Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/6/q/bon-sent-III-d6-a1-q3
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### Article I.
### Question III. *Whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance, or whether "man" is predicated of him after the manner of a habit and accident.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance, or whether "man" is predicated of him after the manner of a habit and accident, as the third opinion held. And that Christ is called a man after the manner of a habit is shown:

1. (*On the contrary.*) To the Philippians, chapter two: *Found in habit as a man;* upon which word Hilary says, in *On the Trinity:* "It was not that habit only of a man, but as of a man": therefore it seems, both from this word which says *in habit,* and from this which says *as a man* — which imports a likeness — that Christ is called a man in another way than other men are: and so it seems that he is said [to be a man] after the manner of a habit, not after the manner of a substance.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the book of the *Eighty-three Questions,* says, and it is contained in the text [of Lombard], that "the fourth genus of habit befits this comparison"; and that fourth genus pertains to what is said to be predicated after the manner of a habit, as to be clothed and shod, which is in a certain adjacency: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. That which comes to something already in completed being is to it an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident; but the human nature comes to the person of Christ already in completed being: therefore it seems that it comes to him as an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident, and therefore not after the manner of a substance.

4. Likewise, what is predicated denominatively is an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident; but the human nature is predicated of Christ denominatively — whence the Son of God is called "humanated," which indeed cannot be said of any other man — therefore it seems that it is not said of him after the manner of a substance, but after the manner of an accident.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that diverse genera be predicated of the same thing essentially: therefore much less will it be possible that the divine and human natures belong to the same thing essentially: therefore if Christ, speaking essentially, is God, it seems that "man" is said [of him] only after the manner of an accident or after the manner of a habit.

6. Likewise, things which have diverse definitions cannot be predicated of one and the same thing essentially; but God and man have diverse definitions: therefore since God is said of Christ essentially, "man" will not be said of him substantially, but only accidentally.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*The grounds.*) In the decretal of Pope Alexander: "Since Christ is perfect God and is perfect man, with what rashness do certain men dare to say that Christ is not anything, insofar as he is man": therefore according to the judgment of Pope Alexander "man" is predicated of Christ after the manner of a substance.

2. Likewise, "a substance is an accident to nothing," as the Philosopher will have it; but the human nature in Christ is a substance: therefore it is an accident to nothing: therefore it is not an accident to the person of the Word.

3. Likewise, if the human nature is an accident to Christ, either it is an accident to Christ as God, or to Christ as man; not to Christ as man, since to no man is it accidental to be a man; nor likewise can it accrue to Christ insofar as he is God, since no accident can be in Christ by reason of the divine nature: therefore in no way does it seem that it can be predicated after the manner of an accident.

4. Likewise, nothing is univocal to substance and accident: therefore if of Christ it is said according to accident, and of other men according to substance, then it is not said univocally, but equivocally. But if this is true, it does not seem that he is of our genus, nor that his death avails for our redemption.

5. Likewise, substance is nobler than accident: therefore if "man" is said of others after the manner of a substance, and of Christ after the manner of a habit, then to be a man belongs less nobly to Christ than to others. But if it is impious to say this, then there remains the same as before, namely that "man" is not said of Christ after the manner of a habit, but after the manner of a substance.

6. Likewise, what is predicated after the manner of a habit and accident is not predicated after the manner of a substance — whence, although a man is called clothed, he is nevertheless never called a garment — therefore if the Son of God were called "humanated" after the manner of a habit, he would never be called a man; but if this is false, there remains the same as before.

### Conclusion.

> Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance and something, and "man" is predicated of him substantially, not after the manner of an accident and habit except by a certain conformity.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is said that "man" is said of Christ after the manner of a habit and accident, (*A twofold sense.*) it can be understood in two ways: either so that that predication is purely accidental, in such a way that it is not substantial; or so that in some way it has the character of an accidental predication, and yet according to the truth is substantial.

(*Conclusion 1.*) If it be understood in this last way, then it holds the truth, because the human nature in Christ in a certain way has the property of an accident, namely in this, that it is substantified in the supposit of another nature, in such a way that it does not give to that supposit its first being, but comes to it already complete. Whence, just as whiteness is not substantified in something which is in the genus of quality, but rather in a substance, nor does it give being to it, but comes to it already complete; so by a certain conformity it is found in the case of Christ's humanity, which is substantified in the divine person, which has perfect being from a nature other than from the humanity itself, namely from the divine. (*Note.*) And therefore our teachers said that the human nature in Christ inclines toward an accident, according to a certain conformity. And this, if it be soundly understood, is said subtly and catholically. — (*Concerning the habit.*) Most of all, however, among every mode of accident it has the mode of a habit, because a habit names the adjacency of one substance with respect to another, which adjacency can indeed be, the property of each being preserved. And therefore the Apostle, the most prudent preacher of the faith, and Augustine, the most subtle defender of the faith, intimate that in some way Christ is called a man according to a habit, not thereby excluding that "man" is said of Christ according to substance.

