Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/1/q/bon-sent-IV-d1-p1-a1-q4
----------------------------------------
### Question IV. *On the efficacy of the Sacraments.*

Fourth, it is asked whether the Sacraments are effective of grace. And that they are, it seems:

1. Because this difference is assigned between the Sacraments of the new law and the Sacraments of the old law, that the former produce an effect, the latter only prefigure; but what produces an effect is an efficient cause: therefore the Sacraments of the new law are effective of grace.

2. Likewise, Hugh says, "that the Sacraments of the new law, the blessing being first infused into them, sanctify"; and elsewhere he says that they are "sanctifying from sanctification"; but the soul is not sanctified except through grace: therefore they produce grace itself in the soul.

3. Likewise, the Master in the definition of a Sacrament in the text says that "a Sacrament is that which bears a likeness and exists as a cause"; but not as a *formal* nor *final* nor *material* cause, as was shown above: therefore *by division* it is an *efficient* cause.

4. Likewise, the same seems so by *reasoning*, because a sign instituted by human institution can engender in us spiritual cognition and affection, as a hoop before a house engenders cognition in the soul of a passer-by that there is wine there; and the gibbet and the signs of war engender fear: therefore if divine institution is much more powerful than human, and the Sacraments are signs according to divine institution; they can engender in us a much nobler effect: therefore they can produce grace.

5. Likewise, "opposites are by nature produced about the same thing"; whence nothing is susceptible of fault unless it is susceptible of grace, and conversely: since therefore the flesh, which is something corporeal, can be so vitiated as to produce and generate fault in the soul to which it is united; therefore a corporeal Sacrament will be able to be so sanctified as to transmit grace: nothing therefore prevents it from producing in the soul spiritual grace.

6. Likewise, just as in the generation of flesh there is a begetter and one begotten and further that by means of which the generation takes place; so in spiritual regeneration there is the regenerator, Christ, the regenerated man, and that by means of which the regeneration takes place, namely the Sacrament: therefore just as the seed, which was the means in carnal generation, transmits fault, by the same reasoning the Sacrament transmits grace, which makes [one] a son; but it does not transmit it essentially: therefore it transmits it causally. If you say that it is not similar, because it is easier to do ill or to vitiate than to do well; this is nothing: for Adam was never more powerful for evil, or his fault, than Christ is more powerful for good, and His passion; but Adam by his fault was able to vitiate all flesh: therefore Christ by His passion was able so to sanctify the Sacraments that they, being sanctified, should sanctify souls and give grace.

7. Likewise, Anselm says in *On the Virginal Conception* that "if Adam had stood, he would have transmitted original righteousness"; but this could not be except by means of corporeal flesh: therefore much more can Christ, by means of a corporeal Sacrament, transmit gratuitous righteousness.

**On the contrary:**
1. Every *efficient* cause is nobler than its effect, and nothing corporeal is nobler than anything spiritual: since therefore grace is spiritual, [and] the Sacrament corporeal, as Hugh says; no Sacrament is an efficient cause of grace itself.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text says that "grace is not *from them*, but *through them*": therefore it seems that they are not as channels, [but] not as a fount: therefore they are not an efficient cause of grace, just as channels are not [the efficient cause] of water.

3. Likewise, Hugh says that "grace is not *from* the Sacraments themselves, but *in* them"; but it is established that *in them* signifies the efficient cause, as is plain there: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, upon that [verse] of the Psalm: *I will bless the Lord, who has given me understanding*; the Gloss says: "God through Himself irradiates pious minds": therefore since that irradiation takes place through the light of grace, it is established that grace is from God immediately: therefore not from the Sacraments.

5. Likewise, "virtue is that which God works in us without us": if therefore He does not work virtue in us through a subjected creature, consequently neither [does He work] grace.

6. Likewise, order ought to be observed among agents: therefore God ought not to flow into a more noble thing through a less noble one; but the soul is nobler than the Sacrament: therefore God does not flow grace into the soul through the Sacrament: therefore grace is from God alone *effectively*. If therefore the Sacrament is a cause of grace, this is only *dispositively*.

*It is asked therefore whether the Sacrament is a cause* disposing *to grace. That it is, it seems:*

1. Because if the Sacraments of the new law were only a cause *without which not*, then they would not differ in the manner of causing from the Sacraments of the old law, and they would be a burden; but this is unfitting: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, both Hugh and the Master in the text, and also others, say that God regenerates the soul through the Sacraments: therefore the Sacrament is a means of the divine action upon the soul; but every means of acting either *transmits virtue* or *disposes*; but the Sacrament does not *transmit*: therefore it *disposes*.

