Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the locutions expressing the predestination of the union.*

Next, with regard to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the locutions expressing the predestination of the union. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God is predestined. Second, inquiry is made concerning this: the Son of God is predestined to be man. Third, inquiry is made concerning this: the man is predestined to be the Son of God.

### Question I. *Whether the Son of God is predestined.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the Son of God is predestined. And that he is, seems [to be the case].

(*To the contrary side.*) 1. This is conceded: the Son of God is man; but every man is either foreknown, or predestined; but the Son of God is not a foreknown man: therefore predestined.

2. Likewise, excepting the words importing the union, there must be a communication of idioms; but the word "predestination" does not import the union, so far as it is of itself: therefore, since that man is predestined, and that man is the Son of God, it necessarily follows that the Son of God is predestined.

3. Likewise, the temporal is more repugnant to the eternal than the eternal to the eternal; but to be predestined says something eternal; but to be conceived and born [says] something temporal; but this is conceded: the Son of God was born of the Virgin: therefore this also: the Son of God is predestined.

4. Likewise, nothing belongs to anyone except from time, in that it says a temporal effect; but it is conceded without qualification: the Son of God was sent into the flesh: therefore much more must this be conceded: the Son of God is predestined.

5. Likewise, predestination is nothing other than the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future; but to the Son of God, Christ, grace and glory were conferred in time and foreseen from eternity to be conferred upon him; but to whatever the definition belongs, the thing defined [also belongs]: therefore one must necessarily concede that the Son of God is predestined.

6. Likewise, this is true: the Son of God is predestined, insofar as he is man; but that qualification "man" does not diminish anything with respect to the subject: therefore, it being removed, it is permissible to infer that the Son of God is predestined without qualification. Since therefore "from the true nothing but the true follows," it seems that the aforesaid locution, namely "the Son of God is predestined," is to be conceded as true.

(*Fundamental arguments.*) On the contrary: 1. Origen: "He is predestined who does not yet exist; these words are said on account of those who speak impiety against the Only-begotten of God. For they think that he is to be numbered among those who, before they came to be, were predestined to be": therefore it is impious to say that the Son of God is predestined.

2. Likewise, upon that text of Romans 8: *Whom he predestined, them he also called;* the Gloss: "He predestined those not existing, he called them before they had turned away": if therefore predestination is of the non-existent, and the Son of God always exists, he never seems to be predestined.

3. Likewise, predestination by the meaning of the name says a precedence of the one predestining over the one predestined; but nothing precedes the Son of God, since he is eternal: therefore in no way does it befit him to be numbered among the predestined.

4. Likewise, no one predestined himself — for just as one is who is created, another who creates; so also one who predestines, and another who is predestined — but all, however many are predestined, are predestined by the Son of God: therefore it is in no way to be conceded: the Son of God is predestined.

### Conclusion

> The locution "the Son of God is predestined" is not admitted by the theologians.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although this is to be conceded: "Christ is predestined," in that "Christ" names the hypostasis in two natures; and this: "Christ is predestined, insofar as he is man," by reason of the adjoined qualification; (*Conclusion.*) nevertheless this is commonly not received: "the Son of God is predestined." — And the reason for this is on account of the repugnance of the intelligible contents, (*Threefold reason.*) which is indeed found between the subject and the predicate.

Now a threefold repugnance is found there. For the word "predestination," with regard to the one predestined, (*Three things in predestination.*) imports three things, namely a relation of effects with respect to a cause, an acceptation through the gift of grace, and an inchoation as regards the being of [the] nature. And it has the first intelligible content because it descends from a passive verb; it has the second intelligible content because it descends from an act expressing an ordering to an end; it has the third intelligible content because it is compounded from a preposition expressing precedence, namely from this preposition "pre-." — On the contrary, "the Son of God" signifies that (*Threefold repugnance.*) person as cause, not as effect. It also signifies that person inasmuch as sonship belongs to him by nature, not by the gift of grace. It also signifies that person as eternal, not as having a beginning. And thus there is expressly a repugnance of the intelligible contents between (*Corollary.*) subject and predicate. — And this repugnance can be reduced to the threefold genus of opposition, namely of contradiction, of contrariety, and of relation. And on account of this threefold repugnance the masters do not admit the aforesaid locution. — Hence the reasonings which are on this side are to be conceded.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that this is conceded: "the Son of God is man"; it must be said that there is not there a repugnance of the intelligible contents, but rather a consonance. For "man" names a nature apt for the union, but not so this predicate "predestined". And therefore it does not follow from this, that if the Son of God is man, that on account of this he is foreknown or predestined, unless there be added to him: insofar as he is man.

2. To that which is objected, that the communication of idioms is in all [terms], excepting the names importing the union; it must be said that not only (*Note.*) are those names to be excepted, but also those words from which a repugnance of intelligible contents arises; and such is the word "predestination" and the like, as will be better made clear below in the eleventh distinction, where it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God is a creature.

3. To that which is objected, that the temporal is more repugnant to the eternal than the eternal to the eternal; it must be said that this is true of that which is purely eternal; but of that which is so eternal that of its primary intelligible content it expresses and names something temporal, it does not hold true, especially when it so imports that temporal [thing] which has a direct opposition to the eternal, as is this participle "predestined."

4. To that which is objected concerning the mission, that although it is temporal, it is conceded that the Son of God was sent; it must be said that it is not alike, because, (*Note.*) although "to be sent" expresses something temporal, nevertheless that temporal [thing] is not said to be placed about the divine person, but about something created; whereas about the divine person it places only an emanation. But predestination places about the very one predestined a threefold intelligible content, which is repugnant to the eternal person; and therefore, although it may soundly be conceded "the Son of God was sent," it cannot soundly be conceded "the Son of God is predestined."

5. To that which is objected, that for the Son of God grace was prepared in the present and glory in the future; it must be said that, although for Christ grace was prepared by reason of the human nature, nevertheless not by reason of the divine. And therefore, just as the first locution is denied, by which it is said "the Son of God is predestined," unless a qualification be added, according to which and by reason of which the predestination itself is regarded; so the other locution is to be denied, in which the definition of predestination is placed, unless this qualification be added: insofar as he is man.

6. To that which is objected, that this qualification "insofar as he is man" does not diminish; it must be said that, although it does not diminish [anything] of the meaning of predestination, it nevertheless brings it about that predestination places its reality about the hypostasis of Christ by reason of the human nature, not by reason of the divine; and thus it removes the repugnance of the intelligible contents. But when it is inferred and said without qualification "the Son of God is predestined," since "the Son of God" denominates the person of Christ according to

the divine nature only, there is there a repugnance of the intelligible contents. And therefore that reasoning does not hold, not because there is there a paralogism of the qualified and the unqualified, but because there is there a paralogism of accident. For what belongs to Christ by reason of the human nature is foreign [to him] by reason of the divine.