Dist. 6, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/6/q/bon-sent-III-d6-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first there is inquiry about what he says, that *the Sacrifice of the Church consists of two things, the visible species of the elements and the invisible flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ.* For in this statement there seems, first, to be an insufficiency, because to the constitution of the Sacrament of the altar not only two things concur, but rather three, namely, the exterior element, the true body of Christ, and the mystical body of Christ. — Likewise, there seems to be a repugnance in his statement, when he says *the invisible flesh and blood*; for flesh and blood are truly bodies: therefore they are also truly visible. If, then, the flesh of Christ was true, it remains, therefore, that it was visible. — Likewise, third, it seems that this likeness is unfitting, since *the Sacrament* and *the reality of the Sacrament* do not concur into the unity of a person, in the way that God and man do: therefore a right assimilation does not seem to be made there.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the Sacrament of the altar there is a twofold reality, namely, that which is both signified and contained, and that which is signified only. And Augustine in this passage does not speak of the reality that is signified only, of which kind is the mystical body of Christ, but of the reality both signified and contained, of which kind is the true body of Christ. For this alone is what bears on the matter, namely, on understanding the mystery of the union and incarnation, and this on account of the likeness found on both sides. (*Note.*)

Now there is found there a threefold likeness, namely, with respect to the unity of the extremes, with respect to the distinction or diversity, and with respect to the end or usefulness. (*Threefold likeness.*) For just as in the Sacrament of the altar there is a visible species and the invisible flesh of Christ, insofar as it is under that Sacrament; so in Christ there is a true sensible human nature, and the divine, which is only intelligible. — There is a likeness also with respect to the distinction, since the exterior visible species and the interior reality do not concur to constitute one thing by nature, but they concur into one Sacrament, which is one by the order and relation of sign to signified. So too in Christ the divine nature and the human do not constitute some third thing, but are united into one hypostasis, which is the supposit of both natures, and in which each nature is substantiated in its own way. And with respect to this there is not an entire likeness, but partly likeness and partly unlikeness. — Third, there is a likeness, because, just as the reality of the Sacrament is united to the exterior sign, so that through it it may be known and turned to true usefulness; so the divine nature is united to the human, so that it might be known in it; and hence it is also that such a unity is like that union by which the word is joined to the voice itself, so that it can be known by others.

And through this the response to the objections is clear. For what he objects about insufficiency does not hold, since for the matter at hand those two members suffice. — Nor does what he objects about repugnance hold, because he does not call these two, namely the flesh and blood, invisible *simply*, but insofar as they are *contained under the Sacrament.* — Nor does that which he objects about the disconvenience of those unions, because he does not mean to say that they are entirely alike, but that they have a likeness with respect to the three things aforesaid.

### Doubt II.

Likewise, concerning the third opinion, which is set down there: *There are also others who, in the incarnation of the Word,* etc., it is to be noted that three things are insinuated in the text of that opinion which are very much improbable. (*In the third opinion three improbable things.*)

The first indeed, when he says: *They acknowledge from the flesh and the soul some composite substance.* (*The first.*) And that is shown to be improbable, since from form and matter there results one composite. If, then, the soul has a natural inclination toward the body as toward its proper matter, which it perfects; it was necessary that from the soul and the flesh in Christ some third thing be constituted. But that is either *a substance* or *an accident*; an accident it is not; this is established, because a substance is not a part of an accident: it is necessary, therefore, that thence a substance be made.

Another improbable thing is in what he says: *That by those two, as by a garment, the Word of God was clothed, so that he might appear fittingly to mortal eyes.* (*The second.*) For if this were true, since the soul does not appear to the eyes, he would not have assumed a soul. And again, if Christ appeared to be a man, and was not a true man, another appeared than he was: therefore there was some falsity and some deception in Christ, which is altogether most absurd. For Truth can neither be deceived nor deceive.

