Dist. 7
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/7/q/bon-sent-III-d7-littera
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### DISTINCTION VII.

### Chap. I. *Then he sets down the things which seem to be opposed to each of the opinions.*

(*The ambiguous locutions according to the first opinion.*) According to the first, then, it is said: *God was made man*, and *man was made God*, because God began to be a certain rational substance which had not been before; and that substance began to be God, and this it had by grace, not by nature or by merits. Hence Christ is rightly said, (*An objection is raised.*) insofar as he is man, *to be predestined to be the Son of God*. — But against this opinion it is objected: if that substance began to be God, and God [began to be] it; then a certain substance is God which was not *always* God; and a certain substance is God which is not the *divine substance*; (*It is conceded.*) and God is *something* which was not always. — Which they too concede, relying on the testimony of Origen, who says: «He was made, without doubt, that which he was not before; but he added: according to the *flesh*; according to *God*, however, he was before, and there was not [a time] when he was not». — In several other ways too this opinion can be opposed; but we forbear these, leaving the zeal of the exercise to the reader and hastening on to other matters.

(*According to the second opinion.*) In the second opinion, however, the account of this statement seems to be such, that, when it is said: *God was made man*, it is understood that he began to be a subsistent [being] out of two natures, or three substances; and conversely, *man was made God*, because a subsistent [being] in two natures began to be God; or rather man was made God, and the converse is said, because God assumed a man, and the man was assumed by God. Hence Augustine says in the book *On the Trinity*: «Such was that assumption, which made the man God, and God man». But the understanding varies when it is said: *God is man*, and *man is God*. For *God* is said to be the person subsisting in two and *out of* two natures, and *the person subsisting in* two and *out of* two natures is said to be God, that is, the Word, or the divine nature. For a simple person, or a nature, can be predicated of a composite person. But it is not, (*Damascene.*) as John Damascene says, the same to say *nature* or *person*. The authorities also which belong to the *first* (*The authorities of the first opinion are determined.*) opinion and seem to contradict *this* one determine [the matter]: so that, when one reads that the man was assumed by the Word in the singularity of the person, or made one person with the Word, it should be understood of the *human* nature, which is united to the Word in the singularity of the person, that is, in such a way that the same person, which was before and was simple, remained without increase of number and unchanged, although *composite*. But the account of this composition is said to be none other than the account by which there is [composition] in other men, because in his case the composition is out of *three*, in theirs out of *two* substances. They also deny that the human nature is a person, or the Son of God; and just as they say that one and the same is man and God, and the son of man and the Son of God, so [they say he is] *one* and *the same*, not *one thing* and *another*, as neither *one* and *another*.

(*The opposed authorities of Augustine.*) But to these seem opposed the things contained in the chapters subjoined. For Augustine says *on John*: «The Word is one thing, the man another; but the Word was made flesh, that is, man; therefore the person of the Word is not one and the person of the man another, since each is Christ and one person». The same, to Felician: «The Son of God is one thing, the son of man another; but [he is] not another [one]». Likewise: «The Son of God [is] one thing from the Father, another from the Mother». The same, in the first book *On the Trinity*: «Since the Son is both God and man, the substance God is one, man another». (*They are explained.*) But these they determine in this manner: that, when it is said, the Word of God is one thing, the man another, or the substance God one thing, the man another; Christ is signified to be of one nature insofar as he is *man*, and of another,

(*Damascene.*) insofar as he is *God*; and *one thing* is the nature by which he is man, *another* the nature by which he is God. For as John Damascene says: «Unconvertibly and unalterably are the natures united to one another, neither the divine standing apart from its proper simplicity, nor the human either converted into the nature of deity, or converted into non-existence, nor made out of two one *composite nature*. For a composite nature cannot be consubstantial — that is, *homoousion* — with either of the natures out of which it is composed, perfecting the one out of the others, just as a body composed out of the four elements is called neither *fire* nor *air* nor *earth* nor *water*, nor is said to be *homoousion* with any of these. If therefore, according to the heretics, Christ existed after the union as of one composite nature, he was converted from a simple nature into a composite one, and is consubstantial neither with the Father, who exists of simple nature, nor with the Mother; and he will be called neither *God* nor *man*, but Christ alone; and this name, namely *Christ*, will not be the name of his person, but of one composite nature according to them. But we do not dogmatize that Christ is of one composite nature, and we say that this name, namely *Christ*, [is] of the person, not *monotropos*, that is, said in one way, but signifying two natures, namely of deity and of humanity. And we confess that out of deity and humanity one and the same is and is called perfect God and perfect man, out of two and *in* two natures». — So therefore the Son of God is said to be *one thing*, the son of man *another*, because he is of *another substance* or nature insofar as he is the Son of God, and of *another* insofar as he is the son of man, not that the Son of God and of man is those two diverse things, that is, two diverse natures.

(*Hilary.*) For Hilary plainly says, in the ninth book *On the Trinity*: «Since the son of man is not *one thing*, nor the Son of God *another* — for *the Word was made flesh* — and since he who is the Son of God is himself also the son of man; I ask, who has been glorified in this son of man». — He plainly says that the Son of God is not *one thing* and the son of man *another*. Whereby the foregoing determination is strengthened and approved.

