Dist. 7, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about what is said: *"The mystery of this union is inexplicable, which is not an account of parts."* For it seems that in such a union there is part and part; because upon Leviticus, chapter five: *"the tenth part,"* etc. The Gloss of Hesychius: "The tenth part of the Ephah is the humanity of Christ. But the Ephah, a measure of three modii, signifies the Trinity." And as sign stands to sign, so the thing signified stands to the thing signified; but the sign is a part of the sign: therefore also the thing signified is a part of

the thing signified: therefore the humanity of Christ is a part of Christ. — Likewise, in the Symbol it is said: "As the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ"; but soul and flesh are parts of man: therefore the humanity and the divinity are parts of Christ; the contrary of which is handed down in the same place.

**I respond:** It must be said that "part" is said in many ways (*It is answered: "part" is said in four ways*). In one way "part" is said *commonly* of everything that enters into the composition of something, whether according to a real composition, or according to reason; and in this way those things which fall in a definition are said to be *parts of the thing made known*. — In another way "part" is said of that which enters into the constitution of something according to *thing* and *nature*, whether it have *quantity* or not; and in this way the soul is a part of the animated thing. — In a third way *"part" is said more properly* of that which enters into the constitution of something according to *thing* and *nature*, and according to *continuous* or *discrete quantity*, as a hand and a foot is a part of the body, and a pair a part of a quaternary. — In a fourth way *"part" is said more properly* of that which enters into the *real* or *quantitative* constitution of something according to a *certain* and *determinate measure*, such that, taken a number of times, it renders the whole; and this part is called *aliquot*, to which the notion of part most properly belongs.

When, therefore, it is asked whether the human nature is a part of Christ; it must be said that, if "part" be taken *commonly*, in the first way, it can be conceded that it is a part. For if anyone should wish to make known what Christ is, he will say that he is one hypostasis in two natures, namely the divine and the human. But if "part" be taken *properly*, then the human nature is not called a part of Christ; and in this way the word of the Master in the text is understood. — And by this the reply to the objections is plain; for in such things the likeness is not in every respect. (*Note*)

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what Damascene says: *"We do not say that man was deified, but that God was made man."* For it seems false to say it. For as the divine nature is united to the human, so also the human to the divine: therefore as we say *"God was made man" (humanatum)*, so also *"man was deified" (deificatum)*. — Likewise, in the union of the divine nature to the human the divine nature is not diminished, but the human is exalted: therefore the human nature is drawn more to conformity with the divine, than the divine to conformity with the human: therefore it ought rather to be said that in Christ the human nature is *deified*, than that the divine is *made man*. If you say that the denomination ought to be made from what is better known; this does not solve it, because the denomination ought to be made not only from what is better known, but also from what is more worthy. If you also say that to be *made man* predicates a habit, as the third opinion says; this does not solve it: because it is not only said *made man (humanatus)*, but it is said *made man (factus homo)*: therefore if we must say that man is God, and God is man; it seems that there is no unfitness in saying that man was *deified*.

**I respond:** It must be said that this adjective *humanatum* (*Resp. 1*) predicates not only a habit, but also a union. Whence to say that God is *made man (humanatum)* is nothing other than to say that he is united to flesh. But this which is *deified*, although it can import a union, imports at the same time order and antecedence. For *deificatum* is compounded from *deitas* and *factum*; whence *deificatum* is "to have been made God." And since the humanity does not precede the divinity, therefore Damascene does not concede this, that man was deified.

Or it must be said that Damascene (*Resp. 2*) does not deny it simply, but that it is not so *proper*: *"man was deified,"* as this is: *"God was made man."* For he himself says, in the third book: "It must be known that the flesh was deified not according to an extermination of nature, or a confusion. For to say that the flesh is deified means as much as that it is joined to the deity." Therefore he does not deny the aforesaid locution as false simply, but it is not so proper as its converse. — Force could also be made (*Resp. 3*) in this, that I say *man*, because on the side of the subject it stands for the hypostasis, but on the side of the predicate for the

form; but the hypostasis of this man is not thus *deified*, since it was always *God*, as it is *made man*, since it was not always man. — And thus both objections are made plain.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what is said, that *one does not say "lordly man" (homo dominicus)*, and it seems that this is to be conceded, by that which is had in the book of the Eighty-three Questions: "It must be admonished that those eternal goods be awaited, which were in the lordly man," for this is understood of Christ. If you say that this has been retracted; it is objected against this: that upon the first book of Kings, chapter one, the Gloss of Bede says: "Who is this man, if not the lordly man?": therefore if this can be said of other men, much more of Christ.

**I respond:** It must be said that this name *dominicus*, according to common usage, is said in two ways (*Distinction*), namely *possessively* and *by likeness*. Whence the lordly man is called he who is possessed by the Lord, or who is like the Lord. And because according to either comparison it says a distinction and a disparity of that of which it is said to the lord, with respect to whom it is said; since Christ is Lord, it is not to be conceded that Christ is a lordly man; for he himself is truly Lord. — And therefore Augustine retracts this, showing that it can generate an evil understanding. — Yet it could soundly (*It is soundly explained*) be understood by reason of the human nature, which is possessed by the Lord and assimilated to the Lord and caused by the Lord; and therefore Augustine retracts it in such a way that in this manner it can have a sound understanding.

But to that which is objected concerning other men, it must be said that it is not similar; for there is not so great a disparity of that man to God, as there is of other men.

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