3. Likewise, "the Sacraments are spiritual medicines"; but corporeal medicine disposes to corporeal health: therefore spiritual medicine disposes to spiritual health.

4. Likewise, if they disposed nothing nor cooperated toward the health of the soul, salvation could come about equally well without them as with them: therefore what is imposed on us in the new law would rather have to be called burdens than medicines, and the new law a law of burden, not of sweetness.

**But on the contrary:**
1. A disposition precedes that to which it disposes, not only by nature, but also in time; but the reception of the Sacrament and the infusion of grace are simultaneous in time: therefore the Sacrament does not dispose to grace.

2. Likewise, grace is created out of nothing and suddenly, therefore it needs nothing disposing toward this, that it should be: therefore the Sacraments do not dispose to grace. — *If you say* that they do not dispose to this, that grace should *be*, but to this, that it should *be in* the soul itself, whence they make the soul itself fit by disposing it to the reception of grace; *on the contrary*: the *being* of grace is its *being-in*, since it is an accident: therefore if it has no disposition toward this, that it should *be*, neither [has it any] toward this, that it should *be in*.

3. Likewise, if the Sacraments dispose and make fit the soul, then they flow into it; but no corporeal thing flows into any spiritual thing: therefore the Sacraments, since they are corporeal, do not flow into the soul: therefore they do not make it fit nor *dispose* it.

*If you say* perhaps that in the Sacraments themselves there is some *spiritual virtue*, through which they flow into the soul; it is asked therefore by reason of this whether in the Sacraments there is some virtue through which they flow into the soul itself. And that there is not, it seems:

1. Because that virtue is either a *substance* or an *accident*. If a *substance*, then either God, or an Angel, or the soul; that it is none of these is certain, because if that virtue is of the Sacrament, then God is of the Sacrament. If an *accident*, but no *spiritual* accident is in a *corporeal* subject: therefore either that virtue is *corporeal*, and so will not flow [into the soul]; or if it is *spiritual*, it is not in the Sacrament.

2. Likewise, that virtue is a *good*, this is established; therefore it is either a *great* good, or a *middling* one, or a *small* one, as Augustine divides. Not among the *greater* [goods], because then it would be grace; nor a gratuitous virtue, which is in the soul alone; not *middling*, because such are the powers of the soul: therefore it is the *lowest* good. But this is a *corporeal* good: therefore that virtue is not *spiritual* and does not flow into the soul.

3. Likewise, no *corporeal* thing is received in a *spiritual* one *corporeally*, but only *spiritually*: therefore likewise no *spiritual* thing is received in a body *spiritually*, but *corporeally*: therefore that virtue, since it is in the Sacraments, is there *corporeally*, and so is not able to flow into the soul: therefore it is there in vain.

4. Likewise, "everything that is received in something is there according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received," as Boethius says: therefore that virtue is received in the corporeal Sacrament according to the mode of a body: therefore etc. — *If you say* that this is true, speaking naturally; but that virtue is there miraculously, and above nature; *on the contrary*: however much it be there above nature and in whatever manner, still it is more ignoble than the soul itself; therefore it does not flow into it: therefore if it is not posited for some other reason, it is manifest etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Bede says that "the Lord by the contact of His most pure flesh gave a regenerative power to the waters": therefore some power was conferred upon the waters themselves; but this could not be except created, because it was conferred upon a creature, and since it was for regenerating, it could not be except spiritual, because the virtue of a spiritual work is spiritual: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the third distinction: "What is the virtue of the water, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?" Therefore there is some virtue in the Sacrament by which the heart is cleansed: therefore a spiritual one.

3. Likewise, we see that the works of divine *justice* are done by the ministry of a corporeal creature, which has from God some power through which it can act upon the soul — otherwise it could not — as is plain in the fire of purgatory: therefore in the works of *mercy*, which are done through the Sacraments, it will be the case that the Sacraments have some virtue conferred upon them by God, through which they act upon the soul.

4. Likewise, we see that if someone contrite approaches baptism, even though grace is not conferred on him, because he already has it, nevertheless the remission of all punishment is conferred on him, which he did not have before: therefore baptism adds, over and above the conferral of grace, the remission of punishment: therefore there is some virtue in baptism besides the virtue of grace; by the same reasoning in the other Sacraments of the new law.

