Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether this is to be conceded: man is predestined to be the Son of God.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning this: man is predestined to be the Son of God, whether it is to be conceded. And that it is so seems to be the case.

(*Foundations.*)

1. Romans 1: *Who was predestined the Son of God in power*; but this is said either of the son of man, or of the Son of God; but not of the Son of God: therefore of the son of man.

2. Likewise, in the Gloss: «Jesus was predestined, that he who was to be in the flesh the son of David, might be in power the Son of God»; but "Jesus" names that man: therefore that man is predestined to be the Son of God.

3. Likewise, the greater the grace, the greater the predestination that ought to be reckoned according to it; but the grace of the union, through which that man was made the Son of God, was the greatest, which contained in itself at once grace and glory: if therefore the man was foreseen to be the Son of God through that grace, it seems that he was predestined to be the Son of God.

4. Likewise, predestination is not attributed to the Son of God on account of antecedence, which indeed does not befit the Son of God, insofar as he is *God*; but such antecedence does well befit the man, insofar as he is *man*: therefore it rightly seems that predestination befits him. Therefore if not only is grace given to that man, by which he is blessed, but also that by which he is the Son of God; it seems that this is to be conceded: man is predestined, that he may be the Son of God.

**On the contrary:** (*To the opposite.*)

1. If man is predestined to be the Son of God, and the Son of God is man, therefore the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God; but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows. But it follows from this: man is predestined to be the Son of God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, predestination is only of a person: therefore if man is predestined to be the Son of God, some person is predestined to be the Son of God; either therefore a created person, or an uncreated person; but not a created person, because such a one is not to be found in Christ: therefore an uncreated person. But to be predestined does not befit an uncreated person: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement ought not to be received, namely this: man is predestined to be the Son of God.

3. Likewise, whoever is predestined precedes that to which he is predestined, in time or in nature; but man precedes the Son of God neither in time nor in nature: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement ought not to be conceded.

4. Likewise, when it is said: man is predestined to be the Son of God, either this is understood insofar as he is man, or insofar as he is God; not insofar as he is God, this is established: therefore it is understood insofar as he is man. But whoever is predestined to this, was predestined from eternity: therefore insofar as he is man, he was from eternity predestined to be the Son of God. But this term "man" supposits for the verb in the past: therefore it supposits for the past: therefore if anyone was from eternity predestined to be the Son of God, from eternity someone was a man; but this is false: therefore also the first.

### Conclusion

> **(Conclusion.)** The locution "man is predestined to be the Son of God" is received by all.

**I respond:** It must be said that this locution has to be distinguished by the same mode by which the one set down earlier was distinguished, namely from the fact that this participle "predestined" can express antecedence with respect to the subject, or with respect to the predicate, or with respect to the whole copulated whole. (*Distinction.*) If it expresses antecedence with respect to the subject, the locution is true, and the sense is: man, before he was man, was foreseen to be the Son of God. (*Conclusion 1.*) — But if it notes antecedence with respect to the predicate, the locution is false. For the sense is: man was foreseen to be the Son of God, before the Son of God existed. (*Conclusion 2.*) — But if it notes antecedence with respect to the whole copulated whole, it is true. For the sense is: man is predestined to be the Son of God, that is, it is predestined that man be the Son of God. And this sense is received by all opinions; and therefore according to common usage the aforesaid statement can be conceded. (*General conclusion.*) — And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments on the negative side:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)

*To 1.* As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that if man is predestined to be the Son of God, then the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God; it must be said that it does not follow, because, as has been said, with respect to the word "predestining" there is no communication of idioms, rather there is a sophism of accident in the aforesaid process. For it does not follow: the divine foreknowledge precedes Christ, insofar as he is the son of the Virgin, therefore insofar as he is the Son of God.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that predestination is with respect to a person; it must be said that if it is by reason of the person, it is not by reason of the personality, but of some nature. (*Note.*) And therefore it is not necessary, in order that the statement have truth, that predestination precede the person absolutely, but it suffices if it precede it by reason of some nature. And therefore, when it is said: man is predestined to be the Son of God, it is not understood that that person is predestined except by reason of the human nature. — But when it is said that the eternal person is not predestined; it must be said that this is true, insofar as it is eternal; yet it can befit it by reason of the nature temporally assumed.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that the predestined precedes that to which it is predestined; it must be said that this is true; and that has no force against the case, when predestination is taken properly with respect to grace and glory; but in the present case the name of predestination is extended to stand for foreknowledge by reason of an adjoined determination, according as (*Note.*) was seen in the preceding problem. — Yet it could be said that the aforesaid statement is to be understood, when the word "predestination" expresses antecedence not only with respect to the subject, but also with respect to the predicate; but it is not so in the present case. (*Another solution.*) It is also necessary to understand concerning the thing to which one is predestined not absolutely, but in comparison to the very thing which is predestined. For it is not necessary that he who is predestined be before grace or glory absolutely, but only insofar as it is in him; and thus it has no force against the case. For if the Son of God precedes the man, nevertheless he is not present in the man before the man exists; rather by nature the humanity is prior to its being united to the person of the Word.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, whether man is predestined to be the Son of God, either insofar as he is God, or insofar as he is man; I say that it is insofar as he is man; and thus it was from eternity. (*Note.*) Nor does it hold: therefore it supposits for the past. For this is understood of a verb of past tense, which does not have the power of amplifying to the future. For in those things which have the power of amplifying to future things, because they enclose in themselves an act concerning the future, the aforesaid rule does not hold. And so it is in the present case, because predestination connotes the foreknowledge of something future; and therefore it is not necessary that this term "man," with respect to such a predicate, supposit for past things. — There is also another reason why it amplifies to every time: because (*Another reason.*) predestination does not place its reality in the predestined, but in the one predestining, just as praise is not in the one praised, but in the one praising. And therefore, just as praise is not only of the present, but also of the past and future; so too past predestination can be of that which is future. And these things become clearer through what was said in the first book.

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