Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/8/q/bon-sent-III-d8-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether to be born of the Virgin is truly said of the assumed nature.*

Secondly it is asked whether to be born of the Virgin is truly said of the assumed [human] nature. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. *(Foundations)* That which it belongs to to beget, it belongs to to be begotten, though not as the same in number; but to beget is an act of the nature itself: therefore also to be begotten. But that which it belongs to to be begotten, it belongs to to be born: therefore if to be begotten befits the assumed nature, it befits it to be born of the Virgin.

2. Likewise, it follows well: this one begets this man, therefore [begets] a man; but to say "this man" is to say a person, whereas "man" [says] a nature: therefore it follows well that, if the person is born, the nature is born.

3. Likewise, everything that begins to be begins to be by some kind of change; but the human nature in Christ begins to be; nor is there any kind of change to be assigned other than that of generation: therefore it was conceived and born.

4. Likewise, Christ was born of the Virgin either by reason of the supposit or by reason of the nature; but not by reason of the supposit, because that is eternal: therefore by reason of the nature: therefore the human nature is properly said to be born of the Virgin.

**On the contrary:** 1. *(To the opposite)* As the divine nature is related to the eternal nativity, so the human nature [is related] to the temporal nativity; but the divine nature is not born by an eternal nativity: therefore neither is the human nature in Christ [born] by a temporal nativity.

2. Likewise, a nativity is terminated at nothing except a complete being; but a complete being says a person: therefore generation is not terminated at a nature, but at a person.

3. Likewise, an act and operation is terminated only at a "this something": therefore if a "this something" does not say a nature, but rather a hypostasis, it seems that the human nature in Christ ought not to be said to be born or conceived.

4. Likewise, the human nature says at once flesh and soul; but just as the flesh is by propagation, so also the soul is by creation: therefore just as this is not admitted, that the human nature in Christ comes into being by creation, so it ought not to be conceded that it comes into being by generation: therefore this does not seem to be admissible: the human nature is born.

### *(Conclusion)*

> It must be conceded that the human nature in Christ was born of the Virgin.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the human nature can be taken in two ways (*Distinction*): in one way by reason of its constituent parts, in another way by reason of the common form following upon the whole composite. And in both ways it is true to say [it] (*Prior conclusion*). For it is true that the human nature assumed by the Word assumed flesh and soul; it is also true that it assumed the form following upon the composition, namely humanity.

In each of the aforesaid ways also it occurs to say that the human nature is born of the Virgin (*General conclusion*). For if the human nature be called the composite, in this way it can be conceded that it is born of the Virgin, not by reason of the whole, but of a part, namely of the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin and came forth from the womb of the Virgin (*Member 1*). — But if the human nature be called the common form, following upon the whole composite, in this way it can be conceded that it was furthermore born in Christ, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the supposit, in which it has to exist, and also in which it has to be multiplied (*Member 2*). On account of which the Philosopher also says that "in the production of such a form nature has to work hiddenly"; for in begetting
this man, it begets a man. — Thus, therefore, it must be conceded that the human nature in Christ was born of the Virgin in either of the aforesaid ways. But in one way it is said to be born by reason of the constitutive part, by synecdoche (*Corollary*); in another way by reason of the subjective part; and thus in a certain manner per accidens. — Therefore the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded, although some of them proceed sophistically (*Note*).

1. *(Solution of the opposing arguments)* To that which is objected, that the divine nature in Christ is not born, therefore neither is the human; it must be said that it is not alike, because the divine nature is not multiplied in supposits, but is one in the one begetting and the one begotten; and therefore it does not receive a distinguishing term. But the human nature has to be multiplied and pluralized in parent and in offspring. Hence it is that generation in divine things is terminated at a person; in creatures not only at a person, but also at a nature (*Note*).

2. 3. But to that which is objected, that generation is terminated at a complete being; it must be said that it is true per se and primarily; yet from this it does not follow that it cannot be terminated at a nature, but that it is not terminated at a nature with the hypostasis set aside; and this indeed is true. — And by this the reply to the next [objection] is clear (*Note*).

4. To that which is objected last, that the soul comes into being by creation; it must be said that, although only a part of the man is propagated, namely the flesh, nevertheless the whole man is said to be born and begotten, for the reason that the intention of nature is not terminated at the one part per se, but inasmuch as it has to be joined and perfected from the other. And therefore the whole man is said to be born, although he is propagated only from the one part; for a man does not intend to beget flesh, but a man. — But if it be asked why it is not said to come into being by creation, as [it does] by generation (*An incidental question is solved*); it must be said that generation does not exclude a preceding creation; but creation, since it is from nothing, excludes another production, inasmuch as it says the proximate and immediate eduction of the creature.

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