Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/6/q/bon-sent-III-d6-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the variety of these opinions, namely, in which there is the greater probability.*
### Question I. *Whether Christ is two.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether Christ is two. And that he is, it seems.

1. Augustine, *to Felicianus*: "The Son of God is one thing, the son of man another"; but what is one thing and another is two: therefore etc. *(In the opposite direction.)*

2. Likewise, Hilary in the ninth book *On the Trinity*: "Christ, the man Jesus, although he is one thing from the Father and another from the Mother, is nevertheless not another person"; but what is one thing and another is two: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he is God, is one by an uncreated unity; insofar as he is man, he is one by a created unity: if therefore the created and the uncreated unity are one thing and another, then Christ is two.

4. Likewise, an essential difference gives being, therefore diverse essential differences give diverse beings; but in Christ there is an essential difference of the human nature, namely the rational, which differs essentially from the divine nature: therefore it is necessary that Christ have diverse beings. But things that have diverse beings are two: therefore it seems that Christ is two.

5. Likewise, one nature in several persons makes those persons to be one, as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit in the Trinity are one: therefore by parity of reasoning several natures in one person will make that person to be two; but Christ is one person in two natures: therefore Christ is two.

6. Likewise, on account of the union there is a communication of idioms; but there is no communication of the same thing to itself: therefore it is necessary that there be a difference between the things whose idioms are communicated. But the communication of idioms is not with respect to the natures, but with respect to the supposits of the natures, which are said of Christ, and of which one is said of the other: if therefore that of which two diverse things are predicated is two; it seems that Christ is two, since in him there is a communication of idioms.

7. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he is God, is something that is the Father, insofar as he is man, is something that is not the Father: therefore he is something and something: therefore it seems that it is necessary to posit that Christ is two.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene in the third book: "The divine nature united the human nature to itself into one of its hypostases": therefore if "hypostasis" names the supposit itself, there is one supposit in Christ; but that in which there is one supposit is one, not two: therefore etc. *(Foundations.)*

2. Likewise, Hilary, *On the Trinity*, ninth book: "Since the Son of God is not one thing and the son of man another, I ask, who has been glorified?": therefore Christ is not one thing and another; nor one person and another, and this is established: therefore he is not two, but one.

3. Likewise, "everything that is, as Boethius says, is for this reason, because it is one"; but Christ is: therefore it is necessary that Christ be one, and one simply and in act, therefore he is undivided; and what is undivided is not two: therefore Christ is not two.

4. Likewise, just as division states an order to multitude, so union states an order to unity: if therefore in the Incarnation there was not division, but rather union; it seems that to be many or two in no way befits Christ.

5. Likewise, if Christ is two, I ask: which two? either two natures, or two persons; neither of these can be granted: not two natures, because the human nature is not predicated of Christ; not two persons, because, as was shown above and will be shown below, in Christ there is but one person: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if any two things differ essentially in their supposits, it is impossible for one to be predicated of the other; but God and man differ essentially: therefore if in Christ they have a difference of supposits, then they are not predicated of each other: therefore neither is God man, nor man God, which is commonly against all the Saints.

7. Likewise, "an individual is constituted out of properties, the collection of which it is impossible to find in another": but whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the son of man, and conversely: therefore the Son of God and the son of man in Christ do not differ in number, like two individuals: therefore Christ cannot be called two individuals or supposits, nor can he be called two natures: therefore it in no way seems that he ought to be called two.

### Conclusion

> Christ ought not to be called two, but one.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether Christ is two, this can be understood in three ways: *(threefold sense.)* in one way, so that Christ is said to be two natures; and in this way no one has posited nor understood Christ to be two, since the human nature is not predicated of Christ. *(Conclusion 1.)* — In another way it can be understood that Christ is two, namely two persons; and in this way it was heretical and against the Creed. For Athanasius says: "Yet not two, but one is Christ." *(Conclusion 2.)* — In a third way it can be understood that Christ is two in a middle way, not because Christ is two natures or two persons, but because he is two supposits, or two "things of nature" (*res naturae*), which hold as it were a middle between the duality of nature and the duality of person. And this manner of speaking belonged to the first opinion, and is not heretical, but had much probability. *(Note.)* For since to diverse natures diverse "things of nature" correspond, and to diverse substances diverse supposits correspond; therefore they wished to say that Christ, who is God by reason of the divine nature and man by reason of the human, is two "things of nature," of which nevertheless one is predicated of the other on account of the unity of the person.

