Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/5/q/bon-sent-III-d5-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether an intention of personality is to be posited in the separated soul, every union being set aside.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether an intention of personality is to be posited in the separated soul, every union being set aside. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. First it is plain through the Master in the text: «A soul released from the body is a person, just as an Angel»; but an Angel is truly and properly a person: therefore the separated soul also. (*To the contrary.*)

2. Likewise, as it is commonly accustomed to be distinguished: a person is a thing distinct by a property pertaining to dignity; but the separated soul is a distinct thing, which is plain: therefore it is a person.

3. Likewise, the reason why the human nature in Christ is not a person is on account of the union to something more worthy: but when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing, and the soul, the assumption and union being set aside, completely has in itself that account which Boethius posits: «A person is an individual substance of a rational nature»: therefore it seems that the account of personality befits the separated soul both properly and truly.

4. Likewise, it happens that the separated soul is compared to an Angel, and it happens to be compared to another soul, and what is the comparison of one Angel to another, the same is the comparison of one soul to another; but the separated soul differs in species from an Angel, just as also an Angel from a soul: therefore by a similar [reasoning], just as between one Angel and another there is a personal distinction, so between one soul and another. But things that have a personal distinction have an intention of personality: therefore it happens that the full account of personality is found in the separated soul.

5. Likewise, to whatever it befits to speak of itself as of itself, that is a person; but it befits the separated soul to speak of itself as of itself — for it happens that one directs speech to it, just as we direct it to the soul of Peter and Paul; and it is established that conversely they can express their will to us, just as they have expressed it to some — therefore it seems that the separated soul truly and properly is a person.

6. Likewise, the soul by its separation from the body does not have a worse condition, but a more worthy state; but as long as the rational spirit was in the body and united to the body, it did not lack a personal account: therefore neither when it is separated from the body.

**On the contrary:** 1. A person is one through itself; but what at some time comes to the constitution of a third is not one through itself and distinct: therefore what is born to be united to the constitution of a third is not a person. But the rational soul is of this sort: therefore etc. (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Likewise, a person signifies what is most complete in the genus of substance, in such a way that it is not ordered to a further perfection in the same genus; but the rational soul is ordered to constituting a human being: therefore it does not have the intention of a person.

3. Likewise, the rational soul, when it is united to flesh, as the Master says, is not a person: therefore if, when it is separated, it has the account of a person; then it has a more worthy mode of existing outside the body. If therefore «nature always desires what is better», it seems that the soul would never desire to be united to a body; it also seems from this, that when the soul is united to the body, it is to its prejudice, and when it is separated, that it is not a punishment to it, but a reward; all of which are false and absurd: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that the separated soul etc.

4. Likewise, if the separated soul is a person; since to assume is an act befitting a person, just as a divine person is said to assume a body, when a body is united to it, and similarly an Angel, by a like mode a soul would be said to assume its own body, when it is again conjoined to it; but if this is not received, it seems that neither should the premise be conceded, namely that the separated soul is a person, just as an Angel.

### Conclusion.

> The soul separated from the body does not fully have the account of personality.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as appears from the text, the opinion of the Master was that the separated soul is a person; and this opinion was that of master Hugh of Saint Victor. (*The opinion of the Master and of Hugh.*) But the reason that moved them to posit this was the actual distinction and completion found in the separated soul, since it exercises noble acts more freely and more perfectly than it exercises [them] in the body.

This opinion, however, is not commonly upheld by the doctors. (*It is not proved.*) The reason for this is that for the complete account of a person there is required, as was said above, a distinction of singularity and of incommunicability and of supereminent dignity. (*Three things in a person.*) But although in the separated soul singularity and dignity are to be found, yet incommunicability is not to be found, because it has an appetite and an aptitude to be united to a body for the constitution of a third. And therefore it is necessary that it lack the distinction of personality; (*Conclusion.*) since, if the soul is more complete, while the appetite which it has with respect to resuming the body is terminated, as Augustine wills in the twelfth [book] on Genesis according to the letter, and then it does not have in itself the intention of a person; it follows necessarily that it lacks personality, when it is separated from the body. Otherwise the aforesaid unsuitable consequences would follow, namely that the union would be preternatural, and the separation would not be penal; again, that the union would be to the soul's prejudice, and the separation [its] reward; each of which is false.

And therefore not without reason in this opinion do they commonly not uphold the Master, although some wish to say that the Master understood it of the separated soul, the unibility to the body being set aside; and this is rather a glossing-over of the words than an exposition, as is plain by looking at his words. (*The author excuses [the Master].*) Furthermore, the unibility or aptitude for uniting with the body is not accidental to the soul, but is essential to the soul itself, and thus cannot be separated or set aside from it, its nature being preserved, as was shown above in the second book. — Yet it could be said, out of reverence for him, that he did not wish to say that the whole account of personality belonged to the separated soul, but that, this being supposed, that the separated soul were a person, even so it would not be a person in Christ, because it would be conjoined with the divine person. But whatever may be the case about the Master's intention, this must be conceded, that the account of personality is not fully present in the separated soul. — Hence the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

**Solution of the opposing [arguments].** 1. To that which is objected from the authority of the Master, the response is already plain through the things already said.

2. To that which is objected, that the separated soul is a thing distinct by a property pertaining to dignity; it must be said that there is not there an account of distinction according to which it befits the intention of a person according to that threefold condition which was assigned above.

3. To that which is objected, that when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing, and thus the unibility to the body does not take away from the soul the property of a person; it must be said that this would be true, if the soul were a person *through itself*; for then it would not be deprived of the account of a person from this, that it were conjoined to a body. If therefore it lacks the account of a person when it is conjoined to a body, it is plain that it is not a person when it is separated from the body. But this is not on account of a defect of *dignity,* but on account of a defect of *incommunicability*; although it could not unsuitably be said that to that very unibility, by way of composition, there follows a certain neediness and a defect from the most worthy completion. (*Note.*)

4. To that which is objected, that the soul differs in species from an Angel, according as it is compared to it; it must be said that the *account of personality* signifies completion more than the *intention of the species.* For Christ according to his human nature is contained under the *species of a human being,* although according to that nature he does not have the intention of *personality.* And therefore it does not follow, that if a specific difference befits the separated soul with respect to an Angel, that on account of this there should also befit it a personal distinction with respect to another soul. Nor does it follow: it differs in *number* from another soul, therefore it differs *personally*; because distinction according to *number* extends further than distinction of personality.

5. To that which is objected, that to whatever it befits to speak of itself as of itself etc.; it must be said that it is true, taking «person» *broadly,* according as a person is said to be in a noun or a pronoun, according as it renders a supposit to a verb; but in this way we do not here speak of a person, because this is the consideration of the grammarian, not of the theologian; for thus it regards the mode of signifying more than the property of the thing. (*Note.*)

6. To that which is objected last, that the glorified soul on account of its separation from the body does not have a worse condition; it must be said that that reasoning fails in two ways: first indeed, because, although it does not have a worse condition as regards well-being, namely as regards the enjoyment of God, yet it has a less good condition as regards the being of nature. Yet personality is not considered as regards well-being or the being of grace, but as regards the being of nature or first being. (*The reasoning fails in two ways.*) — There is also another defect, since the intention of personality follows the soul united to the body, yet in such a way that neither the soul nor the body is a person, but the whole conjoined thing. And therefore it does not follow that such a dignity or property remains in the separated soul; just as neither does risibility, which is a property with respect to the conjoined thing, after the separation remain either in the soul or about the body.