5. Likewise, if there were no virtue there, then the unfitting [consequence] often mentioned would return, that they would not differ from the Sacraments of the old law.

### Conclusion

> Probable is the opinion, with its reasons, first set down, that the Sacraments, with respect to grace that makes [one] pleasing, are a cause *without which not*; but with respect to the character and adornment, are an efficient cause; and finally, with respect to the efficacy of grace and the healing of the powers, are a disposing cause. Probable too is the other opinion, which denies that there was given to the Sacraments themselves an efficient virtue after the manner of an absolute, not a relative, quality.

**I respond:** Some wish to say that in the Sacraments there is some *created virtue* through which they flow into the soul and have an account of causing differently. For they say that in the Sacraments is given *grace that makes [one] pleasing*; there is also given in them *grace freely given*, as is the character and adornment of the soul; there is also given a *weakening of the tinder* [of sin] or an expediting of the powers, [and] this is the efficacy of grace. They say therefore that with respect to *grace that makes pleasing* they are as a cause *without which not*; with respect to the *characterization* and adornment they are as an *efficient* cause; with respect to that virtue, namely with respect to the *weakening of the tinder* or the strengthening of the powers, they are a *disposing* cause. — And this is manifest. For just as we see that in the purgation by the fire of purgatory there is the *soul* itself, purgeable, having guilt or a venial stain; there is *grace* within the soul, because without it the purgation would not take place; there is again the *virtue of the fire*: so in the Sacrament there is the *soul* having the defect and weakness of the powers; there is again *grace* working within the soul; there is again the *exterior virtue of the Sacrament*; and with these concurring the powers are strengthened and healed, and grace becomes more efficacious in its operation by means of the virtue of the Sacrament. Thus therefore they say that the Sacrament is a cause of grace as *without which not*, namely of [grace] *making pleasing*; is an *efficient* cause of the character and adornment; is a cause of the *efficacy* of grace and of the healing of the powers as *disposing*; and this through the virtue which is in the Sacrament itself, spiritual and conferred upon it by God. — These things seen, the response to the objections is manifest according to these [thinkers].

*Solution of the opposing [arguments] of the principal question.*
1, 2. For to that which is asked first, whether they are an *efficient* cause of grace that makes pleasing; they say, no. To that, then, which is objected concerning the difference between these Sacraments and those; they say that the difference is regarded by reason of the *characterization* and adornment and of the *efficacy of grace*. And thus they respond to that of Hugh, that it is understood of that sanctification.

3. Similarly they speak of that which the Master says, that it is a cause; nevertheless, if it be understood as to grace that makes pleasing, they say that it is a cause *without which not*. — *Otherwise* too they say that it can be said to be a *disposing* cause, either toward this, that [grace] *be in*, or toward this, that it be *efficacious*, and this by reason of the work *worked*; but it was not so in those [old] Sacraments.

4. To that which is objected, that a sign from human institution generates spiritual cognition and affection; they say that this is only *dispositively* or occasionally, not *effectively*; rather the soul itself, by conferring within itself, generates the cognition and affection; as is plain by a manifest example, that some see the gibbet and fear, others do not; nevertheless by this it cannot be shown that the Sacrament is an *efficient cause of grace*.

5. To that which is objected concerning the transmission of fault by means of the flesh, they say that just as *grace* is not in anything corporeal, so neither is *fault*. But nevertheless *viciousness* in the flesh can have an account of producing *fault* in the soul; not so [does] the *virtue of the Sacrament* [have an account of producing] *grace*. And the cause of this is that *grace* is an effect nobler than every corporeal virtue and is made out of nothing, and this belongs to God alone; but the effect of *fault* bespeaks ignobility and imperfection and defect. Therefore all those arguments which are made through the likeness of grace to fault are not valid.

6. To that which is objected, that Christ is more powerful for good; they say that it is true; nor however does it follow from this that, if Adam transmits fault by means of the flesh, Christ should transmit grace by means of the Sacrament. For this would be a disorder; *furthermore*, just as a creature cannot receive the power of creating, so neither [can it receive the power] of giving grace.

7. To that of Anselm they say that it is not understood that he would transmit righteousness by means of the flesh, but that all his posterity would have that righteousness from God, because there would be no impediment on the part of the flesh.

