Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether this is to be conceded: man was made God.*

Thirdly it is asked whether this is to be conceded: man was made God. And that it is so, it seems:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) First, on the authority of Augustine: "Such was that union, that it made God man, and man God": therefore if it made man God, then man was made God.

2. Likewise, man is God, and before the incarnation he was not God; and the incarnation is an operation of God: therefore through the incarnation man was made God.

3. Likewise, just as this is true: God is man, so its converse: man is God: therefore by parity of reasoning, just as this is true: God was made man, this will be true: man was made God.

4. Likewise, that man is God is true; either it is true by an eternal truth, or by a temporal truth. If by an eternal truth, then from eternity it was true to say that man is God; but this is false: therefore etc. If by a temporal truth, then that man is God is temporal; and everything such has been made: therefore it has been made that God is man: therefore man was made God.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Fundamenta.*) A subject of becoming stands in the manner of something that gives substance to and precedes the term itself; but man with respect to God stands in neither manner: therefore this is false simply: man was made God.

2. Likewise, when it is said: man was made God, either "man" is taken by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form. Not by reason of the form, because God is not predicated of man by reason of the form; if therefore it is true, it is understood by reason of the supposit or hypostasis. But that hypostasis is the hypostasis of the Son of God, and it is eternal: therefore concerning it, it is false simply to say that man, by reason of it, was made a God-man.

3. Likewise, because God was made man, God is a new man; therefore by a similar reasoning, if man was made God, man is a new or recent God; but this is impossible: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, there is a communication of idioms; therefore if man was made God, God was made God; but this is false: therefore the first is too.

### Conclusion.

> The locution "man was made God" is false, unless it is understood in this sense: it has been brought about that man is God.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid locution, by which it is said "man was made God," is to be distinguished (*The threefold sense.*) in this manner, by which the aforesaid was distinguished: "God was made man," from the fact that the reality of this participle *made* can be placed about the *whole*, or about the *predicate*, or about *both extremes*. In the first sense the locution is true, and the sense is: man was made God, that is, it has been brought about that man should be God; and this indeed is true. (*Conclusion 1.*) — But if it determine the predicate, the sense is: man is God, who was made; and this indeed is false. (*Conclusion 2.*) — But if it fall about both extremes and assert an order of the subject to the predicate, then the sense is: man was made God, that is, he who was previously man was afterwards made God; and this indeed is still false, because being man in no way preceded being God in that supposit, nor is the divine being in any way begun. (*Conclusion 3.*)

And so it is clear that this locution, if in any way it can be conceded in the *first* sense, in the two others cannot and ought not be conceded: man was made God. (*General conclusion.*) Hence "man was made God" is more improper than this: "God was made man," and is more rarely found written. If nevertheless it is anywhere read or found, then it is to be taken according to the first sense. (*Corollary.*)

And by this the objections brought for both parts are made clear. (*To the arguments.*) Hence the reasons that are brought for the first part proceed according to the first way; for otherwise they would not conclude, as is clear. But the reasons brought for the other part proceed according to the other two ways, namely insofar as the participle falls between the extremes, or insofar as it determines the predicate, as is clear to one who looks.

But to that which is objected last concerning the communication of idioms, it must be said that, when it is said that that union causes idioms to be communicated; (*To the 4th of the Fundamenta.*) it must be said that from this generality are excepted those names which imply union. (*Note.*) Hence it does not follow: the divine nature assumed the human nature, therefore man assumed the human nature; so neither in the case at issue does it follow. For when I say that man was made God, I say that man is united to God; and such an idiom is not communicated to God through the union, because the union itself between things that can be united implies diversity and distinction, and it is required that this be presupposed for the communication of idioms; and therefore such idioms implying union are not communicable. And by this an answer can be given to the last objection and to those like it.

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