Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/6/q/bon-sent-III-d6-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the mode of the union of the two natures is singular, or whether some mode of union like it is to be found.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning that union with respect to its mode; and the question is whether the mode of that union is singular, or whether some mode of union like it is to be found. And that it is singular seems to be the case:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) By the *authority* of Algazel himself in his *Metaphysics*, where he sets out the modes of the one. For there he divides *the one absolutely* and *the one in a qualified sense*. The one absolutely he divides into three differences: first into a one (*The modes of the one.*) in which there is no multitude either in act or in potency, as a point and a unit; secondly into a one in which there is no multitude in act, although there is in potency, as is a line; thirdly into a one in which there is a multitude both in act and in potency, as a bed and a limb, in which there are many things in act. But the one in a qualified sense is to be divided into five differences, namely: into a one in genus, as a man and an ox; into a one in species, as Socrates and Plato; into a one in accident, as snow and white-lead; into a one in proportion, as a charioteer and a sailor; into a one in subject, as the sweet and the white in some one substance. But by none of these modes, as is plain to one running through them singly, is that union which is in Christ: therefore it seems that the mode of that union exceeds all the modes of union.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of Aristotle, who in the *First Philosophy* divides the one (*The modes of the one according to Aristotle.*) into *one per se* and *one per accidens*. One per accidens is said as two accidents in one subject. But one per se is said in ten modes, namely: by continuation, of which the terminus is one; one in species or form, as Socrates and Plato in man; one in genus, as a man and an ox in animal; one in definition, as those things which have the same definition, or of which one is the definition of the other; one in indivisibility, as a point; one in number, as a singular; one in simplicity or essence, as a universal; one in totality or perfection, as a circle; one in proportion, as a charioteer and a sailor; one in matter, as all corporeal things. But by none of these modes is the union in the person in Christ: therefore it seems that it is a union in a singular and proper mode.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of Bernard, *to Eugene, book five*, (*The modes of the one according to Bernard.*) where he distinguishes the one in nine modes, namely where he speaks thus: « There is a *collective* unity, as namely many stones make one heap; there is a *constitutive* unity, as when many parts constitute each whole; there is a *conjugal* unity, by which it comes about that two are now not two, but one flesh; there is a *native* unity, by which from soul and flesh one man is born; there is a *potestative* unity, by which the man of virtue, not unstable, not dissimilar, but one, strives to be found at one with himself; there is a *consentaneous* unity, when through charity of many men there is one heart and one soul; there is a *votive* unity, when the soul, cleaving to God with all its desires, is one spirit; there is a *dignative* unity, by which our clay has been assumed by the Word of God into one person ». And there is a last unity, that *of the Trinity*, concerning which Bernard himself adds: « But what are they compared to that one »? Therefore if that unity, by which the Word of God is united to the flesh by a special difference, is called the dignative unity; it therefore seems that the aforesaid union has a singular mode.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of the prophetic word; for it is said in *Jeremiah, chapter thirty-one*: *The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth*, this, I say, is said of that created union; but it would not be new, if it had something like it: it therefore seems that among all unions there is one singular union.

**On the contrary:**
1. (*To the opposite.*) *Ephesians five*: *They shall be two in one flesh; this is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church*; the Gloss: « Because Christ, who was God with the Father, through whom also we were made, was made through the flesh a partaker of us, that we might be the body of that head »: therefore it seems that the unity which is of the Word to the flesh is like that which is of husband to wife: therefore it is not a singular unity.

2. Likewise, that unity by which the Word is united to the flesh is a personal unity, as was shown above; but that unity by which the soul is united to the flesh, which is the native unity, is a personal unity: therefore it seems that that unity is common with other creatures.

3. Likewise, that unity by which God is united to the flesh is from the highest power of God — whence in a certain Sequence: « By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature »: — therefore it seems that it is a potestative unity; but that mode is found and met with in a creature: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, either that union, by which the divinity is united to the humanity, is natural or gratuitous; if natural: then it is contained under those unities which are assigned by the Philosopher; if gratuitous: then, since the gratuitous unity is the votive unity, as Bernard says, it seems that this mode of the divine unity does not make a special difference of unity.