But although this position has something of probability, it nevertheless says something so improbable that it has few defenders or none. *(Not proven.)* For it is plain that those things of which one is predicated of the other are not numbered against each other, although they are formally distinguished; as for example if it be said: Peter is a musician, "musician" and "Peter" are not two, although between Peter and his music there is a distinction. If therefore this opinion says that God is man, and man is God; it cannot be sustained that there are two in Christ, insofar as they are said concretely with respect to the supposit. And therefore it must be granted that this opinion is false, and that the authors of this opinion were deceived. *(Conclusion 3.)*

But the reason for this deception comes from this, *(The origin of the deception.)* that they did not distinguish between supposit, insofar as a supposit is said to be that which is subjected to a genus, and supposit, which is said to be that in which the whole being of a thing is substantified; whereas there is a great difference. *(Note.)* For if supposit be said to be that which is subjected to a genus; body and color have diverse supposits, because they have diverse differences. But if supposit be said to be that according to which the whole being of a thing is substantified in it; then body and color can have one supposit, because there is one substance and one individual in which the nature of corporeity and the nature of color are preserved. But a thing is not numbered according to supposits in being-subjected and being-predicated, but according to the number of supposits in being and substantifying. *(Note.)* — Since therefore the human nature in Christ is substantified in the divine person, hence it is that there is one supposit there, insofar as the numbering of the thing is attended to with respect to

being in act. And therefore Christ ought not to be called two, but one. *(Conclusion.)* — And the reasons that show this are to be granted.

1. 2. To those two authorities for the contrary, then, which are objected, that Christ is one thing and another; it must be said that those predications are improper and ought to be expounded thus: Christ is one thing and another, that is, of one nature and of another. *(Solution of the opposing arguments.)* *(Note.)* And from this it does not follow that Christ is two, but only that in Christ there are several things. For an improper manner of speaking is not to be extended.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ is one, insofar as he is God, by an uncreated unity, and one, insofar as he is man, by a created unity; it must be said that he is more properly called one [masc.] than he is said to be one [neut.]. For in Christ there is but one person, although there is not but one nature. Nevertheless he can be said to be one, insofar as he is God, and one, insofar as he is man. Yet that "one" and that "[one]", insofar as they are said of Christ, do not constitute a number, because Christ is not called one insofar as he is man abstractly, but concretely. But although the created and the uncreated unity can be called two; nevertheless, because in Christ, insofar as he is spoken of, he is spoken of concretely, the created unity is compared to the uncreated supposit and predicated of the same; therefore it does not constitute a number, such that Christ could be called two, just as neither Peter and this white thing, when the same thing is pointed out.

4. To that which is objected, that diverse essential differences give diverse beings; it must be said that this is true when the supposit to which those differences are compared does not naturally precede, with respect to actual being, any of those differences: as Peter is not before this difference "rational," and Brunellus before this difference which is "irrational." But it is not so in the matter at hand. For the Son of God, who is a hypostasis, is the supposit of the human nature through the union and naturally precedes, with respect to actual being, the essential difference of the man. And therefore that difference does not give him being simply, but such-being; for it comes *(Note.)* to a hypostasis already complete in being, and therefore cannot be multiplied into it.

5. To that which is objected, that one nature in several persons makes them to be one, etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because the divine nature is in several persons in such a way that it is predicated of each, not only in concretion, but also in abstraction; and therefore, since it is one, it is necessary that those three hypostases be one something. But the two natures so concur into the one person of Christ that nevertheless the human nature cannot be predicated in abstraction, but rather in concretion to the same supposit; and because in this way they are not numbered but united, therefore one person cannot be called several, just as several persons in the divine are said to be one nature.

6. To that which is objected, that on account of the union there is a communication of idioms; it must be said that this is true. — But if it be asked what communicates the idioms there; it must be answered that it is not nature to nature, insofar as they are considered in abstraction, but the hypostasis of the divine nature communicates idioms to itself, insofar as it is a hypostasis in the human nature; not because it is in itself diverse, but because it is supposited to diverse natures. *(The incidental question is resolved.)* — Or certainly the natures themselves, insofar as they are said in concretion, can communicate idioms to each other, so that it is said: God is man, and man is God; and when they are understood to be taken thus, it is said as a "thing of nature," which holds as it were a middle between the nature considered abstractly and the hypostasis itself. *(In another way.)* *(Note.)* And in this way there is rightly a communication of idioms there, because there is there a diversity between the things of nature, regard being had to the natures themselves; and there is there a unity, regard being had to the person itself.

And if you object that Christ then ought to be called neither one nor two, but to hold a middle between duality and unity; it must be said that although the things of nature have the character of a middle, nevertheless they incline more toward unity, holding with the hypostasis itself. *(Objection and note.)* — And the reason for this is twofold: the first, namely, that the thing of nature is predicated of the hypostasis itself, but is not predicated of the nature itself considered abstractly *(The reason is twofold.)*

considered, nor conversely. The other reason is, that denomination is made from a terminus, whereas the union is ordered as to a terminus; and because in Christ the natures are united in one hypostasis, therefore the things of nature in Christ do not constitute a number, such that on their account Christ should be called two.

7. To that which is objected, that Christ is something that is the Father; it must be said that when Christ is said to be something, insofar as he is man, "something" does not signify the abstract nature itself, but the supposit of the nature. Hence when Christ is said to be man, a relation is intrinsically implied. Just as therefore this does not hold: "Christ is the essence, which is the Father, and is a person, which is not the Father, therefore he is two"; because the essence does not constitute a number with the person, nor what is said substantially with what is said according to relation: so the inference of the aforesaid reasoning has no force. Hence the fallacy of that inference can be reduced to the sophistical topic which is the figure of speech.