Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/9/q/bon-sent-III-d9-a2-q4
----------------------------------------
### Question IV. *Whether latria is a virtue distinct from dulia.*

Fourthly it is asked whether latria is a virtue distinct from dulia. And that it is not, it seems.

1. (*For the opposite.*) On that verse of the Psalm: *O Lord my God, in thee have I hoped*; the Gloss: « Lord of all by power, to whom dulia is owed; God of all by creation, to whom latria is owed »: therefore if to the Lord God only a single species of adoration is owed, namely latria: therefore latria and dulia are not diverse species of virtue.

2. Likewise, it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be believed is believed, namely faith itself: therefore it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be venerated is venerated; but latria and dulia are of this kind: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be loved is loved, namely charity itself: therefore by the same reasoning it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be adored is adored; but latria and dulia are of this kind: therefore etc. If you should say that the case is not alike, because there is not one account of things adorable as of things lovable; it is objected on the contrary: that, just as one's neighbor is not to be loved except insofar as he is the image of God, so too he is not to be adored except insofar as he is the image of God: therefore, just as there is one love of oneself and of one's image according to species, so too there is one honor.

4. Likewise, « more and less do not diversify the species »; but latria and dulia differ as greater honor and lesser honor: therefore it seems that they are not diverse species of virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Foundations.*) On that verse of the Psalm: *Adore his footstool* etc.; « Latria is the adoration which is owed to God alone; dulia is the adoration which is offered even to a creature. This has two species: one which is offered to all indifferently, the other which is offered to the humanity of Christ alone ». If therefore dulia, which is owed to a creature, has two species of adoration, much more strongly are latria and dulia diverse species of virtue.

2. Likewise, « habits are diversified by acts, and acts by objects »: therefore if latria is the worship owed to God as God, and dulia the worship owed to a creature as it is a creature; it seems that latria is a species of virtue distinct from dulia.

3. Likewise, wisdom and knowledge are diverse gifts, according to which we are directed to temporal and eternal things: if therefore latria is the worship owed to the eternal majesty, and dulia the honor and reverence owed to a temporal creature; it seems that they are diverse habits in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, if honor were rendered to a creature by the same mode by which it is rendered to the Creator; it would then no longer be an act of virtue, but rather of vice — for if anyone sacrificed to a man, he would commit the crime of idolatry and would be reproached for idolatry rather than commended for an act of latria or of dulia — therefore if a diversity of modes in the acts of the virtues introduces a diversity in the habits, it seems that latria and dulia differ by a specific difference.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Latria and dulia, according to their proper signification, are diverse species of virtue.

**I respond:** It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that although the name latria, according to Augustine in *On the City of God*, book ten, signifies the worship owed to the divine majesty, the name dulia nevertheless (*Dulia is said in three ways.*) is said in three ways. In one way dulia is said according to a certain analogy; in another way according to antonomasia; and in a third way according to its proper signification. When it is said (*Dulia according to analogy.*) according to analogy, it then signifies the worship owed to a superior nature, whether creature or Creator, according to some account by which the Creator communicates with a creature, namely according to the account of lordship; and in this way it is taken in the Gloss on that verse of the Psalm: *In the churches bless God the Lord*, the Gloss: « God, to whom latria is owed; Lord, to whom dulia is owed ». — When, however, it is taken (*Dulia according to antonomasia.*) according to antonomasia, then it signifies the due reverence to a united or assumed creature; in which manner it is taken on that verse of the Psalm: *Adore his footstool*, where it is said that a greater dulia is owed to the humanity of Christ alone. — When, however, dulia is taken according to (*Dulia properly.*) its proper signification, then dulia is said to be the honor or reverence owed to a rational creature and offered to it; and in that way dulia is wont to be taken according to common usage.

And in this way the question is whether latria and dulia are diverse species of virtue; and to this it is (*Conclusion.*) commonly answered that they are. — And the reason for this is (*Reason.*) that latria and dulia regard exterior worships, which

have a formal difference, according as they are offered to a creature and to the Creator. For there is one mode of adoring the Creator, and another of adoring a creature, and another motive account; and therefore another directive virtue in the one and in the other. And therefore it must be conceded that latria and dulia are diverse virtues. — The reasons adduced for this are also to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

1. (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) To that which is objected on the contrary from the Gloss, it must be said that dulia is there taken according to its general signification and analogy, according to which it is common to latria and to dulia properly so called. — And if you ask (*An incidental question is resolved.*) why it says rather that latria is owed to God and dulia to the Lord, since God and Lord are the same; it must be said that "lord" is communicated to a creature and is said of the Creator and of a creature analogically. God, however, is not so communicated; but if it be said of the Creator and a creature, it is said equivocally. And for this reason it says that latria is owed to God, and dulia to the Lord, not so as to signify that He is to be adored by one species of adoration insofar as He is God, and by another insofar as He is Lord, but so that the difference of these terms may be known, and at the same time, along with the difference, it suggests their agreement.

2. To that which is objected, that there is one virtue by which all things to be believed are believed; it must be said (*Note.*) that this is true of things to be believed which have one account moving to belief in itself, namely the highest truth, of which kind are the articles of faith. But if the things to be believed had diverse accounts — as when I believe a man because he is truthful, and God because He is truthful — these faiths are not necessarily of the same account nor species. For one is the faith which is a theological virtue; another, which pertains rather to the genus of cardinal virtue, which indeed is more properly to be called fidelity than faith. And since latria and dulia consider diverse accounts of honoring in the Creator and in a creature; hence it is that rather, if one attends well, they are diverse virtues than one.

3. To that which is objected, that all things lovable are loved by the same charity; it must be said that this is because charity has one principal object, namely the highest good, which indeed it loves, whether by loving God in Himself or by wishing good to a neighbor, who is the image of God. Latria and dulia, however, regard one worship and mode and another; and therefore the case is not alike concerning love and adoration, nor concerning the account of the image on the one side and the other. And that will be better made manifest below, when charity is treated.

4. To that which is objected, that more and less do not diversify the species; it must be said that this has an exception, and does not hold true as regards species in the genus of morals. Moreover, it does not hold true except when there is no other difference than by more and less; but it is not so in the present case; for latria and dulia do not differ only as to intensity and remission, but also as to one mode of worship and another. — Concerning which mode, I say, many more things could still be asked; but let these suffice, lest we stray too far from the intention of the Master; for in all the foregoing the ground of discussion can sufficiently be drawn from the things said in the text.