Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article I. *On the locutions that express the union itself.*
### Question I. *Whether the locution "God is man" is true.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and the inquiry is about this locution: God is man. And that it is true seems so:

1. (*Arguments*) From what is said in the Creed: « God and man is one Christ»: Christ therefore both is God and is man and is one; but whatever things are said of one and the same thing according to number, are said of each other reciprocally: therefore God is man, and man is God.

2. Likewise, Bernard in the fifth book *to Eugenius*: « That person, by which God and man is one Christ, bears within itself so great and so express a force of union, that, if you should predicate the two of each other, you would not err».

3. Likewise, just as was shown above, that union is terminated at a personal unity, that is, of a hypostasis; but whenever any two things are united in a supposit, they are predicated of each other reciprocally in the concrete: therefore just as "God" names the divine nature in the concrete, and "man" likewise; it seems that there is a mutual predication there, so that God is called man, and man God.

4. Likewise, the middle term, which best joins the extremes, is related to each of the extremes according to the relation of being-subjected and being-predicated: if therefore Christ the perfect mediator is between God and man, then God and man have such a relation with respect to the same thing. But things that have such a relation with respect to the same thing are necessarily said of each other reciprocally: therefore man is predicated of God, and God of man.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*On the opposite side*) Greater is the unity of the persons in the divine nature than is the unity of the natures in Christ in one person, because, as Bernard says: «That unity holds the citadel above all unities»; but by reason of the unity of nature it does not happen that one says that one person is the other: therefore by reason of the unity of person it does not happen that one says that God is man, and that man is God.

2. Likewise, things that are of the same genus and are united in nature and person are more in agreement than things that are of diverse genera and are united in person only; but soul and body are in the genus of substance and are united in one man, who is of the same nature and of one person; but divinity and humanity are not of the same genus, nor are they united into a unity of nature, but only into a unity of person: therefore since this is false: the soul is the body, and conversely; then also this: man is God, and God is man.

3. Likewise, when it is said: God is man, either "man" is predicated of God and of Peter univocally, or equivocally. If univocally: then something is univocal to the Creator and the creature, which is impossible; if equivocally: then Christ does not seem to belong to the genus of men, since "man" is not said uniformly of him and of others.

4. Likewise, when it is said: God is man, either "man" is predicated essentially (*per se*), or accidentally. If essentially; and what is predicated essentially is said of every supposit: then every divine person is man. If accidentally: then it seems that something is accidental to God; which is altogether false, as was proved in the first book.

5. Likewise, when it is said: God is man, either "man" is predicated of God absolutely, or relatively. If absolutely: then it is said of the three, because absolute names are said of the three, as Augustine holds, and these signify substance. If according to relation; but every relative is said with respect to something: then "man" is said with respect to something. But this is plainly false: therefore it does not seem that "man" is predicated of God in any way.

6. Likewise, if "man" is predicated of God, it is either of wider extent, or of narrower, or of equal extent. If of narrower: then every man is God, and it does not convert; if of wider: then everyone who is God, is man; if of equal: then the same incongruity returns.

7. Likewise, this name "God" either supposits for the person of the Son, or not. If it supposits for the person of the Son, then by the same reasoning also for the person of the Father: therefore if this is true for the person of the Son: God is man, then this is also for the person of the Father: God is not man. But if it does not supposit for the person of the Son: then, since in that person the union came about, the aforesaid locution will be simply false.

8. Likewise, God and man are more distant than man and non-man; but God never brings it about that a man

<!-- page 171 (en) -->

be a non-man: therefore it does not seem that he can bring it about, neither by nature nor by miracle, that this be true: God is man.

9. (*Implicit question*) Likewise, the mode of predicating is threefold: for what is predicated of another is predicated either by essence, or by inherence, or by cause. When therefore it is said: God is man, either it is predicated by essence, and then God and man will be of the same essence, which is impossible; or by inherence, and then it is accidental to God to be man; or by cause, and then by the same reasoning it could be said that God is a stone, because he is the cause of a stone just as also of a man: in no way therefore does it seem that "man" can be predicated of God.