Likewise, the third improbable thing is in what he says, that the *two were assumed into the singularity of the person of the Word of God, because by those two accidents the number of persons was not increased.* (*The third.*) For if this were true, since the dove, in which the Holy Spirit appeared, did not increase the number of persons in the divine; [yet] it was assumed into the unity of the person, which it is nefarious to say. And again, since some soul is united to God by conformity of will, and in no way does the number of persons in the Trinity thereby increase; any holy soul would be assumed by the Word into the unity of the person: therefore any saint would be God, which indeed to say is altogether perverse.

And therefore this manner of speaking, as is gathered from the text, has been repudiated as erroneous; (*The opinion is reproved.*) nor is it to be believed that the Master was of this opinion, nor that he says this asserting or approving it, but rehearsing the opinion of others. (*The Master is excused.*) But this opinion, like the others also, he neither wholly reproves nor wholly approves. For its falsity had not yet become clear, especially since it seemed to be founded upon the words of the Saints.

### Doubt III.

Likewise, there is inquiry about what he says: *In many ways we speak of "habit,"* etc. For first he distinguishes habit into three members; but second he distinguishes by another division into four members: therefore either the one is *superfluous*, or the other *deficient*. — Likewise, some members of the second division seem to be impossible. For he says that *certain things accrue**, which change but are not changed, as wisdom.* This seems to be impossible, because, if by some accruing accident a subject is changed, it seems that the subject itself much more ought to be called changed, because from *being in potency* it becomes *being in act.* — Likewise, another member similarly, where he says that *certain things accrue, which neither change nor are changed*, seems impossible. For nothing new can be acquired without some change of the acquirer or of the acquired: therefore it is impossible that some difference of habit be introduced into being, by which there be made no change in the thing had, or in the haver.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine distinguishes habit in two ways: in one way in itself, through proper differences which regard the habit with respect to *being.* (*The first way of distinguishing, threefold.*) And these are three. For everything that is had is had either *interiorly*, or *exteriorly*, or *partly interiorly, partly exteriorly.* If wholly interiorly; thus we speak of a habit of the soul, as knowledge and discipline. If wholly exteriorly; thus we speak of a habit of those things which are accommodated to the body exteriorly, as being clothed and shod. If in a certain way interiorly, and in a certain way exteriorly; thus we speak of one [as] stronger or mightier than another. And this holds, as it were, the mean between the two differences set down before. (*Note.*) And to these three differences can be reduced those seven modes of having which the Philosopher assigns in the *Postpredicaments*.

But because this way of distinguishing avails little for the matter at hand, therefore Augustine takes another way of distinguishing through four members, which regards the habit itself with respect to its *coming-to-be.* (*The second way of distinguishing, fourfold.*) And this division is four-membered according to four sufficient and immediate combinations. For everything that accrues to something either *changes only and is not changed*, as wisdom; or *changes and is changed*, as food; or *neither changes nor is changed*, as a ring; or *is changed, but does not change*, as clothing. — And that fourth member avails for the matter at hand, and through this the response to the first objection is clear. (*To the first objection.*) For these four differences are reduced to those three; therefore neither are these superfluous, nor those deficient.

To that which is objected, that wisdom changes but is not changed; (*To the second objection.*) it must be said that for this, that someone become *wise*, created and uncreated wisdom concur, just as for this, that he become *pleasing [to God]*, created and uncreated charity concur. But when Augustine says that « wisdom is not changed »; he does not understand it of *created* wisdom, which is an accident of the soul, but of *uncreated* wisdom. — And this is frequently to be noted in the words of Augustine, when he speaks of wisdom and grace, because now he speaks of the uncreated, now of the created. (*Note concerning Augustine.*) — This statement can also be understood of *created* wisdom. (*Otherwise.*) But then Augustine is not speaking of any kind of change whatsoever, but of that change which is from one disposition to another, as for example of the change which is according to *form*; and then it has no instance in wisdom, because wisdom, an accident, is not altered, although the wise person is altered according to it.

And through this the third objection is clear: (*To the third objection.*) for Augustine does not exclude every motion, but that motion of alteration which is according to absolute quality. But this is not in the conjoining of a ring to a finger, but only that which is a change according to place or situation.

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