Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether this is to be admitted: God was made man.*

Secondly it is asked whether this is to be admitted: God was made man. And that it is so seems to be the case:

(*Fundamenta*) 1. In the first chapter of John: *The Word was made flesh*; but "flesh," as Augustine says, does not there stand for a part, but for the whole man: therefore if this is true: *The Word of God was made flesh*, much more will this be true: God was made man.

2. Likewise, in the Creed: « Incarnate... and was made man ».

3. Likewise, Augustine: « So great was that union, that it made the man God, and God man »: therefore if that union made God to be man, since every active [verb] entails its passive, then God was made man.

4. Likewise, after the incarnation God is man, and before the incarnation he was not man; but whoever in any *mode* is man, and *previously* was not man, has been *made* man: therefore if God is of this kind, God has been made man.

5. Likewise, "to be made human" is the same as "to become a man"; but this is conceded without qualification: God has been made human: therefore it is to be conceded without qualification: God was made man.

(*Ad oppositum*) **On the contrary:** 1. *To have been changed* is superior to *to have been made*; but this is simply false: God has been changed: therefore also this: God has been made man.

2. Likewise, *to have been made* presupposes *to become*; and *to become* posits imperfection: therefore of whatever it is possible to say *to have been made*, it is to say *imperfection*. But to say this of God is false: therefore this too is false: God was made man.

3. Likewise, whenever it is said: this becomes that, the term has the character of a completion with respect to that about which the becoming takes place; as when it is said: a man becomes white, whiteness is noted to be the completion of the man: therefore when it is said: God becomes man, becoming is noted to be the completion of God. But it is false that man contributes any completion to God: therefore the aforesaid locution will simply be false.

4. Likewise, an adjective posits its reality about its substantive; but this adjective *factus* ("made"), when it falls about both subject and predicate, lies rather alongside the subject than the predicate — which is evident, because it is said: *The Word was made flesh* — therefore this term *factus* posits its reality about the divine supposit: therefore the aforesaid locution names some making about God. But this is false, since there can be no making or innovation about God: therefore the aforesaid locution will be false.

5. Likewise, whenever something is predicated of something with a non-diminishing determination, it can be predicated without qualification; but this term *man* does not diminish from the account of that which is *made*: therefore if this is true: God is *made man*; this will be true: God is *made*. But this is against the Creed, which says that he is « neither made nor created, but begotten ».

### Conclusion

> This locution: "God was made man," in whatever sense it is taken, is true, although it always has something of impropriety.

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked concerning this locution: "God was made man," according to what is customary, (*Threefold sense*) the aforesaid locution is to be distinguished in many ways, from this fact, that that participle can posit its reality upon the whole, or about either of the extremes absolutely, or about one extreme in comparison to the other. — (*Conclusion 1*) If it posits its reality, namely the making itself, upon the whole, the locution is true, and the sense is: God was made man, that is, it was made [to be], that God should be man; and this indeed was done in the work of the incarnation. — (*Conclusion 2*) But if it posits its reality about either of the extremes absolutely, namely about the predicate, then the sense is: God was made man, that is, God is man, who indeed was made or produced; and this indeed is true. — (*Conclusion 3*) But if it posits its reality about one extreme in comparison to the other, then the sense is: God was made man, that is, God made himself man through the assumption of humanity, just as a man makes himself learned through the acquisition of doctrine.

(*Conclusion 1*) And the first sense indeed is true and customary according to the common sense, yet it is not [true] according to the force of the locution; because this participle, which is *factus*, since it is of the masculine gender and an adjective and retained adjectivally, cannot posit its reality about the copula, but necessarily posits [it], so far as it pertains to the force of the discourse, about the subject, or about the predicate.

(*Conclusion 2*) But the second sense indeed is true and can be had through the force and propriety of the discourse, yet it is beyond common usage. For when we say that God was made man, we do not wish to say that God is a man who was produced, but we wish to express the incarnation itself, that is, the union of the divine nature to the human.

(*Conclusion 3*) But the third sense is had both according to common usage and according to the propriety of the locution, yet it has in itself something of propriety and something of impropriety. (*Note*) And this is evident, because, when it is said: this man was made good, or the like, this participle *factus* implies three things, namely *antecedence* on the part of the subject, and *inception* on the part of the predicate, and *transmutation* on the part of both, so far as it pertains to the force of the discourse, for the reason that *to have been made* implies *to become*. But in the matter at hand there is found *antecedence* on the part of the subject, and *inception* on the part of the predicate, but there is not found *transmutation* in the supposit of God; and therefore *factus* here falls away from its proper signification with respect to the third condition, nor does it imply *transmutation*, but *union*; nor is it signified that the Son of God is the supposit of a transmutation, when it is said: God was made man, but that he is the supposit of a nature made and united to himself.

(*General conclusion*) Therefore, although the aforesaid discourse, in whatever way it is taken, has some impropriety; because it has truth, it is nonetheless received, because in the expression of our faith the truth of the discourse is considered more than the fittingness of the discourse. (*Note*) For those things which belong to our faith, as Augustine says, we understand better than we utter; whence Gregory says that « we echo the lofty things of God by stammering ». — The aforesaid discourse, therefore, is to be conceded, and the reasons which show this, because they establish the truth.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments*) 1. To that which is objected in the first place to the contrary, that *to have been changed* is superior to *to have been made*; it must be said that this is true, insofar as *to have been made* and *to become* are taken properly; and this is so, when it expresses a transmutation about the supposit itself. But it is not so in the matter at hand, for the reason that in the work of the incarnation it was made [to be], that God should be man, not according to any transmutation made in God, but according to a transmutation made in the other extreme.

2. To that which is objected, that *to have been made* presupposes *to become*, and *to become* expresses imperfection; (*Note*) it must be said that *to become* expresses imperfection about that which it [signifies as] expressing change; but in the present case it does not express, about God, change or imperfection, but only about the man; nor does it posit about him an imperfection preceding in time, but in nature, because there the *becoming* and the *to have been made* are at once.

3. To that which is objected, that the term of a making is a completion; it must be said that that is true, when that which is noted to become about the principle, or supposit, makes some innovation according to some absolute property. But it is not so in the matter at hand; because, as has already been said, on the part of God it expresses nothing but the relation of union.

4. To that which is objected, that *factus*, since it is a participle, posits its reality about the subject, as when it is said: *The Word was made flesh*; it must be said that, although it draws its name from the supposit, yet because it does not regard it absolutely, but in relation to the predicate, therefore it is not necessary that it posit about it anything absolute. Therefore for truth it suffices that about the subject there be posited antecedence, and union with respect to the predicate. And this indeed is found in the matter at hand.

5. To that which is objected, that this term *man* does not diminish from the account of that which is *made*; (*Note*) it must be said that this is true; yet it is not permissible to infer: he is made man, therefore he is made; not on account of diminution, but on account of the change of denomination. For it does not follow: this man is a white monk, therefore he is white; not because it diminishes from the account of that which is white, but because "white" denominates one way when it is said with an adjunct, another way when it is said absolutely. So too in the matter at hand it must be understood, and this is evident to one who considers it.

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