### Conclusion

> It is necessary to concede that man is God, and God man; this predication, however, is *by a singular mode*.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to Catholic truth it is without doubt necessary to concede (*Conclusion 1*) that man is God, and God man, on the ground (*Reason*) that the two natures there are united into one person. And things that are united in one supposit are necessarily predicated of each other reciprocally, if they are taken concretely, on account of that maxim by which it is said: «whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are the same as each other»; by which also the force of the expository syllogism comes to be grounded, which the Philosopher proves in the book of the *Prior Analytics*, namely that those things which are said of one and the same thing are predicated of each other reciprocally. If therefore Christ, who is God and man, is one, it is necessary to concede that God is man, and man is God. And this indeed the authorities of the Saints attest, and the doctors of theology commonly avow. — (*On the mode of predication*) About the mode of predicating, however, different men think in different ways.

For some have wished to say that this predication (*Opinion 1*) is not in the direct (*in recto*), but in the oblique (*in obliquo*), so that the sense is: God is man, that is, God has a man. (*It is disproved*) — And this manner of speaking falls back into the third opinion, which said that man is predicated of God by way of a habit, which also was disproved above. It is also manifest that this was not sufficiently said, because, if one were to say that God is man, that is, having a man, by the same reasoning he would be called flesh, because he has flesh, and a foot, because he has a foot.

(*Opinion 2*) And therefore others have wished to say that such a predication is in the direct, yet it is neither a formal nor a causal nor an accidental predication, but one by identity; and the sense is: God is man, that is, God is the one who is man; but that one who is man, that is the Son of God, is predicated of God by a predication of identity. (*It is not proved*) — But this still does not fully resolve it, because every implication encloses a predication within itself; and therefore, when it is said: God is the one who is man, it still happens that one inquires about that implication, which is on the side of the predicate, to which predication it is to be reduced; and then either one must go on to infinity implicating, or it will be necessary to have recourse to another mode of predicating.

(*Opinion 3 and conclusion 2*) And for this reason there is a third manner of speaking, namely that when it is said: God is man, this is a singular mode of predicating. For such a predication is not by essence nor by cause nor by inherence, as the last argument showed, but it is a predication by union; for "man" is predicated of God on this account, that it is united to him into a unity of person. And since this union is singular, it is no wonder if it requires a singular mode of predicating.

(*To the implicit question*) And by this is made clear what was asked last; because such a predication is not reduced to the other customary modes of predicating, yet it has truth in itself, as the arguments adduced for this side show.

**Replies to the arguments on the opposite side:**
*To 1.* (*Solution of the opposing arguments*) As to that which is objected, that on account of a union in nature one person is not predicated of another, although that union is more excellent: therefore so also in the matter at hand; it must be said that it does not follow. (*Note*) For the unity of the Trinity is greater with respect to the account of likeness and conformity, but not with respect to the account of mutual predication, on the ground that those things which agree in one nature are not predicated of each other so mutually as those things which concur into one person, on the ground that nature signifies something common, the hypostasis signifies a proper supposit; but the affirmative consequence holds from the inferior to the superior, not conversely. Hence to whatever "this man" is subjected, "man" can be subjected; to whatever "man" is subjected, "animal" can be subjected; but conversely it does not follow: of whatever "animal" is predicated, "man" is also predicated; nay, there is a fallacy of the consequent there. Therefore, when one hypostasis is subjected to two things, it is necessary that these be subjected to each other, and thus consequently be predicated. But when one nature is said

