Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/6/q/bon-sent-III-d6-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the person of Christ is one by a simple unity, or a composite one.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the person of Christ is one by a simple unity, or a composite one, as the second opinion was saying. And that it has in itself a composite unity seems to be the case (*Fundamenta*):

1. *First*, through that which is said in the Symbol (*On the contrary side*): « For just as the rational soul and the flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ »; but a man is composed of soul and flesh: therefore the person of Christ is composed of divinity and humanity.

2. *Likewise*, Damascene in the third book: « In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, one hypostasis composed of both »: if therefore according to him hypostasis and person are the same, therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, the understanding of the person presupposes the understanding of the nature; but if there is composition in that which is presupposed, there is necessarily composition in that which presupposes: since therefore the human nature in Christ is composite, it seems necessarily to follow that the person too ought to be called composite.

4. *Likewise*, if Christ were only of a rational soul and flesh, he would have a composite hypostasis: therefore since he has in himself soul and flesh and divinity, by an argument from the lesser, it seems all the more that he has a composite hypostasis.

5. *Likewise*, Christ is a man either simple, or composite; it is established that he is not simple, because this is contrary to the nature of humanity: he is therefore a composite man. But "man" is not predicated of Christ except by reason of the supposit and hypostasis: therefore it seems that the person in Christ ought to be called composite.

**On the contrary:**
1. Everything composite by a temporal composition is temporal: if therefore the person of Christ is composite, and only by a temporal composition; therefore the person of Christ is temporal: therefore not eternal. But this is false: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, wherever there is a new composition, there is change: if therefore in the Incarnation the person of Christ was composed, it necessarily follows that it was changed. But for the person of the Word to be changed is impossible: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, wherever there is composition, there is imperfection in each of the extremes, since « out of two beings in act one thing is not made », and things capable of being composed are in potency with respect to the composite; but neither in the nature of the Word nor in the person can there be any imperfection: therefore neither composition.

4. *Likewise*, where there is composition, the composite is not predicated of any of the extremes, as is plain, because a man is neither the soul nor the flesh: therefore if the person of Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then Christ is neither God nor man, neither Creator nor creature. But if this is false, it remains that the person of Christ is not composite.

5. *Likewise*, where there is composition, one of the extremes is not predicated of the other — whence since a man is composed of soul and flesh, neither is the soul the flesh, nor conversely — therefore if the person of Christ were composite, neither would the man be God, nor God man; but if this is false, it remains etc.

### Conclusion
> The person of Christ is not composite, properly speaking, but only in a broader sense.

**I respond:** It must be said that composition can be spoken of in two ways. In one way, composition is *properly* called the union of some two things having a mutual inclination toward the constitution of a third (*Distinction*). And in this way, as the arguments show, the person of Christ cannot be called composite (*First conclusion*). For many incongruities would follow, namely that that person would be *changed*, and that it would be *imperfect*, and that it would be *brought into being temporally*, and also that *the idioms would not be communicated*. And therefore to say in this way that the person of Christ is composite would not only be false, but even heretical.

In another way composition is called *broadly* a being-placed-together-with-another; and in this sense the personal union can be called composition (*The second opinion*). And in this way the second opinion was saying that the person of Christ is composite, not because it is itself constituted out of several natures, but because that person before the Incarnation was a supposit in one simple nature; after the Incarnation the person was the supposit of the divine and the human nature, and this without any change made in it, but only on the part of the human nature, as was shown in the first distinction of this book. And therefore that opinion, which said that the person of Christ had been composite, was true and had a sound meaning. — Yet because the word is liable to calumny, since the term "composition" is wont to be taken in the first way, therefore the doctors of the present time retain the sense of this opinion while declining the term "composition." For in the person of Christ there is no composition properly so called. — Whence the arguments which were brought for that side are to be conceded.

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary from the authority of the Symbol, it must be said that there is not a complete likeness between soul and flesh, and divinity and humanity. For the likeness is not as to the composition of the extremes, but as to this, that soul and flesh concur toward the unity of the person; so too divinity and humanity in Christ concur into the unity of the person, although this comes about in one way and another.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from the authority of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not there take "composition" properly, but broadly (*Note*). Whence his word too must be expounded, because perhaps it does not sound so improperly in the Greek tongue as in the Latin. Whence the hypostasis is said to be composed of two natures, not because it is constituted out of those two, but because in the sacrament of the Incarnation it came about that the hypostasis, which was under one nature only, came to be in two and under two; whence the hypostasis is more properly said to be *in* two natures than *of* two natures.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the understanding of the person presupposes the understanding of the nature; it must be said that this is true of the nature which gives the first being to the person, and such is the divine nature with respect to the person of Christ. And therefore, although the human nature is composite, it does not follow that on this account the person of Christ has composition.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that if Christ were only of soul and flesh, he would have a composite hypostasis; it must be said that this is true, because then he would have the first being of his hypostasis from the human nature, which indeed is composite. But now it is not similar, because the person of Christ has its first being from the divine nature, which indeed is altogether most simple. And therefore the human nature supervening, just as it does not give the person personal being, so it does not make it composite.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that Christ is a composite man; it must be said that this is true; but as to what is added, that "man" is predicated by reason of the hypostasis; it must be said that if it is so understood, that "man" is predicated in the predicate by reason of the hypostasis, it does not hold the truth (*Note*); because according to the rule of the Philosopher, although a term is made the subject by reason of the supposit, it is predicated by reason of the form; and therefore this adjective *composite* with respect to that term *man* does not name composition as to the supposit, but as to the form. And therefore it cannot be inferred from this that the person of Christ is composite.