(*Augustine is again brought as an objection.*) That too which was said — each is Christ and one person — can move the reader; as also that which Augustine says in the first book *On the Trinity*: «Because the form of God took the form of a servant, each [is] *God*, each [is] *man*. But each [is] *God* on account of the God who takes, and each [is] *man* on account of the man taken». And that which the same says in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*: «He who is faithful believes that the true human nature, the God-Word assuming it, was so exalted that *he who* assumed and *that which* was assumed were one person in the Trinity, that assumption ineffably making the truth of the one [person] in God and man». But if *he who* assumed and *that which* was assumed are one person: therefore the human nature is one person with the Word. — But all these they hand down to have been said in such a sense (*They answer.*) that each is said to be Christ and one person, because in each one Christ and one person subsists. So too the *thing assumed* with the *one assuming* is said to be one person, because the thing assumed is associated to the one assuming in the unity of the person, that is, in such a way that the unity of the person remained, not in such a way that the flesh and soul are God, because, as Jerome says, (*Jerome and Ambrose.*) «The Word is God, and not the assumed flesh». And Ambrose, in the third book *On the Holy Spirit*, says: «*One thing* is that which assumed, and *another* that which was assumed».

(*Another saying is adduced.*) But there is also another thing which seems very much to stand in the way of this opinion. For Augustine says in the book (*Augustine is brought as an objection.*) against Maximinus: «Christ is one person of a twofold substance, because he is both God and man. Yet neither God nor man can be called a part of this person; otherwise the Son of God, [who is] God, before he took the form of a servant, was not whole and grew, when the man acceded to his divinity». — Behold, he says that God is not a part of that person. Whence it seems that that person does not consist of God and man. — To which these too answer that that (*They answer.*) person does not so consist of God and man as a *whole out of parts*. For the parts of any whole come together in such a way that out of them what was not is constituted. But the human and divine nature are not united in Christ in this way. (*Doubt 1.*) For the account of this union, which is not [a union] of parts, is inexplicable. — Some, however, think that by the name *God* the person is there signified, because he was treating of three persons, of whom he said none was a part of the Trinity; just as a part of this person is not God. But if it is understood of the person, it is manifest that a person is not a part of a person. — The second opinion and its explanation have been carefully set down, against which the authorities adduced in the third opinion stand in nothing or in little, which [third opinion] must now be considered.

(*According to the third opinion.*) In this opinion, then, it is said thus: *God was made man*, because he *took* a man, and thus he is said *to be man*, because *he has a man*; or because he is one having a man; and *man was made God*, because he was assumed by God; and *man to be God*, because the one having a man is God. When therefore it is said: God is man, either *a habit* is predicated, or *a person*, but a humanated one. And that *a humanated person* is predicated, Cassiodorus seems to show, saying: «He was made, so to say, a humanated God, who even in the assumption of the flesh did not cease to be God». Which nevertheless can be taken in various ways, so that it is said: *God* was made humanated, or *Christ* was made a humanated God; for each can soundly be said. When therefore

it is said: God was made man, the understanding becomes manifold according to them, so that it is understood [either] that he took a human nature, or that he began to be a humanated Word. Yet if he began to be a *humanated Word*, it does not on that account follow that he began to be the *Word*; nor if God was made a *humanated Word* does it follow that he was made the *Word*; just as it is said of someone: today this man began to be a *good man*, or was made a *good man*; yet he did not today begin to be a *man*, or was made a *man*.

(*As to being predestined.*) According to them Christ, insofar as he is man, is said to be *predestined to be the Son of God*, because it was predestined by God from eternity, and in time conferred on him by grace, that he, being man, should be the Son of God. For this he did not always have, but in time received by grace. Which Augustine seems to have noted in the book (*Augustine.*) to Prosper and Hilary, saying: «Jesus was predestined, that he who was to be according to the flesh the son of David, should be in power the Son of God». These too, when it is said: Christ is less than the Father, insofar as he is man, understand this said according to *habit*, that is, insofar as he has a man united to himself. Hence Augustine, in the first book *On the Trinity*: «God the Son is by nature equal to God the Father, by habit less. For in the form of a servant he is less than the Father, in the form of God he is equal to the Father». And because the account of the incarnation is to be taken according to *habit*, therefore they hand down that he is to be called *a humanated God*, not *a deified man*. (*Doubt 2.*) Hence John Damascene: «We do not say a deified man, but God made man».

### Chap. III. *That he ought not to be called a Lordly man.*

And although *man God* is said, it is nevertheless not fittingly (*Doubt 3.*) said *a Lordly man*. Hence Augustine in the book of *Retractations*: «I do not see whether he who is the mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, is rightly called *a Lordly man*, since he is assuredly *Lord*; and this indeed, that I should say it, I read among certain catholic writers. But wherever I said this, I would I had not said it. For afterward I saw that it ought not to be said, although it can be defended with some reason». — According to them too the person of the Son is said to exist *in* two and *out of* two natures, according to *adherence* and *inherence*. For the one adheres to him, the other is in him.

(*The Master suspends judgment.*) Diligently enough, in accordance with the opinions of diverse [writers] set down above, I have treated the question without assertion and without prejudgment. Yet I would not have the reader, in so great a matter and one so difficult to discern, think that this our disputation ought to suffice him; but let him read also other things perhaps better considered and treated, and let him examine, with a more vigilant and more understanding mind, if he can, the things which here can move [him], holding this firmly, that «God assumed a man, the man passed over into God, not by a mutability of nature, but by the condescension of God; so that neither was God changed into a human substance by assuming a man, nor the man into a divine [substance], being glorified into God; because a change or mutability of nature works the diminution and abolition of the substance».

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