<!-- page 172 (en) -->

of many things, it is not necessary that these be predicated of each other.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that soul and flesh concur into one person and nature, yet are not predicated of each other by a mutual predication; it must be said that the case is not alike, for a twofold reason. (*Reason 1*) First indeed, because they concur into the unity of person and of nature as constitutive parts, of which there is no being-predicated of the whole, nor consequently of each other; not so the divine and human nature, as was seen in the preceding. (*Reason 2*) — There is also another reason, because soul and flesh signify the constitutive parts in the abstract; but God and man signify not in the abstract, but in the concrete; and for this reason they can be said of each other, although in the abstract they are not predicated of each other. For this is false: Deity is humanity, just as this: the flesh is the soul, although this is true: the flesh is ensouled. — (*Note*) Let it nevertheless be understood soundly, what was said, that "man" is signified in the concrete; for concretion properly so called is found in accidental terms.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, whether, if "man" is predicated of God, it is predicated univocally of God, or equivocally; (*Note*) it must be said that properly neither univocally nor equivocally: not equivocally, because the signification of "man" is not diverse according as it is said of God and of Martin; not univocally, because, although "man" retains the same signification when it is said of God and of Peter, yet in another way it is related to Peter and Paul, in another way to God. To Peter it is related by a formal and essential predication, but to God in a personal union; therefore to neither of the aforesaid modes can those two predications be fully reduced, although something may be found there of one of the aforesaid modes, something of the other.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that when it is said: God is man, it is predicated either essentially (*per se*) or accidentally; it must be said that it is by neither mode, taking *per se* and accidentally properly: essentially, I say, it is not predicated, since there is no essential relation of the one to the other; accidentally it is not predicated, because the one is not an accident of the other. Nor is that incongruous, because such a mode of predicating is not to be comprehended under the aforesaid division. (*Another solution*) — It could nevertheless be said that to be united to human nature, on the part of God, does not signify an accident, but on the part of the assumed nature. Hence in one way such a predication could be called *per se*, in another way accidental: *per se*, by comparing the divine nature to the person, in which the union is, of which it is predicated *per se*; accidental it could be called, by comparing the human nature to the person, to which it comes to be united by grace.

*To 5.* As to that which is asked, whether "man" is predicated absolutely, or relatively; (*Distinction to be noted*) it must be said that to be said relatively is in two ways: either by an implicit relation, or by an explicit one. When therefore it is said: God is man, "man" is predicated of God in one way absolutely, in another way relatively: absolutely with respect to the privation of an extrinsic relation; relatively with respect to the positing of an intrinsic relation. For the sense is: God is man, that is, God is united to the human nature by a unity of person, by reason of which "man" comes to be said of God, and "God" of man.

*To 6.* As to that which is objected, that if "man" is predicated of God, it is predicated either of wider extent, or of narrower, or of equal extent; (*Note*) it must be said that there is a certain genus of predication, in which the predicate and the subject are related as exceeding and exceeded, as when it is said: a man is white; and so it is in the matter at hand. For although "man" be said of some supposit of God, yet it is not said of every one, nor conversely; just as not every man is white, nor is every white thing a man.

*To 7.* As to that which is objected, that just as this is true for the person of the Son: God is man, so this is true for the person of the Father: God is not man; it must be said that the case is not alike; because, as was said in the first book, (*Note*) this term "God" partly has the nature of a common term on account of the plurality of supposits, partly the nature of a discrete term on account of the incommunicable form. And therefore, because it has the nature of a common term, it can render the locution true for one supposit; but because it has the nature

<!-- page 173 (en) -->

of a discrete term, therefore it makes no difference whether the negation be placed before it or after it. Hence in the negative it is negated for all supposits, although in the affirmative it can render the locution true for one alone. And therefore this is false: God is not man; because the predicate is removed not only for the Father, but also for the Son; and from this it necessarily follows that the affirmative opposed to it is true, namely this: God is man.

(*Incidental question 1*) Hence if it be asked: how great in quantity is this proposition: God is man? it must be answered that it has part of the nature of an indefinite [proposition], part of the nature of a singular one; and this is on account of the nature of the subject term. —

(*Incidental question 2*) But if it be asked, in what matter it stands, whether in the natural, or the remote, or the contingent; it must be said that in contingent matter the predicate and the subject are related as exceeding and exceeded; and so it is in the matter at hand; and the aforesaid proposition is to be reduced to that matter, yet it savors somewhat of natural matter on this account, that those natures, so far as concerns themselves, are mutually disparate, [but] by the grace of the union are conjoined, and made as it were natural.