Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/5/q/bon-sent-III-d5-a2-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man.*

Fourth, it is asked whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man. And that He did, it seems:

1. By that which is said in the Psalm: *Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken up*; but "blessed" stands there for some [individual]; and there is no one to point to except a man: therefore etc. (*To the opposite.*)

2. Likewise, Augustine in the Exposition of the Creed: "If anyone shall say that the man assumed by Christ was laid down, let him be anathema."

3. Likewise, Anselm says in the book *On the Incarnation* that "He did not assume a man in general, but this man"; but from "this man" there follows "man": therefore if He assumed this man, it well follows that He assumed a man.

4. Likewise, the property of one part denominates the whole — whence Peter is called white if only his body is white — therefore much more the property of both; but it is true to say that Christ assumed flesh and soul: therefore it is true to say that He assumed a man.

5. Likewise, the Son of God assumed soul and body, and He assumed them united: therefore if body and soul united make a man, it therefore seems that He assumed a man. If you should say that they were not united before they were assumed; by this the reasoning is not dissolved and evaded, because, if soul and body were not united before they were assumed by priority of time, at least they were simultaneously united and assumed to one another in time: therefore it seems that in His assumption they were making a man; and if this is true, therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the Son of God is a man, either a man whom He assumed, or a man whom He did not assume. If a man whom He assumed, then He assumed a man; if He is a man whom He did not assume, then either Peter, or Paul, or of the rest. If, then, none of such can be pointed to, it therefore seems simply to be true that He assumed a man.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the book *On the Rules of Faith* it is said that "the assumer is not the assumed": therefore if the Son of God is a man, it is false that the Son of God assumed a man. (*The grounds.*)

2. Likewise, if He assumed a man and never lays down whom He assumed, then He always was a man: therefore when He was dead, He was a man; which does not seem true, since it is "a contradiction in the predicate".

3. Likewise, if He assumed a man, then either a man in general, or this man. Not a man in general; therefore He assumed this man; but this man names a person or at least a hypostasis: therefore in Christ there are two persons or two hypostases. But this is false and contrary to faith: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, assumption asserts some use of the thing assumed; but the use of a thing follows the thing itself either in time or in nature: therefore the assumed is prior naturally to the assuming itself. If, then, "man" asserts human nature in comparison to a hypostasis or person; it is necessary that in Christ there be a person other than the assuming person, to which the humanity is compared before the assumption. But if this is simply false, it remains that that too is false: the Son of God assumed a man.

### Conclusion.

> The expression "the Son of God assumed a man" is improper.

**I respond:** It must be said that some wished to maintain that expression, like those who held the first opinion, saying that Christ is two things, namely two things of nature, that is, a man and God. (*Opinion 1.*)

But because that cannot be reasonably maintained, as will be seen below, therefore others wished to distinguish, that there is a speaking of assumption either as to its *becoming* (*fieri*), or as to its *being-done* (*factum esse*). If we speak of assumption as to its *becoming*, then it is false that He assumed a man, but rather a soul and flesh. But if we speak of assumption as to its *term* or *being-assumed*, they wished to concede that the person of God assumed a man. For then it does not seem that that man existed before the assumption, but that from the assumption itself someone was made a man. (*Opinion 2.*) — But still that does not seem to have been said very reasonably. For if from the assuming of a garment someone can truly be said to *be clothed*, this is reasonably conceded: "this one assumes a garment"; and this is not admitted: "this one assumes himself clothed, or shod." In this manner neither does this seem to be admissible: "the Son of God assumed a man," although from the assumption itself He was made a man. (*Not proven.*)