### Conclusion.

> The union of the two natures in the unity of the person, with respect to all its conditions taken together, superexceeds every nature and every common grace and philosophical reason.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as no creature is perfectly assimilated to God, but in some way is like, in some way unlike; and where one creature has a likeness, frequently another has an unlikeness: in this manner is it to be understood concerning this most sacred union. (*Conclusion 1.*) For if we speak of it with respect to its special conditions taken singly, thus it can have an agreement with the modes of unities found in creatures; but if we speak with respect to the collection of its properties, thus it bespeaks a singular mode of unity.

And this is plain thus. For in this union there is (*Four things to be considered.*) to be considered the distance of the unitables, the principle of the union, the terminus of the union, and the bond of the things united. As to the distance of the unitables, by which the Creator is united to the creature, it agrees with the votive unity. As to the principle of the union, it agrees with the potestative unity; because such a unity is from the divine power and from sheer grace. But as to the terminus of the union, it agrees with the native unity, which indeed is terminated at the unity of the person. But as to the bond of the union, it agrees with the conjugal unity, in which there is a perpetual bond and an individual coupling. (*Conclusion 2.*) But as to all its conditions taken together, it has no mode of unity like itself, because it superexceeds every nature and every other common grace, namely that the divine nature and the human are united into one person indissolubly by the power of God.

And therefore it must be conceded that such a union superexcels (*Conclusion 3.*) every philosophical consideration; nor is this a wonder, since reason, even elevated by faith, scarcely attains to it. And therefore Bernard, according to this union, assigned a special difference of unity, calling it the dignative unity. — The reasons therefore which are on that side are to be conceded.

**To the opposite:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)
*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that it is like the conjugal union; the response is already plain: because, even though there is a likeness as to the bond, there is nevertheless not a likeness as to the terminus, or the distance of the unitables.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it is like the native unity, for the reason that it is a union in a person; it must be said that, even though there is a likeness as to the terminus, there is nevertheless not as to the bond, or the distance of the unitables.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is like the potestative unity; it must be said that, even though there is a likeness as to the principle, because each is from the divine power, there is nevertheless an unlikeness as to the bond and as to the terminus.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is like the votive unity, since it is through grace; it must be said that there is another difference of grace, by which the soul is united to God through perfect charity, and by which the human nature is united to the Word into the unity of the person; nor is there only a difference as to this, but also as to the bond and as to the terminus; and therefore this union makes a singular mode.

But if it be asked concerning the sufficiency of the modes of unity assigned; (*An incidental question.*) it must be said that this question has its place elsewhere, and the singulars are to be treated in their own places. (*Resolved in part.*) Nevertheless, of those nine modes of unities which Bernard assigns, the sufficiency can be gathered thus. For there is a natural and a gratuitous unity, and a unity constituted over both. (*Natural unity.*) But the natural unity is in a fourfold difference. For one is by an aggregation of distinct differing things, as the collective unity. One is by a binding-together of things formally differing, or of heterogeneous parts; and thus it is the constitutive unity. One is by a conjunction of things differing in sex, agreeing in operation; and thus it is the conjugal unity. One is by a union of differing natures concurring into one union; and thus it is the native unity. (*Gratuitous unity.*) — But the gratuitous unity likewise has four differences: for either it is a unity of the same soul to itself according to the diversity of states, and thus it is the potestative unity; or of many men to one another according to charity, and thus it is the consentaneous unity; or of the soul to God through conformity of will, and thus it is the votive unity; or of the human nature to the divine according to the unity of the person, and thus it is the dignative unity. (*Unity constituted over both.*) — But the unity constituted over both, namely over the natural and the gratuitous, is one alone, namely the unity of the Trinity, which alone indeed it befits to be one, that in it may be the rest of all unities.