Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether this is true: the Son of God is predestined to be man.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning this proposition: the Son of God is predestined to be man. And that it is true is shown:

1. *First*, by the Master in the text, who says that it is to be conceded according to each of the three opinions. (*Foundations.*)

2. *Likewise*, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. It is as much repugnant, or more, for the Son of God *to be made* [man] as to be predestined; but this is conceded: the Son of God was made man: therefore this too: the Son of God is predestined to be man.

3. *Likewise*, that prophecy by which it is said in Isaiah, chapter seven: *Behold, a Virgin shall conceive,* is said to be a prophecy of predestination: therefore that the Word should become flesh, just as it was prophesied and fulfilled in time, so also was it predestined from eternity: therefore, just as he was made man in time, so also from eternity he was predestined to be man.

4. *Likewise*, the Son of God is man either by grace or by nature; not by nature: therefore by grace; but every grace, whatsoever is given to anyone in time, was preordained and prepared from eternity; but this is nothing other than to be predestined: therefore it seems that this proposition — the Son of God is predestined to be man — is to be conceded.

**On the contrary:** (*To the opposite.*)
1. Predestination is in respect of grace and glory, not in respect of nature; but *to be man* states a natural predicate, not a gratuitous gift: therefore in respect of that no one ought to be called predestined.

2. *Likewise*, it follows necessarily: this one is predestined to have grace and glory, therefore he is predestined; therefore likewise it follows: the Son of God is predestined to be man, therefore he is predestined; but this is to be denied: the Son of God is predestined, as was shown above: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, predestination states a precedence not only in respect of the terminus, but also in respect of the one predestined; but although the divine foreknowledge preceded the human nature, nevertheless it did not precede the divine person: therefore whether it be said absolutely, or in respect of the human nature, it must be denied that the Son of God is predestined: therefore the aforesaid expression is false, namely: the Son of God is predestined to be man.

4. *Likewise*, whoever is predestined is prepared for some gratuitous gift; but when the Son of God was made man, no grace was made for that person of the Son of God, but only for the human race: therefore it seems that this predestination in no way befits the Son of God.

### Conclusion.

> The expression "the Son of God is predestined to be man" can be admitted, although in one sense it is false.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since this participle *predestined* states a *precedence,* it can convey it in three ways: either in respect of the *subject,* or in respect of the *predicate,* or in respect of the *whole compound.* (*It conveys precedence in three ways.*) But if it conveys precedence in respect of the *subject,* then the sense is: the Son of God is predestined to be man, that is, the Son of God was foreseen to be man before he was the Son of God; and in this way the aforesaid expression is false. (*Conclusion 1.*) — But if it conveys precedence in respect of the *predicate,* then the sense is: the Son of God was foreseen to be man, that is, he was known or foreseen to be man, not before the Son of God existed, but before he was man. — But if it conveys precedence in respect of the *whole statement,* then the sense is: the Son of God is predestined to be man, that is, it was predestined that the Son of God should be man.

Thus, therefore, there can be a threefold sense of the aforesaid expression; and one indeed is false, but the two following are true; and as regards those two subsequent senses the aforesaid expression is received by all the opinions, as the Master says in the text. (*Conclusion 2.*) And therefore according to this sense it must be conceded that it is true.

**To the arguments to the contrary:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)
*To 1.* To that which is objected first to the contrary, that predestination is in respect of glory and grace, not in respect of nature; it must be said that when the word *predestination* is uttered by itself, it includes within itself the understanding of grace and glory, as for instance when someone is said to be *simply* predestined. But when an *external determination* is added to it, it retains only the understanding of the principal signification, namely of preordination or foreknowledge. (*Note.*) Hence when it is said: this one is predestined to have grace and glory, *predestined* there has only the force of *foreseen.* And it is similar, when it is said: "yield"; by itself it has only the force of "give place"; but when it is said "yield place," *yield* has only the understanding of the other [word]. And therefore, when it is said: the Son of God is predestined to be man, *predestined* conveys only foreknowledge or ordination; and therefore it conveys only the general signification. — It could, however, be said that, although *to be man* predicates of the Son of God something natural, it nevertheless concerns the grace of the union; and therefore such a predicate does not pass outside the account of predestination. (*Otherwise.*)

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that if he is predestined to be man, then he is predestined; it must be said that it does not follow, because, when *predestined* is placed between the subject and the predicate, it can state precedence in respect of the one as much as of the other; but when it is predicated *per se*, it states precedence in respect of the *subject.* And therefore it does not follow: he is predestined to be man, therefore he is predestined; just as it does not follow: the Son of God is predestined, insofar as he is man, therefore he is predestined. Nor is it similar in the case of others, who are predestined to grace and glory, because in them predestination states a precedence not only in respect of that *to which* they are predestined, but also in respect of those *who* are predestined; but it is not so in the case at hand.

*To 3.* But to that which is objected thirdly, that *predestination* states precedence in respect of the one predestined; it must be said that this is true when it is said of something *simply* and per se; but when it is said *in comparison* to some predicate, then it can state precedence in respect of that predicate. And in this way it speaks in the case at hand; and therefore that objection does not compel.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that to whoever is predestined some grace is made; it must be said that *predestination* in respect of him conveys the conferral of grace, in respect of which it conveys *precedence.* But when it is said: the Son of God is predestined to be man, it is not conceded insofar as predestination conveys precedence in respect of the *subject,* but only insofar as it conveys [precedence] in respect of the *predicate.* And therefore it is not denoted that any grace is made to the Son of God himself, but to the son of man; and this indeed is true, and therefore that objection and the others preceding hold only according to that sense by which the aforesaid expression is not received.

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