(*Another sense.*) In another way it is to be understood that Christ is said to be a man according to accident, in such a way that that mode of predicating is altogether accidental, and not according to substance. (*Conclusion 2.*) And this manner of speaking, although it has at some time seemed to have the probability of an opinion, manifestly appears to have in itself the rashness of error. Whence also that third opinion, which posited this, was reproved by Alexander; and not undeservedly, since it is repugnant to the truth of that union. For this the right faith says: that the divine and human natures are united into one person: therefore God is said of Christ as of his proper supposit, and "man" likewise. But when "man" is predicated of something as of its proper supposit, it is predicated substantially and signifies the very thing (*Conclusion 3.*) of which it is said, to be some substance; and therefore from the very foundation of the faith it necessarily follows that he is something, insofar as he is a man. — Whence the reasons which are adduced to this [conclusion] are to be conceded.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1, 2. To that which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of the Apostle and of Augustine, the response is already clear from those things which have already been said. For although "man" has in some way the mode of a habit, it nevertheless does not have it altogether. For although the humanity comes [to him] already complete, nonetheless it is substantified in him as in its own proper supposit, since the Son of God, who is the supposit of the divine nature by nature, made himself the supposit of the human nature by grace.

3. To that which is objected: *an accident is that which comes to something already complete,* etc.; it must be said that, though it be like it in this, that it comes [to him] already complete, yet not altogether; (*Note.*) since an accident lies altogether outside and bespeaks a mode of being, but the human nature comes to that person in such a way that it does not lie outside, nor bespeak only a mode of being, but the substance and nature of the very hypostasis.

4. To that which is objected, that it is predicated denominatively; it must be said that denominative predication can be in four ways: (*The four modes of denominative predication.*) by the mode of inherence, as when it is said, *this man is white;* by the mode of transmutation, as when it is said, *Peter has been whitened;* by the mode of possession, as when it is said, *the ass of Socrates;* and by the mode of union, as when it is said, *iron set afire,* that is, united to fire. When therefore it is said that denominative predication is of an accident; it must be said that this is true when it is by the mode of an inhering thing, but it is not true if it always be understood of denominative predication according to the other modes. — But when it is said, *Christ is humanated,* there is not there a predication by the mode of an inhering thing, but by the mode of union and relation. And therefore it does not follow that the human nature is an accident; nor does it follow from this that the divine person has been changed, since, although an absolute change in an accident posits a change in the subject, the introduction of the relation itself into being can nonetheless come about from a change made in the other extreme.

5. To that which is objected, that it is impossible that the genera of diverse things be predicated of the same thing substantially; (*Note.*) it must be said that this is true of those genera which have opposition and distinction, such as are the genera of created things. But it is not so with the divine and human nature, since, the human being altogether possible and in complete obedience, nothing prevents the human and divine natures from concurring together into one person, in such a way that of the same person God is predicated essentially and by nature, and of that same person "man" is predicated essentially on account of the gratuitous union, by which God, as he was able and willed, made himself the supposit of the human nature; which indeed was as easy for him as it is easy for a man to take a garment to himself, nay, much easier, if his supreme power and the creature's obedience be considered.

6. To that which is objected, that God and man have diverse definitions; it must be said that they are not diverse in such a way that they cannot concur into one supposit, if God will to do it, (*Note.*) because the human nature depends and stands in need much more with respect to the divine person than any accident with respect to a substance. It is therefore not impossible for God, nay, very credible and possible, nay, true, that the Son of God made himself in the human nature, in the incarnation, a person and hypostasis and supposit.

(*On the diversity of the three opinions.*) And he who understands this manifestly sees which of these three opinions comes nearer to explaining the mystery of the incarnation. For the third opinion, which denies that Christ is anything insofar as he is a man, denies also that the person of the Son is the hypostasis of the human nature, and simply departs from the truth. But the first opinion, which says that in Christ there are two supposits, strays from the truth. But the middle opinion, which says that one person, or hypostasis, is the supposit of two natures, speaks the truth. Whence all the teachers commonly hold today the middle opinion, so that, in place of what that opinion used to say — that one person is composed of two natures — there is now said one person that is the supposit of two natures, not changing the sense, but the words, which in such matter are much to be observed. From these things, therefore, which have been said, it can be gathered what the diversity of the aforesaid opinions is, and in which of them is the greater probability of the truth.