To that which is asked, whether the Sacrament is a *disposing* cause; they say that it is, as was touched upon; because it disposes to the *efficacy of grace*, by remitting the tinder which impedes the operation of grace; or, as was touched upon, it disposes to this, that *grace be in* the soul, although it does not dispose to this, that it *be*. And this is to say that grace is compared to the *efficient cause*, [and] is compared to the *receiving substance*. But the Sacrament does not dispose on the part of the *agent*, who is God, but on the part of the *receiver*, which is the soul.

2. And thus the response is plain to that which is objected, that grace is from nothing; for they say that the Sacrament does not dispose to grace by reason of that *out of which* [it is made], but by reason of that *in which it is received*.

*To the arguments for the negative part of the first lateral question.*
1. To that which is objected, that a disposition precedes that to which it disposes; they say that it does not always precede *in time*, as is plain in the disposition which is a *necessity* or in the ultimate disposition; thus the Sacrament worthily received disposes by the ultimate disposition, which is simultaneous *in time* with grace, but prior *in nature*, as on the part of the latter.

3. To that which is objected, that if it disposes, it flows in; they say that it *does flow in*. — To that, then, which is objected, that no corporeal thing flows into a spiritual one; they say that in the Sacrament there is some *spiritual virtue* through which it flows into the soul. Nevertheless that argument is not valid according to them, because in the soul to be cleansed one must consider the *substance* itself and the *stain* itself, from which it is cleansed; and although according to *substance* it is superior to every body, nevertheless by reason of the *stain* or defect it is inferior.

*To the arguments for the negative part of the second lateral question.*
To that which is asked, whether one is to posit in the Sacraments a created virtue; they say that one is.
1. To that, then, which is asked, whether a substance or an accident; they say, an *accident*. — To that which is again asked, whether a *corporeal* accident or a *spiritual* one; they say, a *spiritual* one. — To that which is objected afterward, that a spiritual accident is not in a corporeal subject; they say that this is true naturally, but the Sacrament itself has that virtue above nature according to the order of the divine mercy, just as

virtue is in the fire of purgatory above the nature of the fire according to the order of the divine justice. And what is more, on this account, because the Sacrament is not a natural subject or one according to nature; and therefore it is no wonder if it has a virtue above nature.

2. To that which is asked, whether it is a greatest good etc.; they say that that virtue is to be placed among *middling* goods, because it is below grace and above body. — *If you object* that such a good belongs to the soul's power; they say that Augustine does not exclude, on this account, that there be others; but he says that by way of example or by restricting the good to the human subject. — *But if you object* that it will not act or flow into the powers of the soul, since it is *middling*, and the influx is from a superior; they say that it does not flow into the powers by reason of the powers, but by reason of them as deficient through fault.

3. To that which is objected concerning the reception of a spiritual substance; they say that it is not similar: because, if a *spiritual* substance were to receive a corporeal thing corporeally, then a derogation would be done to that substance, nor would it be perfected in the reception; but if some *material* thing receives a spiritual one spiritually, no derogation would be done to it in anything.

4. To that which is objected, that everything which is received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver; they say that this is true of *natural* reception; but this is *above nature*. *Furthermore*, the Sacrament itself, as such, is a spiritual medicine; and therefore it ought to have a spiritual virtue. But in natural things *matter* is chiefly considered, whereas in divine things *the end* is chiefly and principally considered; therefore, because in the Sacraments the account of *matter* is not considered, but [that of] *the end*, it was fitting according to them to posit a spiritual virtue in them.

To the other [argument] it has, according to them, already been responded, that that virtue is nobler [and] the fallen soul less noble, not by reason of substance, but by reason of the fall. — And in this way the other objections are plain according to this opinion. And this opinion is [the opinion] of great [thinkers].

*Opinion 2, with its conclusion.*
There is also the opinion of other great [thinkers] about this, who say that in the Sacraments there is no *causality* nor any *virtue*, neither *effective* nor *dispositive* toward grace, which is a *quality* or some *absolute* property, but [that it is] *by a certain assistance*. For they say that the divine virtue, which is the cause of grace, assists the Sacrament, and [also] the faith and devotion of the receiver, which disposes to grace. — And they adduce a similitude: that at the word of Elisha, with Naaman washing himself, the divine virtue stood by as *effective* of health, and Naaman's devotion and obedience as *dispositive*; yet there was no causality either in the word of Elisha or in the water of the Jordan. If therefore the Lord had so instituted that at the word of Elisha not only Naaman himself, but [all] others approaching should be cured, and this from a certain pact, such that the divine power should always stand by; that water would be said to cure and heal leprosy and to be the cause of the cure and to have the virtue of curing. So in the Sacraments they say that at the pronouncing of the word the divine virtue stands by the waters and infuses grace and regenerates, while a man subjects himself by the profession of faith and obedience. They say therefore that the Sacraments are said to *have virtue* and are said [to be] a *cause* and are said to *effect* according to the common mode of speaking, on account of the assistance of the divine virtue.