And therefore there is a third, more common and more true, manner of speaking, namely that this is improper: "the Son of God assumed a man." — And the reason for this is that *man* signifies the human form or nature in concretion with the supposit, of which it is truly predicated according to a certain *identity*. And therefore it is truly predicated of the supposit itself, so that it is said: "this one is a man." But the verb *to assume* of its very account asserts more, namely the *distinction* of the assumer to the assumed, in this that it asserts a *relation*; and it also asserts a certain *order* with respect to that which naturally *precedes* the assumption itself, and with respect to that which *follows*. For the thing assumed naturally *precedes* the assumption itself, although it can be said to be simultaneous in *time*; whereas the concretion and union of the assumer to the assumed *follows* the assumption itself. (*Opinion 3 and conclusion 1.*) — And therefore in two ways this is false: "the Son of God assumed a man": both on account of a defect of *distinction*, because *man* is predicated of the Son of God; and on account of a defect of *order*, because the comparison of the humanity to the person or hypostasis follows the assumption itself, and does not precede it, whereas the thing assumed precedes. — And therefore the aforesaid statement is false from a twofold cause, and the reasons [against it] are to be conceded on that side. (*Conclusion 2.*)

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* As for those authorities adduced to the contrary, it must be said that they have something of impropriety and are to be expounded. For the saints sometimes speak very expressly. Whence *man* in the aforesaid authorities is taken rather abstractly than concretely, rather for the human nature than for the thing of nature. And in this manner the like authorities can be answered with a single response: because by the name *of a man* the human nature is to be understood; although according to common usage and according to the force of the word this name *man* is not so customarily taken. (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)

*To 4.* As for what is objected, that the property of a part denominates the whole; it must be said that this has an instance [to the contrary] in *respective* properties, although it has truth in *absolute* properties. For although it is true that Peter's hand is smaller than Peter, or any part of him in a certain manner; nevertheless this is false: "Peter is smaller than Peter," or "differs from Peter." In this manner too it is to be understood in the matter proposed, because *assuming*, as has been said, or *being-assumed* asserts some order, or distinction, which can be found between the *person* of Christ and the *parts of the composite* man, which are body and soul, although that respect or order between the *person* of Christ and *Christ the man* himself cannot be found. (*Note.*)

*To 5.* As for what is objected, that He assumed soul and body united; it must be said that there is a union of soul and body with respect to the *supposit*, in which they are, and with respect to the *human nature*, which they constitute; and *both* unions of soul to body were in the assumption itself. And the one indeed preceded according to the order of nature, namely [the union] of soul to body for the constitution of one nature; but the other, namely [the union] of soul to body into one person or hypostasis, followed the assumption itself, because the person and hypostasis of the Word, by assuming flesh, was likewise uniting flesh and soul. (*Twofold union.*) — When therefore it is said that soul and body united make a man; it must be said that it is true, according as they are united in this twofold manner. And since one of these manners follows upon the assumption, therefore this is not conceded, that He assumed a man, although it is conceded that He assumed soul and body conjoined. — It could also be said that this consequence does not hold: "He assumed soul and body conjoined, therefore He assumed a man"; because *man* supposits for some man, and therefore supposits for someone, whereas soul and body assert a *what*. But among theologians it is reckoned that a change of predicament occurs, when one proceeds from that which is said *who* to that which is predicated *in [the category of] what*, or conversely, as was held in the first book. (*Another solution.*)

*To 6.* As for what is objected, that Christ is a man, either whom He assumed or whom He did not assume; I say that you do not divide rightly and sufficiently, because the contradiction is not taken by the negation that bears upon the *implication*, but by the negation that bears upon the *principal predicate*; and therefore it is not to be divided thus: either He is a man *assumed*, or *not assumed*; but rather thus: either He *is* an assumed man, or He *is not* an assumed man, according to the law of contradiction. (*Note.*) But if it be objected that "man" is sufficiently divided by "assumed" and "not assumed," as by immediates; then a response must be made to the other inference: "therefore either He is Peter, or Paul, etc."; because He is neither Peter nor Paul nor Virgil, but Jesus; and Jesus is not a man assumed by the Son of God, although His nature is assumed. For "Jesus" is not a name imposed on a nature, but a name imposed on a *person*.