Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/1/q/bon-sent-IV-d1-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *On the signification of the Sacraments.*

In the second place inquiry is made concerning the Sacraments with respect to signification; and that signification belongs to the essence or integrity of a Sacrament is shown as follows:

1. *First*, by the definition or description which the Master sets down in the text: "A Sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing."

2. Likewise, Hugh in the book *On the Sacraments*: "A Sacrament is a material element representing by likeness, signifying by institution": therefore a Sacrament has its *being* from institution and is instituted in order to signify: therefore to signify is essential to it.

3. Likewise, the Sacraments were instituted "for our instruction," as Hugh says, and the Master touches upon in the text; but not for the instruction of corporeal things: therefore for the instruction of spiritual things. But the Sacraments are corporeal and do not lead into spiritual things except by way of signifying, because by offering themselves to the senses they cause something else to come into knowledge: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a Sacrament is an element; either therefore a pure corporeal element, or one that together with this also says something spiritual. Not *purely corporeal*, this is established: therefore together with this it says something *spiritual*. That spiritual thing, therefore, is either united to it according to *truth*, or according to *intention*; but not according to *truth* — this is established, since it is not capable of it, as will be proved below — therefore according to *intention*. But to be united according to intention is to be united as the thing signified is united to the sign: therefore signification itself belongs to the integrity of the Sacraments.

**On the contrary:**
1. The Sacraments are principally instituted for healing; but for some medicine to be curative, the fact that it signifies the cure contributes nothing, but it suffices only that it cure: therefore a Sacrament can be a perfect medicine even without signification: therefore signification does not belong to the integrity of a Sacrament.

2. Likewise, if a Sacrament is a medicine, a Sacrament is in some way a cause; but a cause is not the sign of an effect, but rather the thing signified: therefore it belongs to a Sacrament rather to be signified than to signify.

3. Likewise, if a sign belongs to the integrity of a Sacrament; therefore what does not signify is not a Sacrament, and what does not signify to someone, to the one to whom it does not signify, is not a Sacrament; but the Sacrament of baptism signifies nothing to an infant: therefore to an infant it is not a Sacrament: therefore while an infant receives baptism, he does not receive a Sacrament. But this is absurd: therefore a sign does not belong to the integrity of a Sacrament.

4. Likewise, if it is a sign, then it is either *demonstrative*, or *prognostic*, or *commemorative*; it cannot be anything but *demonstrative*, since it effects what it figures, or at least, if it does not effect it, since sign and thing signified are relatives, they are simultaneous by nature: therefore if the sign is present, so also is the thing signified. But it is not *demonstrative*, as it seems, because, if it were this — since it would demonstrate grace to be present, and yet it not be present — then it would seem to be a false sign: therefore also a false Sacrament.

5. Likewise, if it is a sign, it is either *natural* or *voluntary*. If *natural*: therefore the Sacraments are from nature; and if this — since what is natural is the same among all — then therefore the Sacrament also is; which is certainly false. If *voluntary*: therefore, since voluntary things are increased and diminished all day long, as is evident in expressions, therefore by the same reasoning it seems that the Sacraments can be changed at will. — If you should say that they are voluntary signs because they are from the divine will; but so too are the other created things, and everything that is under heaven: therefore on this account they ought not to be called voluntary signs; or if so, then by the same reasoning the other created things also.

### Conclusion.

> Signification belongs to the essence of the Sacraments.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that sacramental medicine has signification of its integrity, and this is common and essential to all the Sacraments.

Now the reason for this, as I believe, is this: that sacramental medicine is a *sufficient* remedy; since therefore fallen man has fallen not only into the proneness of concupiscence, but also into the blindness of ignorance: therefore, in order that he be healed in both by the Sacrament, the Sacrament ought to have not only something *gratuitous*, but also something *mystical*, and thus figurative and significative. — Again, since it is a sufficient medicine of itself, it carries with it its own *preparatory*. Hence, just as bodily medicine does not profit unless the recipient is prepared, so it is necessary that it be done spiritually; and since faith disposes a man, so that the Sacraments are salutary to him; and the movement of faith is aroused through the exhibition of the sign, so that it seeks the thing signified; and through this a man is disposed to healing: therefore, as an efficacious and sufficient medicine, sacramental medicine has signification of its integrity; and thus, speaking essentially, a Sacrament is a sign.