And *if you ask* whether they have any *created* virtue over and above the uncreated one; they answer that, besides the uncreated virtue, one may say that the Sacrament has some virtue, but *by an extended sense of the name of virtue*. For if *virtue* signifies some quality or nature or essence supervening upon the Sacrament, as virtue is *properly* said, then according to them it is not to be said that it has *virtue*; but the name of virtue *is extended* to *some ordination*, so that when something has an efficacious ordination toward something, it is said to have virtue with respect to it. — *And* they put this example: a king ordains that those who have such a token shall have a hundred pounds. After this institution that token does not have any *absolute* property which it would not have had before; yet *toward something* it is *ordained*, toward which it was not before; and because it has an *efficacious ordination*, it is said to *have virtue*, so as to make someone have a hundred marks; and that token is said to be worth a hundred marks, and yet it has nothing more of goodness now than before. — *If therefore you ask* what that virtue in that token is; it will be said that it is not something *absolute*, but *toward something*. — Thus they say that the Sacraments are such tokens instituted by God, that whoever shall have received them in the due manner has such-and-such of grace or has grace for this act; that *ordina-*

*tion*, I say, is in the Sacrament itself, spiritual and conferred upon it by God. And the reasons of it dispose the man so that he may have grace, because it efficaciously ordains toward having and receiving grace.

*The divine pact.* Again they say that, from such a pact, the Lord bound Himself in a certain manner to giving grace to the one receiving the Sacrament; for it binds God in a certain manner to conferring, and therefore it is said to *have virtue* for effecting and also for disposing. And just as the *name of virtue* is extended, so [is] the *word "to effect,"* or *"to dispose,"* because it neither effects nor disposes by *flowing in*, but by *efficaciously ordaining*. And just as these are extended, so also [is] the *name of cause*, because it is not called a cause insofar as it is a *principle of operating*, but insofar as it is an *account of ordaining*.

*Reason consents.* To this position *the piety of faith is not repugnant*, and *reason consents*. — For *reason consents*, because it is very difficult to understand *how* that virtue is given as an *absolute quality*; more difficult, *when* it is given; difficult also to understand *to what* it is given, namely to the word or to the element, which are two things making no one [thing]; difficult also to know *how long* it lasts; difficult likewise it is very [much] to understand *how* it flows in; difficult also, *of what nature* it is in itself; and many such things. But to the other position reason agrees quite easily.

*Faith is not repugnant.* The *piety* too *of faith is not repugnant*. For care must be taken lest, while we give too much to corporeal signs for [their] praise, we subtract honor from the grace that cures and from the soul that receives. — But this opinion neither gives too much nor subtracts anything of due honor. Just as, therefore, royal letters sealed with the king's ring are of great dignity and virtue and value, and are said to be able to do great things and to do them, yet in them there is no *absolute* virtue, but only an *ordination* through the assistance of the royal virtue — which is plain, because, the king being dead, his letters are cared for no more than others, yet they have lost nothing absolute — so it is to be understood in the Sacraments, and so the authorities of the Saints speak according to common usage.

*An incidental question solved.* And the reasons to the opposite are plain. — *And if you ask* upon what the relation is founded, and how it comes about without the donation of a property? it must be said, [it is founded] in the *institutions of signs*; as when a coin becomes an earnest-pledge, nothing is given anew to the coin itself.

*The author's judgment.* Each of these positions seems probable enough; this one, however, seems to me easier to maintain; yet I do not know which is truer, because when we speak of things that belong to the miraculous, we must not adhere too much to reason. We grant therefore that the Sacraments of the new law are a *cause* and *effect* and *dispose*, by an extended sense [of the names], as has been said, and this it is safe to say; but whether they have more, I will neither affirm nor deny. And according to this last way all the questions are plain.

---