Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/8/q/bon-sent-III-d8-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether "man" is truly said of the divine nature.*

Thirdly it is asked whether "man" is truly said of the divine nature. And that it is so, it seems.

*(The grounds.)*

1. This is true: the divine nature is the person of the Son of God, on account of the supreme simplicity and identity that is in God; but of whatever the Son of God is predicated, "man" is predicated: therefore this is true: the divine nature is man.

2. Likewise, man is the divine nature; this is true, because some man, namely Christ, is the divine essence or nature: therefore, by simple conversion, the divine nature is man.

3. Likewise, "God" and "the divine nature" are convertible, therefore of whatever the one is predicated, the other is too; but this is true: God is man: therefore this is true: the divine nature is man.

4. Likewise, either the divine nature is man, or not-man. If it is man, I have what was proposed; if it is not-man — but the Son of God is the divine nature: therefore the Son of God is not-man. But if this is impossible, it remains that this is true: the divine nature is man.

**On the contrary:** *(To the opposite.)*

1. As the human nature stands to being God, so the divine stands to being man; but this is simply false: the human nature is God: therefore this also is simply false: the divine nature is man.

2. Likewise, of whatever "to be man" is predicated, "to be mortal" is predicated: therefore if the divine nature is man, the divine nature is mortal.

3. Likewise, of whatever "man" is predicated, humanity is in it; but in whatever humanity is, it is informed by humanity: therefore "man" is predicated only of that with respect to which humanity is a form. But humanity is not the form of the divine nature: therefore this is simply false: the divine nature is man.

4. Likewise, if the divine nature is man, it is either by reason of the essence or by reason of the person. Not by reason of the essence, because the essences of humanity and of divinity are simply distinct; not by reason of the person, because the nature does not stand for the person, as was said above in the first book: therefore this is simply false: the divine nature is man.

> **Conclusion.** The locution "*the divine nature is man*" can be conceded only if it is predicated by reason of the supposit.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was held in the first book, in divine matters one finds predication by identity and by denomination *(twofold predication)*, although not altogether wholly properly. Now predication by denomination differs from predication by identity, because, when something is predicated in a denominative manner, it is predicated under the aspect of a form; as when one says: the Father generates. But when the predication is by identity, it can be predicated by reason of the supposit; as when one says: the divine essence is the Father, the sense is: the divine essence is He who is the Father. And in this way nothing is predicated by reason of the supposit except that noun which encloses within itself its own supposit, such as a substantive noun, or one made substantive. This twofold mode of predicating, therefore, we find in divine matters according to the catholic manner of speaking: that something be predicated by reason of the form, something by reason of the supposit.

*(Conclusion 1.)* When, therefore, it is asked whether the divine nature is man, a distinction must be made, because this term *man* can be understood to be predicated in two ways: for if it is understood to be predicated by reason of the supposit, then it is true, and the sense is: the divine essence is man, that is, the divine essence is He who is man; and this predication is reduced to the predication that is by identity as regards the principal composition; but as regards the implication, the predication by union is enclosed there. For the divine essence is the Son of God by identity; but the Son of God is man by union.

*(Conclusion 2.)* — But if the predication is made by reason of the form or through the manner of a certain denomination, it is false; and the sense is: the divine nature is man, that is, the divine nature is informed by humanity. And in this way the locution is false, although according to the prior sense it has truth, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

**To the arguments:** *(Solution of the opposing arguments.)*

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected first, that as the human nature stands to being God, etc.; it must be said that it is false, for this reason: that the human nature is not predicated of its own hypostasis by identity, as the divine is predicated on account of the supreme simplicity *(note)*. Hence this is false: Christ is the human nature; although this is true: Christ is the divine nature. And therefore it does not follow, if this is false: the human nature is God, that this is false: the divine nature is man.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that of whatever "to be man" is predicated, "to be mortal" is predicated; it must be said that this is true as regards the predication by which "man" is predicated by the manner of denominating *(distinction)*. But as regards the predication by which it is predicated by reason of the supposit, it does not hold true. For "man," since it is a substantive noun, can be predicated by reason of the supposit; but "mortal," since it is an adjectival noun, taken adjectivally sets its own thing about that of which it is predicated *(note)*. And just as it does not follow: the divine essence is the Father, therefore the divine essence generates; so it does not follow: the divine essence is man, therefore it dies or is born.

*To 3.* To that, however, which is objected, that of whatever "man" is predicated, humanity is in it; it must be said that it is true of that mode of predication by which it is predicated by reason of the form; but not of that by which it is predicated by reason of the supposit; for then it is not signified that humanity is in that of which it is predicated, but that it is in something which has identity with that of which it is predicated.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that this is not true by reason of the substance or of the person: the divine nature is man; it must be said that, although the divine nature does not stand for the person, "man" can nonetheless stand for the person, while the divine nature is made subject by reason of itself; so that it has truth by reason of both: by reason of the one on the part of the subject, by reason of the other on the part of the predicate, namely by reason of the person.

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