1. And through this is evident the response to the first argument, which objects concerning bodily medicine: since it is not similar, as is now evident.

2. To that which is objected, that a cause is not the sign of an effect: it must be said that this is true when the relation of signifying follows the relation of causing; but in the Sacraments it precedes. — Or otherwise it must be said that this is true in those things which have truly and properly the character of cause and effect; for a true

cause is prior by nature, and therefore more remote from our senses; and because signification is through that which is near to us, we therefore signify the cause through the effect, not the reverse. But this is not true in the matter at hand. For since the Sacrament does not truly have the character of cause, nor grace the character of effect; therefore grace is more sublime and more remote from our senses, and the corporeal is nearer to us: therefore rightly is grace signified through it, not the reverse. But that proposition holds in the case of a true cause.

3. To that which is objected, that a Sacrament does not signify to an infant; it must be said that a sign has a twofold relation: both to that which it signifies, and to that to whom it signifies; and the first is essential and has it always in act, but the second it has in habit; and from the first it is called a *sign*, not from the second. Hence the hoop over a tavern is always a sign, even if no one looks at it; so a Sacrament is always a sign, although no one knows it. But still it is not yet resolved, because, although it is a sign, nevertheless it does not signify *to this one*. Therefore it must be said that, just as another's faith suffices for the infant, so it suffices that it be signified to the infant himself in another: hence although it does not signify to him in itself, it nevertheless signifies in another.

4. To that which is objected, under which genus of sign it is contained; it must be said that some Sacraments signified what was *future*, as the legal ones; some what was *past*, as our Sacraments, which signify the past Passion, as the Gloss says upon that text to the Romans, chapter six: *You are buried together* etc.: "Whatever was done on the cross of Christ is figured in these things not only as spoken, but also as enacted"; it speaks of the Sacraments. They are also *demonstrative* signs, because they signify what they give; hence they have a twofold signification, namely *proper* and *allegorical*: proper with respect to the *present*, but allegorical with respect to the *past*. — As to what is therefore objected, that sign and thing signified are simultaneous by nature; it must be said that this is true under the character of *sign*, but it is not necessary that they be simultaneous under the character of the *underlying thing*, since this intention of signs does not posit it, except that the soul be present to the thing. — Likewise, as to what is objected, that if they are demonstrative, then they are false; it must be said that a sign has a twofold truth, as Anselm says: one from *institution*, the other from *use*. From institution, because it is imposed for signifying this; and this truth cannot be changed. The other truth is according to *use*, namely when it signifies that for which it was instituted, through use, and this truth it loses. The sacramental sign therefore, as to the first, is always true; likewise as to the second it is always true, so far as it is on the part of itself or even of the giver, but it is impeded only on the part of the recipient: therefore the Sacrament is not falsified, but the one who receives badly is judged false and feigned.

5. To that which is objected, that it is neither natural nor voluntary; it must be said that a Sacrament has the *aptitude* for signifying from nature, but it has the *actuality* from institution. Hence Hugh says that "there are three things in a Sacrament: *likeness* from creation, *signification* from institution, *sanctification* from benediction. The first is bestowed by the Creator, the second adjoined by the Savior, the third administered by the dispenser." — As to what is therefore objected, that what is voluntary to God is natural to us; it must be said that this is true, if He gives the thing that not only so that it be in it, but also that it be from it, so that it be from the principles of the subject; and because such a ground is not in the Sacraments, therefore they are truly and properly voluntary. — And thus it is evident that they are signs, and in what manner they signify.

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