Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/8/q/bon-sent-III-d8-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the temporal nativity in comparison to the divine nature.*
### Question I. *Whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is born of the Virgin.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is born of the Virgin. And that it is so, seems [provable]:

1. First, by the authority of Hilary, in the fourth book *On the Trinity*: « The Son has nothing except what is born » ; but *(On the contrary.)* he has the divine nature: therefore it is born. But what is born eternally in Christ from the Father, is born temporally of the Mother: if therefore the divine nature is of this sort, it is evident, and so on.

2. Likewise, more expressly Damascene, in the third book, chapter twelve: « We proclaim the *Theotokos*, that is, the God-bearer, to be truly and principally holy Mary the Virgin » ; but « God is a name of the nature »: therefore the Virgin Mary will be the bearer of the divine nature: therefore the divine nature is born of the Virgin.

3. Likewise, most expressly Augustine, *On the Faith, to Peter*: « The eternal and divine nature could not be temporally conceived and born except by the taking up of human truth [reality] »: therefore it seems that it ought truly and properly to be said to be conceived and born of the Virgin.

4. Likewise, the incarnation is ordered to the nativity — whence the person of the Word too was born because incarnate — but it is conceded that the divine nature is incarnate, as was held above in the fifth distinction: therefore it must also be conceded that it is born of the Virgin.

5. Likewise, to assume flesh is nothing other than to be born in the womb; but this is conceded, that the divine nature assumed flesh from the Virgin: therefore it must be conceded that it was born in the womb of the Virgin. But upon nativity in the womb there follows nativity from the womb: therefore if the divine nature was born in the Virgin's womb, it follows that it was born from the Virgin's womb.

6. Likewise, it is more fitting to the divine nature *to be born* of the Virgin than it is fitting for power *to suffer*, and for fortitude *to be weakened*; but Bernard says that « in that union fortitude was weakened »: therefore much more strongly must it be conceded that the divine nature is born of the Virgin.

*(Fundamenta.)* **On the contrary:** 1. Damascene, in the fourth book: « We acknowledge that to be born does not belong to the nature, but to the hypostasis »: therefore to be born of the Virgin does not belong to the nature, but only to the person.

2. Likewise, the eternal nativity is nobler and prior than the temporal; but the divine nature is not said to be born on account of the Son's eternal nativity, as was shown in the first book: therefore much less ought it to be said to be born on account of the temporal nativity.

3. Likewise, to whatever it belongs to be born, to it belongs to be from another; but it does not belong to the divine nature to be from another: therefore the divine nature ought to be said to be born neither eternally nor temporally.

4. Likewise, to whatever it belongs to be born, to it belongs the formal character of sonship: therefore if the divine nature is said to be born of the Virgin, the divine nature is said to be the daughter of the Virgin.

5. Likewise, as the properties of the divine nature stand to the human, so the human properties [stand] to the divine; but this is simply false: the humanity in Christ is eternal: therefore this also [is false]: the divine nature in Christ is born of the Virgin.

6. Likewise, what is born from something is a nature conformable with that from which it is born: if therefore the divine nature is born of the Virgin, it seems that the divine nature and the Virgin Mary are of the same nature; which is false and impossible.

### Conclusion

> *(Conclusion.)* The aforesaid locution, for a twofold cause, ought not to be received.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text, this is not received as proper: the divine nature is born of the Virgin. And this on account of two things, namely on account of avoiding a confusion of the personal properties and of the natural or essential properties, which two things are especially to be observed regarding catholic speech and what expresses the truth of the faith. — *(Reason 1.)* Therefore it is not received that the divine nature is born of the Virgin, on account of the confusion of personal properties; for which reason it is also not conceded that it is born of the Father. And this is what the Master says in the text: « What is not begotten of the Father does not seem to be born of the Mother; nor does any reality have the name of sonship in the humanity which it does not hold in the divinity ».

*(Reason 2.)* Also on account of avoiding a confusion of the natural properties it is not received. For just as in the most blessed Trinity the persons and their properties are distinct from one another; so in Christ the natures are distinct from one another and their properties, although they coincide in the supposit; and therefore the property of one nature ought not to be predicated of the other nature considered in abstraction, lest from this it be understood that the divine and human nature are one essence. For what is predicated of another in abstraction is not understood to belong to it only by reason of the *supposit*, but also by reason of the *form*. And therefore the aforesaid locution ought not to be received. And the reasons demonstrating this are to be conceded.

*(Solution of the contrary arguments.)* 1. To that word of Hilary it must be said that it has something of impropriety and ought to be expounded thus: the Son has nothing except what is born, that is, he has nothing which he did not receive by being born. And this was better explained in the first book.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Damascene, that the Virgin Mary is the God-bearer; it must be said that it must be conceded that God was born of the Virgin; yet from this it does not follow that the divine nature is born of the Virgin, for the reason that this name *God*, because it signifies in concretion, supposits for the person; not so the divine nature, which signifies in abstraction. Whence this too is conceded: God begets; although this is not conceded: the divine nature or essence begets. Whence in all such processes there is a fallacy *of accident*. For the divine nature is signified in one way by this name *God*, and in another by this name *nature*; therefore that authority compels nothing.

3. *(Note.)* To that which is objected, that the divine nature is said to be conceived and born; it must be said that, as the Master says in the text, Augustine there extends the name *nature* so that it stands in place of *person*; and this indeed he does many times. But common usage does not admit such a manner of speaking; therefore from such an authority one ought not to argue, but rather it ought to be expounded.

4. To that which is objected, that the incarnation is the way to the nativity; it must be said that it is true: to the nativity of the *person*, which is the supposit of the assumed nature; but it is not necessary that it be the way to the nativity of the *nature*. For the incarnation does not effect a communication of idioms by reason of a coinciding in *nature*, but rather by reason of a coinciding in *person*.

5. To that which is objected, that to assume flesh is to be born in the womb; it must be said that it is true, insofar as *to assume* is the same as *to receive into the unity of oneself*, and in this way it is proper to the person. But insofar as *to assume* is said of the divine nature, it is taken *more broadly*; and in this way *to assume* is not the same as *to be born in the womb*, but rather *to be united to flesh*.

6. To that which is objected, that fortitude was weakened, and so of the others; it must be said that those words are not to be drawn into a consequence. For it is conceded that something is said by one who wishes to excite devotion and to lift up into admiration, which nevertheless would be censured in one who inquires into the propriety and truth of catholic speech. — *(Another solution.)* It could also be answered otherwise, that it is not similar. For although this name *essence* or *nature* does not supposit for the person; nevertheless *appropriated* names, such as *power and wisdom*, supposit for the person and render the locution true. Whence the sense is: fortitude was weakened, that is, the person to whom fortitude is appropriated, namely Christ, who is *the power of God and the wisdom of God*, namely the Word of the Father, to whom it belongs to be the power of God and the wisdom of God. And therefore, although such predicates befit and are attributed to appropriated names, it nevertheless does not follow that they can be attributed to the essence or nature properly and truly.