Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/9/q/bon-sent-III-d9-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On latria itself according to what it is.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely, concerning latria itself according to what it is. And concerning this, four things are asked.

First it is asked, whether latria is in the genus of virtue.

Second, whether it is a general virtue, or a special one.

Third it is asked, whether latria is a cardinal virtue, or a theological one.

Fourth it is asked, whether it is a virtue distinct from dulia.

### Question I. *Whether latria is in the genus of virtue.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether latria is in the genus of virtue. And that it is, seems [to be the case]:

1. To render to a man what is his own is an act of virtue (*Fundamenta*): therefore, if it is of greater or equal dignity to render to God what is His own, then it will be an act of virtue. But through latria we render to God what is His own, namely reverence and honor: therefore latria is a virtue.

2. Likewise, virtue consists especially about works praiseworthy and difficult: but to worship God is an act of this kind, and this belongs to latria itself: therefore latria is a virtue.

3. Likewise, virtue is most necessary about works meritorious of eternal life; but to worship and adore God is meritorious of eternal life, and this belongs to latria itself: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, virtue has its being especially about works of precept; but to worship and adore God is under a precept: therefore about this virtue most of all has its being; and this belongs to latria itself: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary** (*Ad oppositum*): 1. Augustine, in the tenth book of the City of God: « Latria, always, or frequently, is called the service which pertains to the worship of God »; but every virtue, insofar as it is a virtue, consists in free will: therefore no virtue is a service. But latria is a service: therefore latria is not a virtue.

2. Likewise, latria is commonly defined: « Latria is the worship owed and rendered to God alone », and it is taken from the words of Augustine, in the same place; but worship is not a habit, but a use: if therefore latria is worship, it is not a virtue or a habit, but a motion.

3. Likewise, latria is the same as piety, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the City of God: « Piety is properly wont to be called the worship of God, which the Greeks call *theosebia* »; but piety is contained among the habits of the gifts: therefore it seems that latria is rather a gift than a habit of virtue.

4. Likewise, it belongs to latria to revere God; but the gift of fear makes us revere God — for fear is [the fear] of reverence — therefore it seems that either latria is superfluous, or it is the same as fear: therefore latria is not a virtue.

> ### Conclusion.
> Latria, understood as a habit, is a habit of virtue.

**I respond:** It must be said that latria, as Augustine holds, names that by which God is worshipped; and that by which God is worshipped can be understood in two ways (*Worship of God is understood in two ways*): either as in act, or as in habit. Therefore the name *latria* is said equivocally and sometimes stands for the habit, sometimes for the act. But according as it stands for the habit of the soul itself, disposing it to the worship of God, it is thus a habit of virtue, inasmuch as it is concerned with the good and the difficult and the meritorious and the necessary for salvation; and it is about works of this kind that the habit of virtue especially consists (*Conclusion*). — And therefore the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the objections:**

1. To that, then, which is objected, that latria is a service; it must be said that there is a service by which one serves a man, and there is a service by which one serves God (*Solution of the opposing arguments. Fourfold service*); and again, there is a service of necessity, and there is a service which is from mere will. It must be said, therefore, that that service which is rendered to a man out of necessity (*Note*) in some way derogates from man's liberty; and therefore it does not have in itself the excellence of virtue. The service which is rendered to God out of mere will places man in a higher state, and makes man so much the more free as it removes man further from sin. And such is the service of latria. And therefore such a service in no way prevents latria from having the character of a complete virtue.

2. To that which is objected, that latria is the worship owed to God alone (*Note*); it must be said that habits are often defined and made known through acts; but this is not by essential predication, but by causal; and therefore it does not follow that latria, if it be worship, is not a habit. — Yet it could be said, as before, that latria is taken sometimes for the act, sometimes for the habit (*Another solution*), as this is frequently found in the habits and acts of the soul, which have one common name. Hence the Philosopher sometimes takes the name *intellect* for the habit, sometimes for the potency; similarly Anselm [takes] the *will*; in the same way Augustine and other doctors use the name *latria*.

3. To that which is objected, that latria is the same as piety; it must be said that, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the City of God, piety is said in three ways (*Piety is said in three ways*). In one way piety is the same as *theosebia*, and thus it is the same as the worship of God; in another way piety is called the office shown to parents; in a third way piety is called the mercy which is shown to one's neighbors in works. And of these it is said according to prior and posterior and according to a certain account of analogy, according as it is said in the same place, because in all of them there is the worship of God; yet it is said principally of the divine worship, that is, of that virtue by which God is worshipped. And thus it is plain that piety, according to its diverse acceptations, can be the same as latria and can differ from latria. — But when it is said that piety is a gift, the name of piety is used equivocally. For there piety is not taken for that virtue by which God is worshipped.

4. To that which is objected, that to revere God belongs to fear; it must be said that reverence is found both in honor and in fear, because in fear there is a recoiling into one's own smallness; but in honor there is a testifying or exhibiting on the part of one who testifies to and professes that majesty. But the reverence which belongs to latria is rather of honor than of fear. — And thus it is plain how it differs from fear, and why also latria is not a gift, as fear is (*Note*). For it has rather the character of a virtue, since latria consists in exhibition, fear in recoiling; and thus latria consists more in action, fear in passion. And this is one difference of the gifts from the virtues, as will be made plain below.