Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/6/q/bon-sent-III-d6-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the quality and nobility of that union.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the quality and nobility of that union, from which arises the diversity of those three opinions; and concerning it three things are asked.

First, there is inquiry concerning that most blessed union with respect to its *terminus*.

Second, there is inquiry concerning it with respect to its *mode*.

Third, there is inquiry concerning the same with respect to its *degree*.

### Question I. *Whether the union of the two natures is terminated at the unity of the person.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and there is inquiry concerning that union with respect to its terminus; and it is asked whether it is terminated at the unity of the person, or not. And that it is so, it seems.

(*Arguments.*) 1. John 8: *I am the beginning, who also speak to you*; but *I* is a demonstrative pronoun, therefore it points out a determinate person; and *who* is a relative noun, therefore it refers to the same person: therefore there was one person, who was the beginning, and who was speaking. But he was the beginning according to the divine nature, and was speaking according to the human nature: therefore that union seems to be terminated at the personal unity.

2. Likewise, the Son of God alone is united to the human nature; but the Son of God is not distinguished from the Father except in person: therefore it is necessary that that union have for its terminus the personal unity.

3. Likewise, a union is a way toward some unity, therefore, if that union is not in vain, it arrives at some unity; but it did not lead to a unity of nature, since neither can the divine nature become human, nor the reverse, nor can a third be made from these: therefore it is necessary that that union be terminated at the unity of the person.

4. Likewise, when any two things are united, one of which predominates over the other, the predominating one draws to itself that over which it predominates; but the Son of God was united to the human nature, over which he predominates in all things: therefore he drew it to his own unity. But he did not draw it to a natural unity, as was shown before: therefore he drew it to the personal unity.

(*On the contrary.*) But against this: 1. The eternal cannot be the terminus of a temporal thing; but the personal unity of the Son of God is eternal, while the union was temporal: therefore that union cannot be terminated at the personal unity.

2. Likewise, no one and the same thing is the middle and the extreme and the terminus in the same action; but the unity of the person in that union has the character of an extreme: therefore it does not seem that it has the character of a terminus.

3. Likewise, the divine person is of equal simplicity and dignity as the nature; but on account of the dignity and simplicity of that nature it is impossible for that union to be terminated at the unity of nature: therefore it is impossible for it to be terminated at the unity of the person.

4. Likewise, just as to the divine nature there corresponds an uncreated person, so to the human nature there corresponds a created person: therefore, since the terminus of a union is related equally to the extremes, and that union cannot be terminated at the unity of a created person, by parity of reasoning it seems that it cannot be terminated at the unity of an uncreated person: therefore it is simply true that that union is not terminated at the unity of the person.

### Conclusion.

> In Christ the union of the two natures is terminated at the unity of the divine person.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain union (*The four species of union.*) in which there is a conversion of one of the unitable things into the nature of the other; and this is because there is in the one a repugnance to, and predominance over, the other, as if a drop of water were united to a flagon of wine. — But there is a certain union in which there is an alteration of both unitable things and the production of a third nature; and this is because there is repugnance there and not an excelling predominance, as the elements are united to constitute mixed bodies. — But there is a certain union in which there is no transmutation of the things united, but the constitution of a third nature; and this is because the unitable things have no repugnance, yet have a mutual dependence, as body and soul are united for the constitution of man. — But there is a certain union in which there is neither transmutation nor the constitution of a third nature, but one of the unitable things is founded only in the other. And this is because there is there neither repugnance nor essential dependence, yet there is an excelling predominance; as when one tree is grafted onto the stock of another tree, then each tree preserves its own nature, and yet the one tree is substantiated in the stock of the other tree, so that there is one stock of both.

(*First conclusion.*) Yet it is by this fourth kind of union that the divine nature has to be united to the human. For since there is no repugnance between the divine nature and the human, therefore there is there no transmutation, nor conversion. And since there is no mutual dependence, there is no constitution of a third nature. But because there is there the predominance of the other, namely of the divine nature, it is necessary that the divine nature draw the human nature to unity; but it cannot draw it to a unity of nature without transmutation and conversion: (*Second conclusion.*) it is necessary, therefore, that it draw it to a unity of person, and that there be one and the same hypostasis of the divine nature and the human, so that the human nature may be, as it were, founded and substantiated in the divine stock. — (*Corollary.*) And therefore this union is much assimilated to that union which is by grafting. On account of which also, perhaps, blessed James says, in chapter 1: *With meekness receive the ingrafted Word.* — It must be conceded, therefore, that that union is terminated at the unity of the person.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. To that which is objected, that the unity of that person is eternal; it must be said that *person* names the supposit itself in comparison to the nature to which it is subjected; and so the *dignity of the person* must be regarded with respect to the nature. The person, therefore, can be compared to the divine nature, and thus its dignity is eternal. It can also be compared to the divine nature and the human alike; and thus it connotes something temporal, and by reason of that thing connoted it is said to be the terminus of the union. For that union did not bring it about that the person should be, or should be one, but it brought it about that the person, which was one in a simple nature, should be one in a twofold nature.

(*Note.*) 2. To that which is objected, that the personal unity is an extreme, therefore it is not a terminus; it must be said that according to one comparison which it has, namely to the divine nature, it is an extreme; but according to the comparison which it has to the human nature, it is the terminus of the union, because by that union it came about that the person of the Word was a man. But according to the comparison which it has to both natures, it holds the character of a middle. And nothing prevents one and the same thing from having, in a different respect, the comparison of middle and of extreme and of terminus; and it is in this way indeed that it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that on account of the supreme simplicity of the divine nature it cannot be united to the human nature in a unity of nature; it must be said that it is not similar: because for several natures to coalesce into *one nature* is repugnant to a simple nature, but (*This union is not repugnant to the simplicity of the person.*) for several natures to be united in the *unity of a person* is not repugnant to a simple person, for a twofold cause. The one indeed is, because, just as several persons can be in one nature, in such a way that they do not impede the simplicity of the nature; so several natures can be in one person. But the other reason is, because the divine person can become the supposit of the human nature by the relation alone of the human nature to

it, which relation indeed posits nothing new about the person of the Word, but only in the assumed nature; and therefore the union of the natures is not repugnant to the unity of the person. But it is not so when a union is terminated at a unity of nature, where there is noted not only a relation, but there is noted also that a fitting-together comes to be in the form; and this cannot come to be without some composition or transmutation.

(*Note.*) 4. To that which is objected, that that union cannot be terminated at the unity of a created person; it must be said that it is not similar, because the divine nature cannot be substantiated in a created person. For what is substantiated in something has less of stability than that in which it is substantiated; and therefore, since the divine nature is being and self-subsistent in a truer mode than the human, therefore the human nature can rest upon the divine person, although the divine nature cannot rest upon a created nature. And therefore a union into the unity of an uncreated person can come to be, although a union into the unity of a created person cannot come to be. — (*Another reason.*) There is also another reason: because a person always has to be denominated from the worthier property; and therefore the divine nature and the human concur into one hypostasis. And since it is always necessary that the divine nature excel in dignity, a union into the unity of a created person cannot come to be, although a union into the unity of an uncreated person can come to be. And therefore it is clear that what he takes for something similar is not similar, but very dissimilar.