields a twofold understanding, of which one is true and catholic, although the other is ambiguous: one, when it is said: the divine nature is made incarnate, that is, *united to flesh*; and this without doubt is true. For since union bespeaks a relation, together with this it notes the distinction of the natures and excludes confusion; and therefore by reason of this understanding it can be conceded: the divine nature is made incarnate.

(*Conclusion 2.*) There can also be another sense: the divine nature is made incarnate, that is, *made flesh*. And by reason of this it is not commonly admitted by the doctors. For this is not received: the divine nature is made flesh; for it has a twofold understanding, and in one understanding it is *false* and in the other understanding it is so *expressive* that it can lead into error; and therefore it is in no way received.

(*The reason for this twofold sense.*) — The aforesaid locution has a twofold understanding from this, that this which is *made* can fall between *subject and predicate*, and *be referred to the whole*. If it falls *between subject and predicate*, then it notes a making with regard to the divine nature in respect of the form of flesh; and therefore the sense is: the divine nature is made flesh, that is, converted into flesh; and this indeed is simply *false*. — But if it regards the whole, then the sense is: the divine nature is made flesh, that is, it is brought about that the divine nature be flesh; (*Conclusion 3.*) and this indeed, properly speaking, is false, because flesh is not predicated of the divine nature. But if it be understood synecdochically, so that the sense be: the divine nature is flesh, that is, *man*; even though that might in some way (*Conclusion 4.*) be conceded on account of the convergence in the hypostasis, which makes the communication of idioms — on account of this, that this is true: man is the divine nature, that is, he who is man — yet on account of its excessive *expressiveness* it must be passed over in silence, lest nature seem to be predicated of nature, or an identity or confusion of the natures be made; all of which must be banished from that most excellent union and assumption. — There are therefore to be conceded the arguments showing that the aforesaid locution is not to be admitted, although they do not greatly compel.

**To the objections:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. As to that indeed which is objected, that the divine nature is made incarnate and is conceded; it must be said that it is not similar, as has already been seen.

2. As to that which is objected, that on account of the assumption of human nature this is conceded: the Word is made flesh; it must be said that it is not similar, (*Note.*) because the Word names the very hypostasis upon which the human nature itself rests and which it has to denominate. And therefore there is not signified by this any mutation or confusion of the natures, but only the denomination of the Word to human nature, so that the Word is said to be man. But it is not so when it is said: the divine nature is made flesh, because, since these natures are distinct, and one cannot be denominated from the other, although it can be united to the other, the aforesaid locution recedes the more from propriety and truth.

3. As to that which is objected, that for the Word to be made flesh is nothing other than for the Word to be made man; it must be said that it is true. And since this is true and proper: the Word is made man; the figurative locution, which is immediately resolved into it, is not a way of leading into error, but rather can be conceded quite catholically. But this: the divine essence is made man, although it is not *wholly false*, because the hypostasis is predicated of the divine nature by *identity*; nevertheless is not *so proper* as this: the Son of God is made man, but rather is excessively expressive. And therefore the figurative locution, in which it is signified by synecdoche that flesh is taken for the whole man, is simply rejected, for the reason that it recedes the more from the propriety of speech and from the expression of truth, and approaches the understanding of error. — (*Note.*) For which cause many locutions are denied by the doctors of theology, lest the simple, who do not know the force of words, be led into fallacy and deceived.

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